It is generally much easier to fee a defect than to amend it; nor are reviewers of poetry neceffarily expected to be poets themselves. We have already declared, however, that we are not pleased with either of the above verfions; and, audacious as the attempt is, we will hazard the following:

O knew they but their blifs, most bleft were they,
In rural fcenes who pass their peaceful day!
For whom, far diftant from the battle's roar,

True to their wants, earth freely spreads her store.

The addrefs to the Mufes, which enfues fhortly afterwards, is a most beautiful and animated paffage. It is thus rendered by Mr. Sotheby, v. 589.*

Me first, ye Mufes! at whofe hallow'd fane
Led by pure love I confecrate my strain,
Me deign accept! and to my fearch unfold
Heaven and her hoft in beauteous order roll'd,
Th' eclipfe that dims the golden orb of day,
And changeful labours of the lunar ray;
Whence rocks the earth, by what vaft force the main
Now bursts its barriers, now fubfides again;
Why wintry funs in ocean fwiftly fade,
Or what delay retards night's lingering shade.
But if chill blood restrain th' ambitious flight,
And Nature veil her wonders from my fight,
Oh may I yet, by fame forgotten, dwell
By gufhing fount, wild wood, and shadowy dell!
Oh lov'd Sperchean plains, Taygetian heights,
That ring to virgin choirs in Bacchic rites!
Hide me fome god, where Hamus' vales extend,
And boundlefs fhade and folitude defend!' P. 105.

For a comparison with his predeceffors we fhall felect the verfion of Dr. Warton, as far fuperior to that of Dryden, v. 578.

Teach me, ye Mufes, your devoted priest,
Whofe charms with holy raptures fire my breast,
The ways of heav'n, the wandering ftars to know,
The radiant fun and moon's eclipfes fhow,
Whence trembles earth, what force old ocean fwells
To burft his bounds, and backward what repells;
Why wintry funs roll down with rapid flight,
And whence delay retards the lingering night.
But if my blood's cold ftreams, that feebly flow,
Forbid my foul great Nature's works to know,

Me may the lowly vales and woodlands please,
And winding rivers, and inglorious ease!
O that I wander'd by Sperchius' flood
Or on Taygetus' facred top I food !

Who, in cool Hamus' vales my limbs will lay,
And in the darkest thicket hide from day!?

Of thefe rival paffages we have no hesitation in faying that, upon the whole, we prefer the latter: though we do not think the last eight verfes of either equal, in any measure, to the exquifite elegance and fpirit of the original, which occurs thus, v. 483.

Sin, bas ne poffim naturæ accedere partes,
Frigidus obftiterit circum præcordia fanguis;
Rura mihi et rigui placeant in vallibus amnes;
Flumina amem fylvasque inglorius. O ubi campi,
Spercheosque, et virginibus bacchata Lacænis
Taygeta o qui me gelidis in vallibus Hæmi
Siftat, et ingenti ramorum protegat umbrâ! P. 104.

May we be permitted to propofe as follows?
But if this heart, too fluggifh and too cold,
Forbid me Nature's fecret depths t'unfold,
Be then the plains, the dales, the woodlands mine,
O'er fount and flood inglorious to recline.
O, by thy banks, Sperchins! may I ftray,
Or climb Taygetus, where, in frantic play,
Sport the wild nymphs of Sparta! hide me deep,
O hide me, Hamus! in thy bow'ry steep;
Down thy cool valleys let my limbs be laid,
And all thy branches fhield me with their fhade!

The epifode of Orpheus and Eurydice, at the clofe of the fourth book, is far too long for extraction, or we would willingly infert it. For the most part, it poffeffes much merit but the conclufion of Eurydice's dying fpeech, ineffably pathetic and beautiful in the original, is followed with very unequal steps in the version, v. 497.

Jamque vale; feror ingenti circumdata note,
Invalidasque tibi tendens, heu! non tua, palmas.

Now, now farewell! involv'd in thickeft night,
Borne far away, I vanifh from thy fight,

And stretch towards thee, all hope for ever o'er,
Thefe unavailing arms, ah! thine no more.' P. 223.

The prefent verfion, however, we think fuperior to that of

Warton, and highly preferable to that of Dryden. In the former it occurs thus: our readers fhall determine for themfelves.

Adieu! no longer must thou blefs my fight,

I go! I fink! involv'd in thickest night!
In vain I ftretch my feeble arms to join

Thy fond embrace; ah! now no longer thine!'

There is fo much compreffed in the Latin couplet, that we believe it to be impoffible not to extend the two verses to four in a rhyme metre; yet, with this allowance, much of the excellence of the original is ftill withheld in both the above verfions. May we once more have the hardihood to obtrude an attempt of our own?

And now farewel! the fhades of boundless night
Surround, and bear me headlong from thy fight,
Vainly to thee forth-ftretching, as I glide,.

Thefe fhadowy arms-ah! never more thy bride.

The undefinable merit and exquifite beauty of the Georgics, and the various and elegant verfions which have now been exhibited of it in our own language, have induced us to extend the prefent critique to an unufual length. The value of the tranflation before us is very confiderable in many parts we think it fuperior to that of Dr. Warton, in others it manifeftly falls fhort. But to be entitled to an equal degree of praife with a man of his juftly literary and poetic fame muft excite no fmall degree of complacency and felf-fatisfaction, In the liberal language of the Roman bard himfelf:

Non noftrum inter vos tantas componere lites;

Et vitula tu dignus, et hic.

• So nice a difference in your finging lies,

That both have won, or both deferve the prize.' DRYDEN.

Remarks on the Theory of Morals: in which is contained an Examination of the Theoretical Part of Dr. Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philofaphy. By Edward Pearfon, B. D. &c. δυο. 5s. Boards. Rivingtons.

1800.

THE author is no mean proficient in the fchool which hoafts the names of Butler, Powel, Balguy, Thomas and William Ludlamı, and Hey. The laft of thefe authors, whofe manner of thinking and mode of expreflion he has

largely imbibed, was his college-tutor. The work is compofed in oppofition to the principles of a popular writer and difciple of another celebrated school, which boasts the names of Law, Jebb, Watfon, and Paley; and the moral philofophy of this laft philofopher is fcrutinifed in the manner generally employed by his opponents of this clafs. Hey and Paley were college-tutors in the univerfity of Cambridge at the fame time; both gave lectures in their refpective colleges on metaphyfics and morality; both preached frequently. before the univerfity; and both were diftinguifhed by a peculiarity of manner as well as originality of thought and expreffion. The one was open, cheerful, and perfpicuous, endeavouring to familiarife every topic to the lowest capacity; the other was dry, referved, profound, fcrutiniting every thought with metaphyfical nicety. The pupils of the one attended the lecture-room with pleasure, and were fure of acquiring fome ideas with which they could inftruct and amufe their fellow-ftudents in the univerfity. The pupils of the other could mention only with admiration the fagacious profundity of their tutor, but the nicety of his difcriminations evaded their powers of memory, and what was delivered with labour by the teacher, at the end of the hour allotted to this exercife, was in general forgotten by his fcholars. The one did every thing with eafe, the other was labouring under his tafk; the one taught in converfation, the other was always fermonifing. Both have published the fubftance of their lectures. Paley's Moral Philofophy is in every boarding-school, and contains fcarcely a thought that had not been noted down in the lecture-room by one or other of his pupils. Hey's lectures. on the thirty-nine articles are too dry to become popular, but they afford a fufficient proof of his reading and erudition; and the minutenefs of his inquiries, in inveftigating certain fubjects which alarmed, and not without reafon, the heads both of the univerfity and church, as much as feveral favourite maxims of the oppofite fchool.

Moralifts are very much divided in their defininitions of virtue, and a new one is naturally to be expected from every writer on this fubject. Thofe of Thales, Epicurus, Cicero, Potamon, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Clarke, Wollafton, Brown, Hutchefon, Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, and Paley, are enumerated, in the introduction to this work; but it is against the definition of this last celebrated writer that the artillery of our author is chiefly directed. Paley defines virtue to be the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the fake of everlafting happinefs.' This definition, it is contended, is liable to objection in all its parts, as the fubject about which virtue is employed does not properly form

a part of the definition of virtue,' as the rule, the will of God, is not in its proper place; fince the will of God is the ground and foundation of virtue, and the motive to virtue ought to have no place in the definition. Let us firft fee,' the writer properly obferves, what virtue itfelf is; and, after oft-refumed confideration,' he has ventured upon the following definition. Virtue is voluntary obedience to the will of God.' We are fully aware of the objections that may be logically made to Paley's definition; and as fimplicity and clearnefs are to be aimed at in every feience, we make no fcruple in giving the preference to our author in point of precifion. But though this definition be more accurate and fimple, it by no means follows that the virtue thus defined is the fame that has been difcuffed by all other moralifts. The virtue defcribed by one has often differed fpecifically from that of another; and the view of this fubject prefented to us by Locke clears up the difficulties by which it is encumbered, and at the fame time reconciles us to the author's definition. Locke has very judiciously claffed actions under three heads: as they are referred to the law of God, to the law of the ftate, and to the law of reputation and honour. Under the third head he has claffed virtuous and vicious actions; and hence we fee, at once, why virtue has been fo very differently defcribed under different fyftems. It has depended on the changeable opinions of men; and its ftandard has naturally varied with the degree of cultivation, improvement, and experience, in every fociety. If all the world were Chriftians, virtue and duty would coincide, and voluntary obedience to the will of God, as it is the greatest perfection of human nature, would be held alfo in the highest eftimation.

It is a great point to define correctly; and, whether the definition before us be allowed or not, as moft affuredly it will not be amidst fome claffes of fociety; if the propofitions built upon it are well arranged, and lawfully derived, the one from the other, a complete whole may be prefented, on which the mind will reft with fatisfaction. Its excellence is feen on a comparison with other definitions; in which the author fucceeds completely, in our opinion, in showing the reafon of their failure, and juftifies, with great acutenefs, his own pofition: Virtue is voluntary obedience to the will of God in other words, what God commands is right, and right because he commands it; what God forbids is wrong, and wrong becaufe he forbids it,"

Having afcertained what virtue is, we come next to the rule of virtue. And conformity to the eternal differences of things, or to truth according to Wollafton and Clarke, being juftly exploded, the imperfection of the ancient fyftems judicioufly