avoid such blunders in translating, when one aims at being literal, without attending to the different geniuses of different tongues. In original performances, they are more rarely to be met with, being just such improprieties as none but novices in the language are apt to fall into.

A second species of this figure is when words which, from their etymology, appear to be applicable solely to one kind of thing, come afterward to be applied to another, which is nearly related in its nature or design, but with which, nevertheless, the analysis of the word will not accord. This is sometimes not only excusable from necessity, as when the language doth not furnish a proper term, but sometimes also receives the sanction of general use; and in this case, whatever it was originally, it becomes proper. I shall give some examples of this in our own tongue. As it is probable that among our Saxon ancestors candle-holders were solely made of wood, they were properly denominated candlesticks; afterward, when, through an increase of wealth and luxury, such utensils were made of metal, the old name was nevertheless retained, and at first, by a catachresis, applied to these. But. the application is now ratified, and the word appropriated by custom. The name inkhorn, denoting a portable case for holding ink, probably at first made only of horn, is a similar instance. In like manner, the word parricide in English, like parricida in Latin, at first perhaps signified only the murderer of his father, but hath come to be equally applied to him who murders his mother, his brother, or his sister. In all these instances there was an excuse at first from necessity, the language not affording words strictly proper; but now, having obtained the universal suffrage, which in every country gives law to language, they need no excuse. There is an in

stance of a catachresis of this kind in our translation of the Bible, which (not being supported by the plea of necessity) ought to be considered as a glaring impropriety: "He made the laver of brass, and the foot of it of brass, of the looking-glasses of the women."* It is, however, probable that the word mirror was not in such common use then as it is now. There are a few phrases which come under the same denomination, and which, though favoured by custom, being quite unnecessary, deserve to be exploded. Such, among others, are the following: the workmanship of God for the work of God; a man-of-war for a ship of war; and a merchantman for a trading vessel. The absurdity in the last two instances is commonly augmented by the words connected in the sequel, in which, by the application of the pronouns she and her, we are made to understand that the man spoken of is a female. 1 think this gibberish ought to be left entirely to mariners, among whom, I suppose, it hath originated.

* Exod., xxxviii., 8.

The only remaining species of the catachresis which I can recollect at present is no other than a far-fetched and incongruous metaphor. Nothing can more justly be reduced under this class than the application of the attributes of one cor poreal sense to the objects of another; as if we should say of a voice that it is beautiful to the ear, or of a face that it is melodious to the eye. Nothing succeeds better, as hath been observed already, than metaphors taken from the objects of sensation, to denote the objects of pure intellection; yet nothing generally succeeds worse than metaphors that are only transferred from sense to sense. I say generally, because such is the omnipotence of fashion in respect of language that it is capable of conciliating us even to such applications. Thus the term sweet belongs properly to the sense of tasting alone; yet it hath been transferred to the sense of smelling, of hearing, and of seeing. We say a sweet scent, sweet melody, a sweet prospect. The word soft, in like manner, belonged originally to the sense of touching, and to it only; yet it hath been applied metaphorically, and (as we learn by the event) successfully, to other senses. Thus we talk of a soft whisper, and Pope speaks of the soft-eyed virgin. Customary applications at length become proper, though they do not exhibit the primitive sense. For this reason, several of the aforesaid instances are not to be considered at present as examples of the catachresis. Sometimes, however, even a new catachresis of the last-mentioned kind, which is the most hazardous, will please the most fastidious critic. Take the following example from Young:

"Her voice is but the shadow of a sound."*

The reason of our approbation in this case is, if I mistake not, that an illusion or comparison is suggested which exhibits more strongly the author's meaning than it could have been exhibited by any other words in the same compass. The sentiment is, that the same relation which the shadow bears to the substance of which it is the shadow, the lady's voice bears to an ordinary sound.

Having now discussed what was proposed here concerning tropes, I shall conclude with observing that, in this discussion, there hath been occasion, as it were, incidentally to discover, that they are so far from being the inventions of art, that, on the contrary, they result from the original and essential principles of the human mind; that, accordingly, they are the same, upon the main, in all nations, barbarous and civilized; that the simplest and most ancient tongues do most abound with them, the natural effect of improvement in science and language, which commonly go together, being to regulate the fancy and to restrain the passions; that the sole * Universal Passion. FF

business of art in this subject is to range the several tropes and figures into classes, to distinguish them by names, and to trace the principles in the mind which gave them birth.

The first, indeed, or, rather, the only people upon the earth who have thought of classing under proper appellations the numerous tropes and figures of elocution, common to all languages, were the Greeks. The Latins, and all modern nations, have in this particular only borrowed from them, adopting the very names they used. But as to the tracing of those figures to the springs in human nature from which they flow, extremely little hath as yet been attempted. Nay, the names that have been given are but few, and, by consequence, very generical. Each class, the metaphor and the metonymy in particular, is capable of being divided into several tribes, to which no names have yet been assigned.

It was affirmed that the tropes and figures of eloquence are found to be the same, upon the main, in all ages and nations. The words upon the main were added, because, though the most and the principal of them are entirely the same, there are a few which presuppose a certain refinement of thought not natural to a rude and illiterate people. Such, in particular, is that species of the metonymy, the concrete for the abstract, and possibly some others. We shall afterward, perhaps, have occasion to remark, that the modern improvements in ridicule have given rise to some which cannot properly be ranged under any of the classes above mentioned, to which, therefore, no name hath as yet been appropriated, and of which I am not sure whether antiquity can furnish us with an example.

SECTION III.

WORDS CONSIDERED AS SOUNDS.

WHEN I entered on the consideration of vivacity as depending on the choice of words, I observed that the words may be either proper terms or rhetorical tropes; and whether the one or the other, they may be regarded not only as signs, but as sounds, and, consequently, as capable, in certain cases, of bearing, in some degree, a natural resemblance or affinity to the things signified. The first two articles, proper terms and rhetorical tropes, I have discussed already, regarding only the sense and application of the words, whether used literally or figuratively. It remains now to consider them in regard to the sound, and the affinity to the subject of which the sound is susceptible. When, as Pope expresseth it, "the sound is made an echo to the sense,' ,"* there is added, in a certain degree, to the association arising from custom, the influence of resemblance between the signs and the things signified, and * Essay on Criticism.

this doubtless tends to strengthen the impression made by the discourse. This subject, I acknowledge, hath been very much canvassed by critics; I shall therefore be the briefer in my remarks, confining myself chiefly to the two following points. First, I shall inquire what kinds of things language is capable of imitating by its sound, and in what degree it is capable; secondly, what rank ought to be assigned to this species of excellence, and in what cases it ought to be attempted.

PART I. What are Articulate Sounds capable of Imitating, and in what Degree?

First, I shall inquire what kinds of things language is capable of imitating by its sound, and in what degree it is capable.

And here it is natural to think that the imitative power of language must be greatest when the subject itself is things audible. One sound may surely have a greater resemblance to another sound than it can have to anything of a different nature. In the description, therefore, of the terrible thunder, whirlwind, and tempest, or of the cooling zephyr and the gentle gale, or of any other thing that is sonorous, the imitation that may be made by the sound of the description will certainly be more perfect than can well be expected in what concerns things purely intelligible, or visible, or tangible. Yet even here the resemblance, if we consider it abstractly, is very faint.

The human voice is doubtless capable of imitating, to a considerable degree of exactness, almost any sound whatever. But our present inquiry is solely about what may be imitated by articulate sounds, for articulation greatly confines the natural powers of the voice; neither do we inquire what an extraordinary pronunciation may effectuate, but what power in this respect the letters of the alphabet have when combined into syllables, and these into words, and these again into sentences, uttered audibly, indeed, and distinctly, but without any uncommon effort. Nay, the orator, in this species of imitation, is still more limited. He is not at liberty to select whatever articulate sounds he can find to be fittest for imitating those concerning which he is discoursing. That he may be understood, he is under a necessity of confining himself to such sounds as are rendered by use the signs of the things he would suggest by them. If there be a variety of these signs, which commonly cannot be great, he hath some scope for selection, but not otherwise. Yet so remote is the resemblance here at best, that in no language, ancient or modern, are the meanings of any words, except, perhaps, those expressing the cries of some animals, discoverable, on the bare hearing, to one who doth not understand the language.

Indeed, when the subject is articulate sound, the speaker or the writer may do more than produce a resemblance; he may even render the expression an example of that which he affirms. Of this kind precisely are the last three lines of the following quotation from Pope :

"These equal syllables alone require,

Though oft the ear the open vowels tire,
While expletives their feeble aid do join,
And ten low words oft creep in one dull line.”*

But this manner, which, it must be owned, hath a very good effect in enlivening the expression, is not imitation, though it hath sometimes been mistaken for it, or, rather, confounded with it.

As to sounds inarticulate, a proper imitation of them hath been attempted in the same piece, in the subsequent lines, and with tolerable success, at least in the concluding couplet : "Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,

And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,

The hoarse rough verse should like the torrent roar."+

An attempt of the same kind of conformity of the sound to the sense is perhaps but too discernible in the following quotation from the same author:

"O'er all the dreary coasts!

Dreadful gleams,
Dismal screams,
Fires that glow,

Shrieks of wo,

Sullen moans,

Hollow groans,

And cries of injured ghosts."‡

Milton's description of the opening of hell-gates ought not here to be overlooked :

"On a sudden open fly,

With impetuous recoil and jarring sound,

Th' infernal doors, and on their hinges grate
Harsh thunder-"§

The same author has, in another performance, given an excellent specimen in this way:

"Grate on their scrannel pipes of wretched straw."||

He succeeds the better here, that what he says is evidently accompanied with design of exciting contempt. This induceth us to make allowance for his leaving the beaten road in search of epithets. In this passage of the Odyssey,

Essay on Criticism.
Ode on St. Cecilia's Day.

+ Ibid.

Lycidas. An imitation of a line of Virgil, Ecl. iii.:

46

Paradise Lost, b. fi.

Stridenti miserum stipula disperdere carmen."