My next instance shall be in the conjunctions: "They were both much more ancient among the Persians than Zoroaster or Zerdusht."* The or here is equivocal. It serves either as a copulative to synonymous words, or as a disjunctive of different things. If, therefore, the reader should not know that Zoroaster and Zerdusht mean the same person, he will mistake the sense. In coupling appellatives, there is not the same hazard, it being generally manifest to those who know the language whether the words coupled have the same signification. If, nevertheless, in any case it should be doubtful, an attention to the ensuing rules may have its utility. If the first noun follows an article or a preposition, or both, the article or the preposition, or both, should be repeated before the second, when the two nouns are intended to denote different things, and should not be repeated when they are intended to denote the same thing. If there be neither article nor preposition before the first, and if it be the intention of the writer to use the particle or disjunctively, let the first noun be preceded by either, which will infallibly ascertain the meaning. On the contrary, if, in such a dubious case, it be his design to use the particle as a copulative to synonymous words, the piece will rarely sustain a material injury by his omitting both the conjunction and the synonyma. The following is an example in the pronouns : "She united the great body of the people in her and their common interest." The word her may be either the possessive pronoun, or the accusative case of the personal pronoun. A very small alteration in the order totally removes the doubt. Say, "in their and her common interest." The word her, thus connected, can be only the possessive, as the author doubtless intended it should be, in the passage quoted. An example in substantives: "Your majesty has lost all hopes of any future excises by their consumption." The word consumption has both an active sense and a passive. It means either the act of consuming, or the state of being consumed. Clearly thus: "Your majesty has lost all hopes of levying any future excises on what they shall consume." In adjectives: "As for such animals as are mortal or noxious, we have a right to destroy them." Here the false sense is suggested more readily than the true. The word mortal, therefore, in this sentence, might justly be considered as improper; for though it sometimes means destructive or causing death, it is then almost invariably joined with some noun expressive of hurt or danger. Thus we say a mortal poison, a mortal wound, a mortal disease, or a mortal enemy; but Bol. Subst. of Letters to M. de Pouilly. Guardian, No. 52. + Idea of a Patriot King. Guardian, No. 61. the phrases mortal creature, mortal animal, or mortal man, are always understood to imply creature, animal, or man, liable to death. In verbs: "The next refuge was to say, it was overlooked by one man, and many passages wholly written by another."* The word overlooked sometimes signifies revised and sometimes neglected. As it seems to be in the former sense that this participle is used here, the word revised ought to have been preferred. Another instance in verbs: "I have furnished the house exactly according to your fancy, or, if you please, my own; for I have long since learned to like nothing but what you do." The word do in this passage may be either the auxiliary, or, as it might be termed, the supplementary verb, and be intended only to supersede the repetition of the verb like; or it may be the simple active verb, which answers to the Latin facere, and the French faire. In the next quotation the homonymous term may be either an adjective or an adverb, and admits a different sense in each acceptation: "Not only Jesuits can equivocate."‡ If the word only is here an adverb, the sense is, "To equivocate is not the only thing that Jesuits can do." This interpretation, though not the author's meaning, suits the construction. A very small alteration in the order gives a proper and unequivocal, though a prosaic expression of this sense: "Jesuits can not only equivocate." Again, if the word only is here an adjective (and this, doubtless, is the author's intention), the sense is, "Jesuits are not the only persons who can equivocate." But this interpretation suits ill the composition of the sentence. The only other instance of this error in single words I shall produce, is one in which, on the first glance, there appears room to doubt whether a particular term ought to be understood literally or metaphorically. The word handled in the following passage will illustrate what I mean: "Thus much I thought fit to premise before I resume the subject, which I have already handled-I mean, the naked bosoms of our British ladies." Sometimes, indeed, a thing like this may be said archly and of design, in which case it falls not under this animadversion. It was remarked above, that there are not only equivocal words in our language, but equivocal phrases. Not the least and not the smallest are of this kind. They are sometimes made to imply not any; as though one should say, not even the least, not so much as the smallest; and sometimes, again, to signify a very great, as though it were expressed in this manner, far from being the least or smallest. Thus they are sus * Spect., No. 19. Dryden's Hind and Panther. † Spect., No. 627. ceptible of two significations that are not only different, but contrary. We have an instance in the following passage: "Your character of universal guardian, joined to the concern you ought to have for the cause of virtue and religion, assure me you will not think that clergymen, when injured, have the least right to your protection."* This sentence hath also the disadvantage taken notice of in some of the preceding quotations, that the sense not intended by the writer occurs to the reader much more readily than the author's real meaning. Nothing less than is another phrase which, like the two former, is susceptible of opposite interpretations. Thus, "He aimed at nothing less than the crown," may denote either, "Nothing was less aimed at by him than the crown," or 66 Nothing inferior to the crown could satisfy his ambition." All such phrases ought to be totally laid aside. The expression will have mercy is equivocal in the following passage of the vulgar translation of the Bible: "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." The expression commonly denotes "I will exercise mercy;" whereas it is in this place employed to signify "I require others to exercise it." The sentiment, therefore, ought to have been rendered here, as we find it expressed in the prophetical book alluded to, "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice." When the phrase in question happens to be followed by the preposition on or upon before the object, there is nothing equivocal in it, the sense being ascertained by the connexion. So much for equivocal words and phrases. PART II. Ambiguity. I come now to consider that species of double meaning which ariseth, not from the use of equivocal terms, but solely from the construction, and which I therefore distinguish by the name of ambiguity. This, of all the faults against perspicuity, it is in all languages the most difficult to avoid. There is not one of the parts of speech which may not be so placed as that, agreeably to the rules of grammar, it may be construed with different parts of the sentence, and, by consequence, made to exhibit different senses. Besides, a writer intent upon his subject is less apt to advert to those imperfections in his style which occasion ambiguity than to any other. As no term or phrase he employs doth of itself suggest the false meaning, a manner of construing his words different from that which is expressive of his sentiment will not so readily occur to his thoughts; and yet this erroneous manner of construing them may be the most obvious to the reader. I shall give examples of ambiguities in most of the parts of speech, beginning with the pronouns. Guardian, No. 80 + Matt., ix., 13 Hos., vi., 6. As this signification of the pronouns (which by themselves express only some relation) is ascertained merely by the antecedent to which they refer, the greatest care must be taken, if we would express ourselves perspicuously, that the reference be unquestionable. Yet the greatest care on this article will not always be effectual. There are no rules which either have been, or, I suspect, can be devised in any language, that will in all circumstances fix the relations of the pronouns in such a manner as to prevent ambiguity altogether. I shall instance first the pronoun who, begging that the reader will observe its application in the two following sentences: "Solomon, the son of David, who built the temple of Jerusalem, was the richest monarch that ever reigned over the people of God;" and "Solomon, the son of David, who was persecuted by Saul, was the richest monarch-" In these two sentences, the who is similarly situated; yet in the former it relates to the person first mentioned, in the latter, to the second. But this relation to the one or to the other it would be impossible for any reader to discover who had not some previous knowledge of the history of those kings. In such cases, therefore, it is better to give another turn to the sentence. Instead of the first, one might say, Solomon, the son of David, and the builder of the temple of Jerusalem, was the richest monarch." The conjunction and makes the following words relate entirely to Solomon, as nothing had been affirmed concerning David. It is more difficult to avoid the ambiguity in the other instance, without adopting some circumlocution that will flatten the expression. In the style that prevailed in this island about two centuries ago, they would have escaped the ambiguous construction in some such way as this: "Solomon, the son of David, even of him whom Saul persecuted, was the richest-" But this phraseology has to modern ears I know not what air of formality, 66 that renders it intolerable. Better thus: " Solomon, whoseé father David was persecuted by Saul, was the richest-" The following quotation exhibits a triple sense, arising from the same cause, the indeterminate use of the relative: "Such were the centaurs of Ixion's race, Who a bright cloud for Juno did embrace."* Was it the centaurs, or Ixion, or his race, that embraced the cloud? I cannot help observing farther on this passage, that the relative ought grammatically, for a reason to be assigned afterward, rather to refer to centaurs than to either of the other two, and least of all to Ixion, to which it was intended to refer.t * Benham's Progress of Learning. t Let it not be imagined that in this particular our tongue has the disadvantage of other languages. The same difficulty, as far as my acquaintance with them reaches, affects them all, and even some modern tongues in But there is often an ambiguity in the relatives who, which, that, whose, and whom, even when there can be no doubt in regard to the antecedent. This arises from the different ways wherein the latter is affected by the former. To express myself in the language of grammarians, these pronouns are sometimes explicative, sometimes determinative. They are explicative when they serve merely for the illustration of the subject, by pointing out either some property or some circumstance belonging to it, leaving it, however, to be understood in its full extent. Of this kind are the following examples: "Man, who is born of woman, is of few days and full of trouble"-"Godliness, which with contentment is great gain, has the promise both of the present life and of the future." The clause "who is born of woman," in the first example, and "which with contentment is great gain," in the second, point to certain properties in the antecedents, but do not restrain their signification. For, should we omit these clauses altogether, we could say with equal truth, "Man is of few days and full of trouble"- "Godliness has the promise both of the present life and of the future." On the other hand, these pronouns are determinative when they are employed to limit the import of the antecedent, as in these instances: "The man that endureth to the end shall be saved""The remorse which issues in reformation is true repentance." Each of the relatives here confines the signification of its antecedent to such only as are possessed of the qualification mentioned. For it is not affirmed of every man that he shall be saved, nor of all remorse that it is true repentance. From comparing the above examples, it may be fairly collected, that with us the definite article is of great use for discriminating the explicative sense from the determinative. In the first case it is rarely used, in the second it ought never to be omitted, unless when something still more definitive, such as a demonstrative pronoun, supplies its place.* The a higher degree than ours. In English, one is never at a loss to discover whether the reference be to persons or to things. In French and Italian the expression is often ambiguous in this respect also. In a French devotional book I find this pious admonition: "Conservez-vous dans l'amour de Dieu, qui peut vous garantir de toute chute." I ask whether the antecedent here be l'amour or Dieu, since the relative qui is of such extensive import as to be applicable to either. The expression would be equally ambiguous in Italian: "Conservatevi nell' amor di Dio, che vi puo conservare senza intoppo." In English, according to the present use, there would be no ambiguity in the expression. If the author meant to ascribe this energy to the devout affection itself, he would say, "Keep yourselves in the love of God, which can preserve you from falling;" if to God, the great object of our love, he would say, "who can preserve you." This convenient distinction was not, however, uniformly observed with us till about the middle of the last century. In this respect the articles are more subservient to perspicuity in our tongue than in many others. In French, a writer must give the article indiscriminately in all the instances above specified. Thus, "L'homme, qui |