DAMAGES.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. Breach of covenant.-Where a breach of covenant is proved, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages at least. Coppinger v.
Armstrong,
210
2. Direct and remote.-In an action against a railroad company for
damages arising from a direct physical injury to plaintiff's dwelling by
reason of running its trains, evidence is not admissible of the general
depreciation in value of plaintiff's property, where the witness is unable to
distinguish between damages such as were the result of the injury com-
plained of and such as arose from general causes. C. & E. I. R. R. Co.
v. Hall,
621
3. Dissolution of injunction.-A failure to assess damages upon the
dissolution of an injunction is no bar to an action upon the injunction
bond for the recovery of damages. Linington v. Strong,
384
4. Dissolution of injunction.—To confer jurisdiction to hear evidence
and assess damages on dissolution of an injunction, suggestions in
writing should be filed and the evidence on that issue preserved in the
record. When the evidence is not preserved in the record, no presump-
tion will be indulged that it was heard. Adm'r of Driggers v. Bell,
254
5. Evidence of.-Testimony of a party that he had the goods which
were replevined appraised at a certaim sum, is no evidence of the value
of the goods. Melody v. The People,
485
6. Exemplary.-To warrant exemplary damages there must be gross
fraud, malice, wanton or oppressive conduct, or a willful injury. In the
absence of these elements, the damages should be restricted to compen-
sation for the injury sustained. Sullivan v. Dee,
263
7. Punitive. In an action against a railroad company for injuries, it
is error to instruct the jury that the plaintiff may recover punitive dama-
ges, if the acts of the defendant were wanton or willful, without also in-
cluding in such instruction the principle of contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, I. & St. L. R'y Co. v. Willisch,
242
8. Sale of goods upon warranty.-Such damages only are recovera-
ble as may be considered as arising naturally in the usual course of busi-
ness from a breach of the contract, or such as may be reasonably sup-
posed the parties had in contemplation at the time of making the con-
tract. Goodkind v. Rogan,
413
DECLARATION.-See PLEADING.
1. When may be inquired into.-The consideration of a deed may be
inquired into for all purposes, collateral or between the parties to the
deed, except to show that there was no consideration to support it. As
to the latter, the recitals are conclusive. Richardson v. Clow,
DELIVERY.
2. To stranger.-Where a grantor places a deed in the hands of a
stranger for the grantee, and no restrictions are imposed on its delivery,
it is a sufficient delivery to give the deed full effect. Richardson v.
Clow,
GENERALLY.
3. Recitals. A successor of the sheriff who made the sale cannot, by
recitals in the deed made to complete such sale, estop a party from
showing that certain lands mentioned in such deed were not in fact sold.
McDaniel v. Bryan,
4. Sheriff's Deed.--A sheriff's deed is prima facie evidence that the
provisions of the statute have been complied with, but it is not conclusive.
McDaniel v. Bryan,
5. Credit on mortgage.-A mortgagee, on the day the release deed
was dated, wrote on the back of the mortgage, “I hereby agree to allow
Martha Richardson, wife of Amasa Richardson, a niece of mine, $1,200
in my will, and if her equal share shall not amount to that sum, to take
the amount out of the whole pile." Held, that the $1.200 was only in-
tended as a gift or advancement, was without consideration, and could
not be placed as a credit on the note and mortgage. Richardson v.
Clow,
DEPOSITIONS.-See EVIDENCE-FEES AND SALARIES.
DIVORCE.-See MARRIAGE.
CONDONATION.
1. A bar.-Condonation is an absolute bar to a remedy for the of-
fenses condoned, and restores the offending party to the same condition
he occupied before the offense was committed. Thelin v. Thelin, 421
2. Subsequent cruelty.-The counter-affidavits alleged a renewal of
the acts of cruelty charged in the bill. The only way in which the com-
plainant could avail herself of this, would be by way of supplemental
bill, and not under her original bill, for the cause of action therein alleged
had been condoned. Thelin v. Thelin,
421
GENERALLY.
3. Setting aside default.—An affidavit setting forth that after the filing
of the bill for divorce, the complainant had condoned the alleged offense,
and resumed conjugal relations with the defendant, and also showing a
stipulation signed by the complainant to dismiss the bill, shows a suffi-
cient reason for setting aside the decree. Thelin v. Thelin,
ERROR IN FACT.
GENERALLY.
1. Meaning.-" Error in fact" is a phrase of definite legal meaning.
It is error in the process, such as non-age of the parties, and, at common
law, coverture of the plaintiff. Kihlholz v. Wolff,
ESTATES.-See ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.
ESTOPPEL.-See JUDGMENTS.
GENERALLY.
1. By acts of purchaser.—A vendee of lands entering into possession
under a conditional contract of sale, making material changes in the
property, collecting the rents, and acting as though he considered the con-
tract an absolute one, is precluded from afterwards claiming that the con-
tract is conditional. Eames v. Der Germania Turn Verein,
663
2. Effect of. The effect of an estoppel is that it is a finality, not only
as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat
the claim, but as to every other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose. Campbell v. Goodall,
266
3. To deny title.-Where a lessee enjoyed the premises under the
demise without question or interruption, he cannot be heard to deny the
title of his landlord. Coppinger v. Armstrong,
EVIDENCE.
BURDEN OF proof.
1. Denial of execution of note.-A plea denying the execution of a
note, casts upon the plaintiff the burden of proving its execution as at
common law. Wallace v. Wallace,
Signing by another.-Where it appears that the note was signed in
defendant's name by another person, the burden is upon the plaintiff to
show that such person had authority to so sign it. Wallace v. Wallace,
69
2. Admitted by consent.-The competency of evidence admitted by
consent, cannot afterwards be called in question. West Chicago Alcohol
Works v. Sheer,
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
3. Contents of writing. A witness cannot, upon cross-examination.
where it appears that the contract of sale was in writing, be required to
state the contents of such writing, no notice having been given to pro-
duce the writing. Strong v. Lord,
539
4. New matter.-When a witness is called by one party, the other
party has the right to cross-examine him only as to the facts to which he
testified in chief. Waller v. Carter,
GENERALLY.
5. Books of account.—Admission of plaintiff's books in evidence to
prove delivery, amount and price of the goods, there being no sufficient
ground laid for their admission, is error, but all these facts having been
proved by evidence aliunde, it is not such error as will reverse. Baird v.
Hooker,
EVIDENCE.
GENERALLY-Continued.
6. Certificate of purchase.-The certificate of purchase required by
law to be given by the sheriff to the purchaser, is the best evidence of
what lands were actually sold by him under the execution. McDaniel v.
Bryan,
273
7. Contradicting one's witness.-Although a party calls a witness to
prove certain facts, he is not concluded by the testimony of such witness,
but may prove by other witnesses that the witness was mistaken, or did
not truthfully state the facts. Waller v. Carter,
511
8. Custom. In the trial of a person for violating the ordinance of a
town prohibiting the sale of liquors, except upon a physician's prescrip-
tion, evidence of the custom of other physicians in giving prescriptions,
as to their form, is not admissible to prove or disprove the issue before
the jury. Town of Carthage v. Buckner,
152
9. Depositions.-There is no statute limiting or regulating the fees
of commissioners employed here to take depositions in suits pending in
other States. Fairchild v. M. C. R. R. Co.,
591
10. Opinions of witnesses.-In proceedings to assess damages for land
taken, the opinions of witnesses as to the value, though not supported by
facts or reasons on which such opinions are predicated, will be considered,
especially when not met by rebutting testimony, and when supplemented
by the personal visit of the jury to the premises. S. E. & S. E. R. R. Co.
v. Peters,
300
11. Promise to pay another's debt.-The building contract between
defendant and a third person, and receipts showing payment thereon in
full, are not admissible as evidence against the plaintiffs when suing the
defendant upon his promise to pay for goods furnished to his building
contractor. Dencer v. Parsons,
625
12. Proof of value of services.-Statements of what the witness him-
self would have charged for a similar service, furnish no criterion for
determining the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services, and should
not be admitted as evidence. Fairchild v. M. C. R. R. Co.,
591
13. Relevancy.-A witness was permitted to testify to statements
made to him by appellant, that the judgments confessed were without
consideration, and made to cover up appellee's property. This evidence
was not relevant to the issue, and should not have been admitted.
14. Res inter alios acta.--In an action upon a constable's bond for a
failure to take a sufficient replevin bond, evidence of what the sureties
upon such replevin bond told the deputy coroner as to their responsibilty
is not admissible, being made in the absence of the constable. Melody
v. The People,
485
15. Sheriff's Deed.--A sheriff's deed is prima facie evidence that the
statute has been complied with, but it is not conclusive. McDaniel v.
Bryan,
16. Sufficiency.-The issue being whether defendant authorized an-
other to sign his name to a note, it was only necessary for defendant to
disprove the authority by a preponderance of testimony; not to satisfy
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, as in a criminal case, that no au-
thority was given to sign his name. Wallace v. Wallace,
69
17. Value of goods.-Testimony of a party that he had the goods
which were replevied appraised at a certain sum, is not evidence of
their value. Melody v. The People,
485
18. Verdict of coroner's jury.-Where the contract of insurance
provided that in case of an inquest the company should be furnished
with a copy of the verdict and evidence taken upon the inquest, as a part
of the proofs of loss, there was no error in admitting the same in evi-
dence against the company. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Laurence, 488
PAROL.
19. To explain record-Appellant brought suit declaring specially
upon four notes, two for $25 each. Upon the trial he entered a nol. pros.
as to one of said $25 notes, but the record failed to show which one. In
a subsequent suit upon such note, held, that parol evidence was not ad-
missible to show which of the $25 notes was intended to be excluded
upon the former trial. Bisbee v. Woodbury,
PRIMA FACIE.
20. What is not.-As between an employer and a person operating
machinery, or a fellow-servant, the fact that the machine exploded is not
prima facie evidence of negligence against the employer. Kranz v.
White,
SECONDARY.
21. Contents of writing.-There was no error in rejecting the offered
testimony of a witness as to the contents of a writing claimed to have
been brought to defendant by plaintiff, there being no proof of the loss
of the original writing, or defendant's inability to produce it. Baird v.
Hooker,
306
EXCEPTIONS.-See PRACTICE.
EXCESSIVE JUDGMENT.-See JUDGMENTS.
1. Issued before procedendo filed.-An execution issued after dis-
missal of an appeal in the Appellate Court, but before procedendo filed
in the circuit court, is not void. At the most it is a mere irregularity,
of which no one but the defendant can take advantage. Being regular
on its face, it is a sufficient justification for the officer proceeding under
it, and it could not be attacked collaterally. Shimp v. Hay,
1. Debtor must furnish schedule.—It is the duty of the debtor, if he
would claim the benefit of the exemption law, to make a schedule of all
his personal property, subscribed and sworn to by him, and tender the
same to the officer. Cook v. Bohl,
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