ON THE STRENGTH OF NATIONS. CHAPTER I. THE PRIMARY ELEMENT OF THE STRENGTH OF NATIONS. "WHEN a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace: but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils." This is as true now as it was two thousand years ago, and it nearly concerns all independent nations to look well to their strength, and to take order that a stronger nation do not come upon them and overcome them, and take from them not only their armour, but all things that render life of value to them. B Since the publication, in 1776, of Adam Smith's immortal work on the "Wealth of Nations," the wealth of nations has, in this country at least, engaged so much attention, that but little has been left for another quality of nations-their Strength; without which their wealth, with all its advantages, may be of little use, since it may be destroyed at any time with fearful rapidity. There appears to be a time in the history of all powerful nations at which, while their wealth goes on increasing, their strength begins to decline, till-to use the words of Bacon *-it comes to "that, that not the hundredth poll will be fit for a helmet; and so there will be great population and little strength.' And it is also well to bear in mind another remark of Bacon in the same Essay: "Neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said) where the sinews of men's arms in base and effeminate people are failing; for Solon said well to Croesus (when in ostentation he showed him his gold): 'Sir, if any other comes that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold.' As soon as this current has fairly set in, unless its course can be arrested-which is a difficult if not an impossible operation-the decay of that nation has commenced, and will continue, till the time arrives when its strength is inadequate for its defence, and its wealth becomes the prey of an invader. * Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates. Adam Smith appears to consider this question to be satisfactorily solved by "the irresistible superiority" which, he says, "a well-regulated standing army has over a militia." And he mentions, as the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct account, the victory which the standing army of Philip of Macedon obtained over what he terms "the gallant and well-exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece."* This statement contains several It is true that Philip's army may be grave errors. termed a standing army, and it is also true-though Adam Smith has omitted that essential element, and therein lies one principal fallacy of his argument-that it was a standing army formed of good materials; but it is not true that the troops of Greece which it defeated were at that time "gallant and well-exercised militias." 66 Indeed," as Mr. Grote has well observed,† "the Spartan infantry, from their peculiar and systematic training, possessed, though not in the days of Philip of Macedon, the arrangements and aptitudes of a good standing army." And it is no small proof of the superiority of a well-regulated standing army formed of good materials, that every Greek who contrasted his own brave and patriotic but unsystematized militia with the symmetrical structure of the * Wealth of Nations, bk. v. ch. i. Lacedæmonian armed force, and the preparation of every Spartan for his duty by a painful discipline and laborious drilling, experienced a feeling of inferiority which made him willingly accept the headship of "these professional artists in the business of war,” as they are often denominated by the Greek writers.* But Adam Smith's words, "gallant and well-exercised militias," would lead to the inference that the armed forces of the several States of Greece were in as sound a condition at the time of the battle of Charonea as at the times of the battles of Marathon, Thermopylæ, and Platea. The fact was, however, very different. We have the best authority for the conclusion that, in the course of the century preceding the battle of Chæronea, the military excellence of the Lacedæmonian armed force had greatly declined, if it had not almost disappeared, and that Athens no longer possessed a "gallant and well-exercised militia." I will endeavour to explain the causes of this change in these two States respectively. Mr. Grote, indeed, seems to think that the subdivision of Greece into numerous independent States -a subdivision in great part arising from the mountainous nature of the country-proved finally the cause of her ruin,† and that, had the Amphictyonic * Grote, vol. ii. pp. 608, 609. Plutarch. Pelop. c. 23: Пávтwv ἄκροι τεχνῖται καὶ σοφισταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ὄντες οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται. Xenoph. "Rep. Lac." c. 14. Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν. † History of Greece, vol. ii. p. 299. 66 Council really been the commune Græciæ concilium” which Cicero calls it, united Hellas might have maintained her independence not only against the Macedonian kings, but even against the conquering legions of Rome.* But the fact that Greece did maintain her independence against the great Persian invasion proves that her subdivision into numerous independent States was not the cause of her ultimate ruin. That cause must, I think, be looked for elsewhere. And in regard to the two principal States of Greece, Sparta and Athens, there exist sufficient data whereon to found a tolerably accurate conclusion. No union could ever have imparted a durable and healthy vitality to a nation with such a government as either the Spartan oligarchy or the Athenian democracy. The question of standing armies and militias I shall hereafter consider more in detail. But Adam Smith, in the exaggerated importance he appears to me to have attached to standing armies generally, has, I think, taken an erroneous view of this question. At the same time the general opinion of the other States of Greece respecting the effect of the Spartan discipline seems to prove the advantage of superior discipline, whether the troops possessing that discipline are called a militia or a standing army. It is a remarkable fact that the militias of * History of Greece, vol. ii. p. 332. |