vacity, by reason of the striking resemblance both in the appearance of the things signified and in their use. The last, however, is the best, for a reason which will be given in the next remark. But, in general, it may be asserted that, in the representation of things sensible, there is less occasion for this trope; accordingly, this application of it is now almost entirely left to the poets. On the contrary, if we critically examine any language, ancient or modern, and trace its several terms and phrases to their source, we shall find it hold invariably, that all the words made use of to denote spiritual and intellectual things are in their origin metaphors, taken from the objects of sense. This shows evidently that the latter have made the earliest impressions; have, by consequence, first obtained names in every tongue; and are still, as it were, more present with us, and strike the imagination more forcibly than the former. It may be said, that if this observation be true, it is to no purpose to mention, as a method of enlivening the diction, the representing of intelligible things by sensible images, since it is impossible by language to represent them otherwise. To this I answer, that the words of which I am speaking I call metaphors in their origin; notwithstanding which, they may be at present, agreeably to what was formerly observed, proper terms. When speaking of tropes in general, it was remarked that many words, which to a grammatical eye appear metaphors, are in the rhetorician's estimate no metaphors at all. The ground of this difference is, that the grammarian and the rhetorician try the words by very different tests. The touchstone of the former is etymology, that of the latter is present use. The former peruseth a page, and perhaps finds not in the whole ten words that are not metaphorical; the latter examines the same page, and doth not discover in it a single metaphor. What critic, for example, would ever think of applying this appellation to terms such as thesespirit, evidence, understanding, reflection? or what etymologist would not acknowledge that to this trope solely these terms had owed their birth? But I proceed to give examples of vivacity by true rhetorical metaphors, wherein things sensible are brought to signify things intelligible. Of this the following is one from Pope : "At length Erasmus, that great injured name (The glory of the priesthood and the shame!), Stemm'd the wild torrent of a barbarous age, And drove those holy Vandals off the stage." Here the almost irresistible influence of general manners, which is an object purely of the understanding, is very appositely and vivaciously represented by a torrent, an object both of the sight and of the feeling. By the same vivid kind of metaphor, light is used for knowledge, bridle for restraint; we speak of burning with zeal, being inflamed with anger, and having a rooted prejudice. But metaphor is not the only trope which can in this way confer vivacity; metonymy frequently, in a similar manner, promotes the same end. One very common species of the metonymy is when the badge is put for the office, and this invariably exhibits a sensible in lieu of an intelligible object. Thus we say the mitre for the priesthood, the crown for the royalty; for the military occupation we say the sword; and for the literary professions, those especially of theology, law, and physic, the common expression is the gown. Often, also, in those metonymies wherein the cause is put for the effect, and contrariwise in those wherein the effect is put for the cause, we have the same thing exemplified, a sensible object presented to the mind instead of an intelligible. Of the former, the cause for the effect, the following lines of Dryden may serve as an illustration: ""Tis all thy business, business how to shun, To bask thy naked body in the sun."* Though the rhyme had permitted the change, the word sunshine instead of the sun would have rendered the expression weaker. The luminary itself is not only a nobler and distincter, but a more immediate object to the imagination than its effulgence, which, though in some respects sensible as well as the other, is in some respect merely intelligible, it not being perceived directly no more than the air, but discovered by reflection from the things which it enlightens. Accordingly, we ascribe to it neither magnitude nor figure, and scarce, with propriety, even colour. As an exemplification of the latter, the effect, or something consequential for the cause, or, at least, the implement for the motive of using it, these words of Scripture will serve: "The sword without, and terror within," where the term sword, which presents a particular and perceivable image to the fancy, must be more picturesque than the word war, which conveys an idea that is vague and only conceivable, not being otherwise sensible but by its consequences. 4. THINGS ANIMATE FOR THINGS LIFELESS. A fourth way in which tropes may promote vivacity is when things sensitive are presented to the fancy instead of things lifeless; or, which is nearly the same, when life, perception, activity, design, passion, or any property of sentient beings, is by means of the trope attributed to things inanimate. It is not more evident that the imagination is more strongly affected by things sensible than by things intelligible, than it is evident that things animate awaken greater atten† Deut., xxxii., 25. * Dryden's Persius. tion, and make a stronger impression on the mind, than things senseless. It is for this reason that the quality of which I am treating hath come to be termed vivacity, or liveliness of style. In exemplifying what hath been now advanced, I shall proceed in the method which I took in the former article, and begin with metaphor. By a metaphor of this kind, a literary performance hath been styled the offspring of the brain; by it a state or government in its first stage is represented as a child in these lines of Dryden : "When empire in its childhood first appears, A watchful fate o'ersees its tender years." In the last two examples we have things lifeless exhibited by things animate. In the following, wherein the effect is much the same, sense, feeling, and affection are ascribed metaphorically to inanimate matter. Thomson, describing the influence of the sunbeams upon the snow in the valley, thus vividly and beautifully expresseth himself: 66 66 Perhaps the vale Relents a while to the reflected ray."+ 76 Every hedge," says the Tatler, was conscious of more than what the representations of enamoured swains admit of." Who sees not how much of their energy these quotations owe to the two words relents and conscious? I shall only add, that it is the same kind of metaphor which hath brought into use such expressions as the following: a happy period, a learned age, the thirsty ground, a melancholy disaster. There are several sorts of the metonymy which answer the same purpose. The first I shall mention is that wherein the inventor is made to denote the invention-Ceres, for instance, to denote bread, Bacchus wine, Mars war, or any of the pagan deities to denote that in which he is specially interested, as Neptune the sea, Pluto hell, Pallas wisdom, and Venus the amorous affection. It must be owned, that as this kind seems even by the ancients to have been confined to the discoveries, attributes, or dominions ascribed in their mythology to the gods, it is of little or no use to us moderns. Another tribe of metonymies, which exhibits things living for things lifeless, is when the possessor is substituted for his possessions. Of this we have an example in the Gospel : "Wo unto you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites, for ye devour the families of widows." Here the word families is used † Winter. Tatler, No. 7. * Almanzor. Even when such tropes occur in ancient authors, they can scarcely be translated into any modern tongue, as was hinted in Part First, in regard to the phrase "Vario Marte pugnatum est.' Another example of the same thing, "Sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus." for their means of subsistence.* Like to this is an expression in Balaam's prophecy concerning Israel: "He shall eat up the nations his enemies."t A third tribe of metonymies, which often presents us with animate instead of inanimate objects, is when the concrete is made to signify the abstract; as, the fool, used for folly; the knave, for knavery; the philosopher, for philosophy. I shall illustrate this by some examples. Dryden hath given us one of this kind that is truly excellent. "The slavering cudden propp'd upon the staff, The whole picture is striking. The proper words, every one of them, are remarkably graphical, as well as the metonymy with which the passage concludes. Another from the same hand : "Who follow next a double danger bring, As David himself was king, both the proper name and the * Matt., xxiii., 14. The noun oikias may be rendered either families or houses. The last, though used by our translators, hath here a double disadvantage. First, it is a trope formed upon a trope (which rarely hath a good effect), the house for the family, the thing containing for the thing contained, and the family for their means of living; secondly, ideas are introduced which are incompatible. There is nothing improper in speaking of a person or family being devoured; but to talk of devouring a house is absurd. It may be destroyed, demolished, undermined, but not devoured. + Deut., xxiv., 8. Cymon and Iphigenia. Absalom and Achitophel. Annotations in Johan. Intr. in particular the care of Mary his mother. The following sentiment of Swift is somewhat similar: "I do the most that friendship can; I hate the viceroy, love the man." The viceroy for the viceroyalty. I shall only add two examples more in this way: the first is from Addison, who, speaking of Tallard when taken prisoner by the allies, says, "An English muse is touch'd with generous wo, And in th' unhappy man forgets the foe."* The foe, that is, his state of hostility with regard to us at the time. For the second I shall again recur to Dryden: "A tyrant's power in rigour is express'd, The father yearns in the true prince's breast." The father to denote fatherly affection, or the disposition of a father. In fine, it may be justly affirmed of the whole class of tropes, that as metaphor in general hath been termed an allegory in epitome, such metaphor and metonymies as present us with things animate in the room of things lifeless are prosopopeias in miniature. But it will be proper here to obviate an objection against the last-mentioned species of metonymy, an objection which seems to arise from what hath been advanced above. Is it possible, may one say, that the concrete put for the abstract should render the expression livelier, and that the abstract put for the concrete should do the same? Is it not more natural to conclude that, if one of these tropes serves to invigorate the style, the reverse must doubtless serve to flatten it? But this apparent inconsistency will vanish on a nearer inspection. It ought to be remembered, that the cases are comparatively few in which either trope will answer better than the proper term, and the few which suit the one method, and the few which suit the other, are totally different in their nature. To affirm that in one identical case methods quite opposite would produce the same effect, might, with some appearance of reason, be charged with inconsistency; but that in cases not identical, nor even similar, contrary methods might be necessary for effecting the same purpose, is nowise inconsistent. But possibly the objector will argue on the principles themselves severally considered, from which, according to the doctrine now explained, the efficacy of the tropes ariseth: "If," says he, "the abstract for the concrete confers vivacity on the expression, by concentrating the whole attention on that particular with which the subject is most intimately connected, doth it not lose as much on the other hand, by presenting us with a quality instead of a person, an intelligible for a sensible, an inanimate for a living object?" If this were the effect, the objection would be un * Campaign. |