[1812 A.D.] redoubt. The column of Davout had, in the meantime, rallied; its second effort drove Bagration from his batteries. What Fain calls a third battle was fought towards evening on the contested points. Finally, the Russians abandoned the field. It is said that, by ordering forward his guard, which he held in reserve, Bonaparte might have changed the Russian retreat into a rout, intercepted and cut up their army. But Bagration had shown the stubbornness of the Russians on such occasions; and Napoleon would not risk his guard, nor advance his reserve when the consequence was doubtful.d "There is in the art of lying a degree to which not all nations can attain," says Capefigue k ; "never could a general of old Europe, driven from his entrenchments and forced to retreat, have dared, when writing to this court, to proclaim himself victor. But Kutusoff, writing after the lost battle, did not hesitate to say that he had won it." In a transport of joy Alexander ordered Te Deums to be sung. He made Kutusoff a field-marshal and loaded him and his family with honours. The losses of the two armies were great; those of the Russians, however, far exceeded those of the French. Possibly the reverse might have been the case, if, after being compelled to evacuate their trenches, they had not returned to try and retake them. It was during this audacious undertaking that the masses of troops, motionless under the thunder of French artillery, experienced the most terrible losses. Of all the battles yet fought by Napoleon the battle of the Moskva was undoubtedly the most bloody. Among the others only two approach it in any degree in the magnificence of the sacrifices by which victory was bought-the battles of Eylau and Wagram. Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, were less costly and had better results.i The battle was won, but dearly. Eight generals fell on the part of the French; the heroic Bagration killed, was a loss as severe to the Russians. The honour of the day fell to Ney. He was created prince of the Moskva, this river, which runs to Moscow, being a short space in the rear of the action; its name sounded better to fame than the Kalocza, on whose banks it was really fought. The night of victory was one of sadness to Napoleon. "Seven or eight hundred prisoners, and a score of broken cannon, were all his trophies won." The discouragement of his army was excessive. We believe, in opposition to Ségur,m that moral despondency, but too well founded, influenced his spirits, not that disease or corpulency benumbed his faculties [yet much might be said in favour of the opposite view]. MOSCOW TAKEN AND BURNED (SEPTEMBER 17TH, 1812) Moscow, however, was won. Kutusoff reluctantly abandoned the hope of defending it. The governor, Rostoptchin, took his measures, if not for excluding the French, at least for rendering the possession useless to them. But Moscow remained, apparently in all its original splendour, when the French entered it on the 14th of September. Napoleon took up his residence at the Kremlin, the ancient palace of the czars. He was not long left in peaceable possession of it. From the first day of occupation, fire had appeared in different quarters. It was either neglected or renewed; but on the 17th the flames, fanned by a strong wind, spread rapidly, and showed themselves masters of the whole city. The Kremlin was surrounded by the fire, its windows burst with heat, and it required all the efforts of the guard to pre [Seeley places the French loss at 30,000, the Russian at nearly 50,000. He accuses Napoleon of showing "unwonted indecision," which he justified by saying that "at 800 leagues from Paris, one must not risk one's last reserve."] [1812 A.D.] serve the quarters of Napoleon. At length, when a way was cleared for him through the burning city, he left it, and established himself at the countryhouse of Petrowskoie, not far from the gates of Moscow.d On the first intelligence of this catastrophe the destruction of Moscow was attributed in Russia to the French themselves, and was not by any means regarded as a crushing blow dealt at Napoleon by Russian patriotism. It is indeed not clear that this event had any decisive influence upon the result of the war. Nor does it seem to have been the deliberate work of the patriotism of Moscow. The beginner of it was one man, Count Rostoptchin, governor of Moscow, who is shown by many public utterances to have brooded for some time over the thought, and is proved to have made preparation for carrying it into effect before leaving the town.1 It is, however, supposed that what was begun by him was completed by a rabble which had no object but plunder, and partly by French soldiers. The immediate effect of it was to deepen the alarm of the Russians, and, when this feeling passed away, to deepen their hatred of the French.e The first object of the expedition over, and Moscow, or its ruins, in the power of the French, what was to be the next aim? Napoleon's instant conception was to march upon St. Petersburg, menace or cut off Wittgenstein, and be reinforced by the army of Macdonald. It was a giant resolve, and required giant efforts. It was the wisest, too, except that of immediate and direct retreat, which had many disadvantages. But, without the concurrence of his chiefs, such an enterprise was impossible. They counselled retiring by a new and circuitous road to the south. And betwixt both opinions, resolve rested in suspense, and neither was prosecuted: this was the most fatal step of all. The French remained at Moscow, waiting, like victims, for the winter to immolate them. A little more courage would have followed the emperor's idea; and if ever Alexander was to be brought to terms, it was by marching towards him. On the contrary, however, Napoleon sent Lauriston with proposals of peace, and vainly awaited in the Kremlin, which had been preserved from the fire, an answer never to return. At length, after a month's lingering and debating and incertitude, Moscow was evacuated by the main body of the French on the 19th of October, a rearguard remaining with orders to blow up the Kremlin. The imperial wagons were laden with trophies, those of the army with spoil, and all the carriages and calèches of Moscow travelled with their captors. It seemed merely a return from a party of pleasure. A month was yet to elapse ere the middle of November, the general period for the frost's setting in. To arrive at Smolensk, and take up winter quarters before that time, seemed feasible and certain. The army of Kutusoff in the meantime, after evacuating Moscow, had turned, still within sight of the burning city, towards the south. Murat had followed it, but was defeated. Napoleon, on leaving Moscow, adopted the original plan proposed by his chief officers, to march first to the important town of Kaluga, and thence by a fresh unwasted road to Smolensk. The French numbered 100,000 men, almost all on foot; artillery and cavalry were without horses; and there was every prospect of being obliged to abandon some, if not the greater part, of the former. THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS The chief motive for choosing this southern road was that it had not the appearance of retreat, so anxious was Napoleon to conceal his failure even [1 This, however, was denied by Admiral Tchitschakoff."] [1812 A.D.] from his own eyes. The Russian general reached Malojaroslavetz in time to oppose the French march. A sanguinary engagement took place between the advanced guard under Prince Eugène and the Russians October 24th; the village, taken and retaken seven times, at length was kept by the French. The French army in three corps now turned their faces to France, and to Smolensk as the nearest rallying-place. They looked there for the support of Victor's fresh corps; but Victor was busied elsewhere. Wittgenstein, reinforced by the ever-swelling levies of Russia, had beaten Gouvion-SaintCyr on the Düna, and taken Vitebsk. This was cutting the retreat off from Vilna, and Tchitschakoff, commanding the army returned from the Turkish war, had received orders to advance from the south, and, by seizing Minsk, cut off the only other practicable road westward. Such were the tidings that saluted Napoleon on his entry into Smolensk. The viceroy Eugène and Ney each led a corps in the rear of Napoleon, and were dreadfully harassed by the Russians, who, now driving their enemies before them, felt the spirit of success animating their previous stubbornness. Not only pursuing, but often anticipating the march of the foe, they hung upon his rear and flank, delayed his flight, by forcing him to turn and fight, whilst clouds of Cossacks swept away the stragglers, or deferring to slay, from a savage spirit of amusement, drove the famished wretches before their spear points as a pastime.1 - Winter, too, set in, that dreaded foe, - this year peculiarly severe and premature. The snow already fell in October; but on the 6th of November it descended, driven like a tourmente of the Alps, with a force, fury, and denseness unknown except in these northern climates. Amidst such weather the progress of the French, more especially of Ney, was a dire combat against the foe, and the elements as pitiless. The army foundered ere it reached even Smolensk, abandoning piecemeal its artillery, its deeply venged plunder, the cross of Ivan, and the other trophies of the Kremlin. Even at that town, where it arrived November 9th, famine still awaited it. The magazines had been devoured. Winter became more fierce, the enemy menacing both in front and rear ; whilst the French numbers, at least its fighting numbers, did not exceed onethird of the army that had evacuated Moscow. This scanty force was now divided into bands, for the sake of procuring some sustenance, and preserving some order. It was actually surrounded by armies. Tchitschakoff stopped its passage by the Minsk road, Wittgenstein by Vitebsk; whilst Kutusoff was behind, and in flank. The marvel is that a single French soldier escaped. Ney was completely intercepted in his march and summoned to surrender in a position where even the "bravest of the brave" might despair. No feat of the twenty years of war surpasses Ney's retreat.d CRUELTY OF THE RUSSIANS The barbarity of the Russians indeed passed belief. In the midst of a cold of thirty degrees, they stripped such of the prisoners as they did not kill, and drove them along by thousands. As most dropped upon the road, their numbers were filled up by the gathering of other fugitives, and columns of [According to Duruy Napoleon had only 50,000 men in the ranks when he returned to Smolensk. He had left Moscow with only 80,000 fighters and 800 cannon, but had a following also of 50,000 workmen, women, and children, and a multitude of carriages. With these the Cossacks played havoc, and in Napoleon's own words "even before the battle of the Moskva the army lost more stragglers every day than if a battle had been fought."] |