Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

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Cambridge University Press, 27.03.2003 - 413 Seiten
Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.
 

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Inhalt

Economics
1
II Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly
9
III Further Topics
21
Law and Policy
27
I Some Interpretation Issues
28
II Enacting the Antitrust Laws
30
III What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do?
40
Enforcement
43
III Predatory Pricing
212
IV Conclusion
228
Power
230
II Determinants of Market Power
235
Cellophane
237
Alcoa
239
Guidelines
243
Attempts
244

II Enforcement Provisions of the Antitrust Laws
47
Appendix
64
Cartels
68
II Conscious Parallelism
73
III Conclusion
89
Development of Section 1 Doctrine
90
II Rule of Reason and PerSe Rule
104
III Conclusion
112
Rule of Reason and PerSe Rule
113
Further Developments
116
Understanding the Supreme Courts Justification for the PerSe Rule
129
Agreement
132
I The Development of Inference Doctrine
133
II Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory
140
Facilitating Mechanisms
144
I Data Dissemination Cases
145
II Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices
154
Economics
160
Boycotts
166
II PostSocony
170
III PostBMISylvania
181
IV Conclusion
184
Monopolization
186
II Leveraging and Essential Facilities
202
II Dangerous Probability Requirement
248
Vertical Restraints
252
II Vertical Nonprice Restraints
262
III Manufacturer Retains Title
267
IV Agreement
270
Tying and Exclusive Dealing
279
II Early Cases
284
III Development of PerSe Rule
286
IV Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and PerSe Rule
295
V Technological Typing
301
VI Exclusive Dealing
303
Appendix
307
Horizontal Mergers
311
II Horizontal Merger Law
317
III Conclusion
330
Mergers Vertical and Conglomerate
333
II Conglomerate Mergers
344
III Concluding Remarks
351
Antitrust and the State
352
I NoerrPennington Doctrine
354
II Parker Doctrine
371
Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines
375
Index
379
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Über den Autor (2003)

Keith N. Hylton has taught at the School of Law of Boston University since 1995. He previously served on the faculty and was tenured at Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Hylton currently teaches courses in antitrust, torts, and labor law, and writes widely in the field of law and economics, with more than forty publications in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. He has served as a Director of the American Law and Economics Association.

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