CHAPTER XXXVIII PURSUIT AND CAPTURE OF CRONJE LORD ROBERTS' plan, seconded by what has been Kimberley was relieved on the 15th of February, but now Cronje had to be dealt with. The 6th Division having reached Klip Drift with two Naval 12-pounders, remained there, faced by a large body of Boers, who, having cleared out of French's path and thrown themselves in front of Kelly-Kenny, and begun to entrench a hill 6,000 yards distant, were now to be swept away. Other movements were contemplated by the combined action of the 6th and 7th Divisions, but the clearance of the Boers from the hill was a matter of pressing importance. The enemy clearly imagined that the difficulties confronting their opponents would enable them to hold the kopje, for the river at that point was deep, and the banks steep. The 9th Division had come up to Waterval Drift, and proceeded to cross in spite of the difficulties. The division, however, was not able to take on the convoy because of its exhaustion. Rest was necessary. On the 15th 1900. of February the 33rd, acting as escort to the convoy, arrived at Klip Drift after six hours' marching. While Tucker, with part of his 7th Division, was to co-operate with Kelly-Kenny in protecting the fords of the Modder, the remainder were to occupy Jacobstal, where a considerable force had been concentrated to "make certain of the new line of communications with Modder Camp." Part of the 7th Division, as already mentioned, were to remain at Wegdraai, awaiting orders, while the 6th Division was "to push through the Boer defensive line north of Klip Drift, and occupy Abon's Dam with one brigade, the other brigade remaining at the drifts; thus allowing Hannay's mounted infantry to join the cavalry division at Kimberley." Meanwhile Cronje had deemed it wise to move from Magersfontein. With French at Kimberley, Tucker at Jacobsdaal, and heavy columns to the southeast, he at length realised the danger of his situation. Abandoning his entrenchments he moved up to the right bank of the Modder, hoping to reach Bloem fontein. It now remained for Kelly-Kenny to deal with the Boers in his front. Cronje, however, was in view, and consequently Kelly-Kenny determined to deal with him as well as those of the enemy near by. MajorGeneral Knox was ordered to pursue him and harass his transport. The mounted infantry succeeded in driving in the guards in the rear. The advance of Knox's 13th Brigade and the mounted infantry caused Cronje to hasten in order to ensure his crossing the river by the Vendutie Drift, and thus gain his communication with Bloemfontein. Cronje reached the southern knoll of the Drieputs kopjes; but Hannay's advance guard of mounted infantry seized the northern end of the ridge. The 13th Brigade was nearly three miles in the rear, marching eastward, parallel to the Modder. The 33rd were standing No. 3 in brigade to cover the march of the mounted infantry. In the advance the battalion held the enemy, and drew near to the spot where fierce fighting was likely to follow. Knox sent forward the 81st Field Battery to support the mounted infantry, thinking to drive the Boers from the drift. Hannay, at his orders, sought to get between Cronje and the Modder, but the Boer guns rendered this impossible. Knox thereupon attacked Cronje with the 13th Brigade. He kept the 33rd and the 2nd Gloucesters in reserve, but sent the 2nd Buffs forward, while the 1st Oxford Light Infantry were to find a crossing to the river's left bank, and work round to the Boer's flank. The 6th Mounted Infantry were to quit the ridge they had occupied, join the 2nd Mounted Infantry, and support the Oxford Light Infantry, who had succeeded in fording the river. These distracted the enemy by extending and advancing thus across the open veldt, while their Colonel, Dalzell, with two companies, crept up the bed of the river. The Oxfords were converging thus on the Boers, and the Buffs, the 33rd, the Gloucesters and the 81st Field Battery, in support, with the 76th Battery, which had been sent up by Kelly-Kenny, threatened Cronje's front, advancing slowly across the plain. Cronje was compelled to fall back on the second ridge. This new position had now to be attacked. The Boers' "right and left centre rested on a kopje about a mile to the west of Klip Drift, and faced west and south; their left ran from this hill along a series of knolls, until it reached Klip Kraal Drift."1 Practically the tactics which cleared the first ridge had to be resorted to in driving the enemy from the second. The official account of the disposition of Knox's forces for the second attack runs thus: The Oxfordshire Light Infantry were to push up the left bank of the Modder and search for a crossing-place. This found, the battalion was to pass over the river, and supported by the 81st Field Battery, via Klip Drift, and the 6th Mounted Infantry, make a flank 1" Official History of the War." attack upon the southern face of the kopje. The remainder of the mounted infantry, with the 76th Field Battery, were to prolong the line on the left bank towards Klip Kraal Drift. The Gloucestershire, West Riding (33rd) and the Buffs were to assault the western face of the right and centre of the position.1 The Oxfords accordingly crossed with the 81st Field battery, and assailed Cronje's rear-guard, while the 33rd, with the Gloucesters in the second line, made their frontal attack, being in close touch with the Oxfords' left. The Boers, however, firmly held the main ridge. On centre, right, and left, the English forces were unable to effect anything. The horses of the mounted infantry, on the right, were so exhausted that many of them fell dead. Things looked so hopeless that Kelly-Kenny gave the order to halt, water, and feed. This had such good effect that the column was able to reach the rising ground south-west of the Drift, a feat of which the horses were incapable before. The 76th battery got to the top, but had to retire before a heavy musketry fire, and occupy another position, which enabled them to drive out the Boers. The part played by the 33rd was an important one. They held the enemy on the left flank, and supported the attack which Kelly-Kenny made on the kopje. The men were under fire all the day, and after driving the enemy out of the first laager, and holding him in front for eight and a half hours, they were ordered to advance with the Gloucesters on that part of the Boers' position in the Battalion's front. This was done brilliantly. The Boers were driven out of the two kopjes, but not without loss, for Corporal Newman was killed, and Captains Harris and Taylor and 21 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. The conduct of the 33rd in this day's fighting won the commendation of the General, who said that nothing could have been better than the behaviour of the Battalion. He made a special note of this to Lord Roberts, and ordered a 1 Ibid. similar communication to be made known to all ranks of the battalion. Cronje moved away in the night, and when day dawned on the 17th of February, he was striking eastward towards Paardeberg, as if purposing to get on the road to Bloemfontein, where there were no British troops to hinder him. Two hundred of his wagons succeeded in crossing the Modder. Kelly-Kenny followed in pursuit with the 6th Division. Kitchener, too, with Hannay's mounted infantry, moved on rapidly, and came in touch with the Boer rear-guard, while French, with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and the Carabiniers, arrived at Kameefontein. Broadwood, moreover, was at Vendutie Drift, midway between French and Cronje, and thus threatened to head off Cronje's advance. French surprised the convoy just as it was beginning to cross the Modder, and creating a panic, caused a halt. Cronje gave up the idea of retreat, and began to entrench in the river bed on both banks. The 6th and 9th Divisions were advancing in the meantime with what speed was possible. The stress of the pursuit may be understood by a quotation from Kelly-Kenny's letter to Lord Roberts in the evening of February 17th. "Nothing can exceed the marching and spirit of our people. Marching day and night; we made an eleven-mile march this morning. After a rest we start again at 5 o'clock, and again, as your plan has suggested, we march at 3 a.m. to-morrow." Cronje's position with this fast-closing movement was serious in the extreme. He appealed to President Steyn for help from Bloemfontein, and 4,000 men were to be sent to him. De Wet, who was alarmed for his own safety, could not spare more. Cronje's only chance of escape was to abandon his transport, and save his men, but he determined not to do that, since it is stated that all the transport was the property, not of the state, of the farmers themselves, and in many cases f a large part of their |