PLANS OF NAPOLEON FOR INVASION.

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which I shall have occasion, besides other authorities, to quote documents emanating from himself.

It was pretended by Napoleon that his squadrons, putting to sea simultaneously, should raise the blockades of the ports of Europe, and, after ravaging the British colonies, concentrate in the Channel. In this he certainly pursued a very different system from that which had been adopted by his predecessors. Convinced that the failure of the maritime expeditions of France in her former wars was occasioned by precipitation, he resolved to collect an overpowering force, and not to hazard it in action until he could ensure a favourable result. See Précis, vol. xi., p. 317. "His plan was so good," says his eulogist, “that it ought to have succeeded even at the very last moment." This is a conclusion to which we should not have been led by reading the letters and instructions of Napoleon; on the contrary, knowing, as he did, the force under the command of Nelson and Cornwallis, I cannot admit that he showed any judgment in trusting to the union and resources of his scattered squadrons after months of separation, and in not having as many French three-deck ships under the command of Villeneuve as there were in the British fleet.*

says,

In a letter to his minister of the marine, dated at St. Cloud, 1st May, 1804, Napoleon gives the most positive injunctions for the Brest fleet to be daily under sail; he is discontented with the conduct of the admiral, who, notwithstanding his urgent commands, "had not caused one ship to weigh her anchor in the whole course of the year, in order to facilitate the passage of the flotilla from Audierne bay;" so that, with a very small squadron, the English had been permitted to blockade their fleet. "Whenever the weather will permit," he "let light squadrons be kept constantly under weigh, to harass the enemy, even if they should receive a few broadsides." No excuse would be admitted for the neglect of this order, the execution of which was to keep the British on the alert, and the French in wind, (en haleine.) Napoleon forgot that this exercise was at least as beneficial to us as to them; increasing the local knowledge of our officers, and the practical seamanship of our men. Rewards and promotions were liberally held forth to the most zealous; and, by a letter to Admiral La Touche Treville, dated Malmaison, July 2, 1804, it would appear that a little energy had been instilled into them.

* Fouché, vol. i, p. 333. The author of that work, speaking of the vast schemes of Napoleon, says, "Hélas! il s'abîma dans ses combinaisons maritimes, croyant mouvoir nos divisions navales avec la même précision qu'il mettraient ses armées de terre à manœuvrer devant lui." The instructions to Villeneuve, in the same page, were more easy to dictate than to execute.

To that officer Napoleon writes "that the Rochefort squadron consists of five sail of the line and four frigates, ready for sea; while at Brest there are 20 sail of the line, which are in the constant habit of weighing anchor "to harass the enemy;" that three Dutch ships of the line were blocked up in the Texel, with four frigates, and a convoy of 30 transports, having on board the army of Marmont."

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He adds that "between Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, he had 1,800 gun-vessels, carrying 120,000 troops, and 10,000 horses." Let us only be masters of the Channel six hours, and we shall be masters of the world." Précis, vol. xi., p. 200. "If," continues Napoleon, "you deceive Nelson, he will go to Sicily, to Egypt, or to Ferrol;—if your squadron should get out of the Mediterranean, it will naturally be supposed that you intend to raise the blockade of the last-named place; it will therefore be advisable that you take a circuitous route to reach Rochefort; this will give you 16 sail of the line and 11 frigates: then, without anchoring, or losing one minute, you will either sail round Ireland at a great distance, or get before Boulogne." (We suppose by running up the English Channel.) Our Brest fleet, of 23 sail of the line, will have the army embarked, and by keeping under sail will oblige Cornwallis to remain close to the shores of Britany, in order to prevent their escape." He adds, "It is probable that you will reach Boulogne in the course of September, when the nights will be reasonably long, and the weather not bad for any length. of time."

When, in the autumn of 1804, Bonaparte was at Mayence, he ordered Decrès to prepare three expeditions. One, under Villeneuve, was to embrace two objects: it was to sail from Toulon, consisting of 12 sail of the line, eight frigates, and two brigs, with a body of troops. When in the Atlantic Ocean the admiral was to detach, on a separate expedition, two sail of the line, four frigates, and two brigs, with 1,800 troops, under the command of Brigadier-general Rielle, to take St. Helena; to carry succours to Senegal; retake Goree, and burn or lay under heavy contributions all the British settlements on the coast of Guinea. After having sent off this detachment, he was to proceed in accomplishment of the other object: with nine or ten sail of the line, three frigates, and 5,000 or 6,000 men, he was to repair to Guayana, take on board Victor Hugues, and go to Surinam, of which no doubt he was expected to become

master.

The moment it was known that this fleet had sailed from Toulon, the remaining expedition, consisting of the Rochefort squadron, under Vice-admiral Missiessy, was to sail directly to

Martinique; to take Dominica, St. Lucia, and the Saints, and form a junction with Villeneuve; who, thus reinforced, would lay all the British islands under contribution; take as many prizes as he could; show himself before every roadstead in the Windward Islands; run down to the city of St. Domingo, in which a few French troops still remained, reinforce them with 1,200 or 1,500 men; then, returning to Europe, raise the blockade of Ferrol, release the five sail of the line in that port, and thus, with a fleet of 20 sail of the line, proceed to Rochefort; then join the Brest fleet, and with the whole proceed to Boulogne.

Villaret, who commanded the fleet on the 1st of June, 1794, and at St. Domingo in 1802, was appointed governor of Martinique; Victor Hugues of Surinam; and, as if success were certain, governors were also appointed to Demerara, Berbice, and Cayenne.

The instructions respecting a fourth expedition are fully detailed in a letter from Napoleon to Decrès, dated Mayence, September 29, 1804, Précis, vol. xi., p. 212. This was to be undertaken by Gantheaume, with the Brest fleet. The Océan, of 120 guns, under repair at that port, was to have been finished by torchlight, to assist in conveying 18,000 men, 3,000 of whom were to be cavalry, artillery, and engineers. Sailing from Brest they were to steer well to the westward of Ireland, and then, turning suddenly to the east, enter Loch Swilly, as if coming from Newfoundland. Thirty-six hours after having anchored they were to sail again, leaving the brigs and all the transports, with the Volontaire frigate, whose guns were to serve for the army, or to be placed in battery, or otherwise, as might be most advisable. The landing in Ireland, if it could not be immediately effected, was to have been abandoned; no time was to be lost, and the squadron was to steer for Cherbourg, to gain intelligence of the army at Boulogne, and escort the flotilla. If, on reaching this last place, the admiral should find the winds so unfavourable as to force him to pass the Straits of Dover, he was to proceed to the Texel, where he would find seven Dutch ships of the line, and 27,000 men embarked: these he was to take under his convoy, and proceed with them to Ireland. "One or the other of these operations," says Napoleon, "must succeed;" and then, whether he had 30,000 or 40,000 men in Ireland, whether he was himself in England or Ireland, the victory was his. "Le gain de la guerre est à nous." "The English, attacked at the same time in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, unaccustomed to such visitations, will be made sensible of their own weakness." Napoleon supposed, and with great reason, that, as soon as Admiral Cornwallis heard of the sailing of Gantheaume from

VOL. 11.

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Brest, he would steer for Ireland, and, not finding him there, that he would return to Brest and watch for him. For this reason Gantheaume was directed, after landing his troops, to go round the north of Scotland, and repair to the Texel. At the time of his departure from Brest 120,000 men were to be embarked at Boulogne, and 25,000 at the Texel. These were to continue embarked as long as the expedition to Ireland lasted. The sailing of the Toulon and Rochefort divisions was to precede that of Brest for Ireland, as it was calculated that the 20 sail of the line, of which those squadrons were composed, would oblige us to send 30 sail in pursuit of them; and the 10,000 or 12,000 troops on board of them would cause us also to detach strong reinforcements to our vulnerable points. Great indeed is the difference between an attacking and a defensive enemy; yet with so many contingencies it was impossible that the plans of Napoleon should succeed without a miracle.

In consequence of our seizure of the Spanish frigates in October, 1804, the King of Spain was very easily induced to join Napoleon in his hostility to England. A force of 30 sail of the line in the ports of the Peninsula, with six months' provisions and 5,000 troops, would appear formidable in a French or English newspaper, but nowhere else. I have seen Spanish line-of-battle ships 24 hours unmooring; as many minutes are sufficient for a well-manned British ship to perform the same operation. When, on any grand ceremony, they found it necessary to cross their top-gallant yards in harbour, they began the day before; we cross ours in one minute from the deck. as enemies, the Spaniards have rarely deserved our notice. Gravina took the command of the Spanish fleet at Cadiz; Grandelana the squadron at Ferrol. Gibraltar was threatened by a Spanish army encamped at St. Roque, under the command of Valdez; while O'Farril had another, on paper, of 25,000 men on the frontiers of Portugal, to enforce the equivocal neutrality of that power.

But,

There is an inextricable confusion and want of arrangement in the plans of Napoleon, and one is led to suppose that he wished to put England on her guard against his enterprise, merely to furnish him with excuses for not undertaking it. It is clear that, if he seriously meditated the invasion of England, he began his work in a manner of all others the least likely to ensure success. He had so long threatened it, that he felt his honour was concerned in the execution: yet when the season approached he was evidently afraid to risk his crown, his life, and his reputation as a soldier, by embarking on an element which fatal experience had often told him was not favourable to the genius of France.

DISAPPOINTMENT OF NAPOLEON.

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Why did he not, when his forces in the spring of 1805 were perfectly prepared, assemble them all in the Channel? His fleet from Toulon, which he intended should coast along the shores of Europe, and gather the squadrons, till the united fleet at Brest comprised 80 sail of the line, never followed up the attempt further than to raise the blockade of Cadiz. What was the capture or pillage of a small island in the West Indies, compared to the mighty plans of which he had so loudly boasted? Was it likely that his fleet, after a six-months' campaign in that pestilential climate, would have been better prepared for the execution of his project than they were at their first sailing out of port? Where was the probability that his scattered squadrons (admitting their escape from our pursuit) would join the appointed rendezvous at Boulogne, after a cruise of six months, worn out with disease-in want of every thing, even perhaps ammunition-while so many events, of which his admirals must have been ignorant, might in their absence have changed the whole face of Europe? Napoleon, who had led his legions to the water-side, trembled at the sight of that shore, the possession of which had been the object of his fondest hopes, the height of his ambition. Having advanced so far, he knew not how to retreat with honour, and was, no doubt, happy to hear that Villeneuve had returned to Ferrol; and thus, after venting his peevish expression, "Quel Amiral!" he was glad enough of the non-appearance of his fleet, which he pretended had rendered the undertaking impracticable.* The armaments which he had sent to different parts of the world returned without effecting any thing, if we except the plunder of Rousseau, in Dominica, by Missiessy and General La Grange. Napoleon, affecting disappointment, turned away from the ocean, and led his army to the plains of Jena and Austerlitz. Missiessy, a gallant and enterprising officer, whether enjoined to return quickly, or not supposing himself strong enough, made no systematic attack to reduce Dominica, and was forced to be contented with a predatory warfare. Villeneuve, anxious to avoid the victorious Nelson, fled through the West Indies, and had almost reached his port, when intercepted and brought to action by the brave and unfortunate Sir Robert Calder.

Early in March Sir Robert was on his station near Cape Prior, with only seven ail of the line, soon after augmented to nine: nor was it till the 14th of July that he was reinforced by the junction of Rear-admiral Stirling, with six sail of the line,

The Duc d'Otrante, in his Memoirs, vol. i., p. 338, says, "The invasion of Bavaria by Austria was a fortunate diverson for Napoleon, saving at once his maritime honour (he never had any), and preserving him, to all appearance, from a disaster which might have ruined both him and his rising empire."