With reference to Gen. Marshall, I find him a very active, hard-working individual, who never lets the difficulties of his job force him even to blink an eye. Everything that I have learned about him causes me to respect him, and I think an investigation of his work will entitle him to all possible credit.

The Board of Review has had exceptional opportunities to observe the performance of the Construction Division and has been impressed with the tact and resourcefulness shown by its chief and the high regard had for him and his work by the members of the division and would here record its concurrence in the above-quoted statements.

The construction was done under general contracts which provided for payment on a basis of cost plus an agreed sum. It was necessary to do the work under this type of contract or a type of contract whereby the contractor would act as an agent of the Government, or by the Government itself on a purchase and hire, or force account basis. The cost is believed by the board to have been no greater, and probably less, than it was otherwise possible to secure. There are advocates of the use of other types of contracts, but, so far as known to the board, they have presented no facts or convincing speed record of accomplishment in support of their expressed opinions.

The cost of work done by the Cantonment and Construction Divisions was not swelled by extravagance of design or subordination of public to private or political interests. The Board of Review has endeavored, in the following tabulation, to indicate how, in its judgment, construction costs averaged on the work done by these divisions as compared with the costs of like Government work done under prewar conditions, using war prices, as fixed by Government bureaus, for materials and labor in each case:

(a) Extravagance (immoderate expenditure)......
(b) Waste (expenditure made without obtaining
useful results).

(c) Dishonesty (losses from deceptions practiced for private gain)..

Findings: Below normal as to plans and specifications; normal as to costs of materials (which were largely fixed by the Government); and above normal as to costs of the field construction forces.

and

Findings: Below normal as to
plans and specifications, pro-
curement of materials
field office forces, and normal
as to field working forces.

Matters of finance and accounting of funds and property attained great importance. The Government methods prescribed for handling them resulted in serious delays in making final settlements with many contractors, because of the lack of control over these matters given to the Construction Division. These delays were expensive to the Government and worked hardship upon contractors and disbursing officers who are not released from bond or liability until final

settlements are effected. It has been impossible to get the final audits made until long after the completion of work and the disbanding of the field forces. These difficulties would have been minimized and better results obtained had the Construction Division been authorized to direct its own finance and accounting of funds and property on each project and been made directly responsible therefor to the Treasury Department.

In quickly procuring and mobilizing construction material the division was notably successful. This was due to its direct control of most of its purchases and shipments. The speed realized and the amount of work done by it could not have been approximated if it had not directed its own procurement of materials, nor if such procurement had been transferred to a central purchasing bureau, as was advocated by some. This subject is dealt with at greater length in the section entitled "Consolidation of Government procurement," in which are given the reasons which necessitate the purchase of material for construction by the construction bureau, and not as an incident in a much greater volume and variety of purchases, largely of supplies and finished articles for operation, by the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic.

It is believed by the board that operations must depend on supply and that both must depend on construction, and that the supply and the construction bureaus should be kept separate, and that the construction bureau should be given an independent status, so making its services available wherever needed. Conflict of the two purchasing departments could readily be avoided by cooperation.

It seems to the board to be inexpedient to transfer the whole or a part of either the procurement branch or the finance and accounting branch of the Construction Division to any other bureau. Information obtained indicates that such branches should be left with the Construction Division and that they should be given authority and power commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the large sums involved in incompleted and unsettled outstanding contracts constitute an enormous Government liability, the proper settlement of which can be made only by agencies and individuals familiar with the details and conditions pertaining to such contracts. If the settlement of large Government contracts made by the Construction Division is turned over to departments or individuals unfamiliar therewith or with whom these construction contract settlements are but one item in a great number of contract cancellations, the interests of the Government may be jeopardized and settlements delayed. It is most desirable, in justice to all interests, that such delays be avoided.

Appropriate ratification by Congress should be given to clear properly the acts and records of deserving officers of the Construction

Division, in order to render justice to men who acted with decision under the stress of war conditions, when hesitation or delay would have been fatal. This statement applies especially to the financial and property accounting of constructing quartermasters, many of whom evidently had to meet conditions without adequate authority and felt they were morally bound, though perhaps not legally authorized, to act first and explain later.

The Board of Review has endeavored to obtain from all available sources a thorough knowledge of the essential facts relating to the Construction Division and its work. In the conduct of its review the board issued an exhaustive questionnaire to about 200 emergency construction projects and so collected much accurate data in comparative form; obtained and studied numerous pertinent reports from Government bureaus; secured at its hearings the attendance and testimony of many witnesses, including officers and civilians from most of the War Department bureaus, members of labor boards, contractors, and others competent to criticize and express judgment upon the performance of the Construction Division and of other War Department bureaus which had done war construction; gave special attention to organization, methods, results, speed, economy, quality and cost of work and opportunities for improvements; and visited and made field inspections of construction projects. A summary of its general findings and conclusions is given in the following paragraphs, specific points being dealt with in the later parts of this report:

The Construction Division of the Army earned the respect and confidence of substantially all of those with and for whom it worked, especially as to its grasp of actual and probable requirements and its speed of execution.

The plan of organization, methods, and procedure, taken as a whole and measured by results accomplished, seem to average higher than those of any other War Department bureau with which the board has dealt and it can suggest no improvements therein except for certain minor changes, largely in accounting procedure, which could be made to advantage if the division were given additional authority or a military position higher than its divisional status. Its present plan of operations provides properly for centralization of advisory and directing functions, decentralization of supervisory and executive functions, and expansion to meet construction requirements of almost any character.

Its personnel showed unusual ability, energy, and courage in grappling with the big problems of design, administration, and construction which were thrown upon them and demonstrated capacity and competency to handle such work satisfactorily. The standards and methods adopted in the selection of its personnel and the character

of men chosen reflect credit upon the chief of the division and his advisers. They showed discrimination in the choice of officers, took special pains to put the right man in the right place, where he could work at maximum efficiency, and, in order to eliminate guesswork and selection based on impressions, endeavored to choose only men who have made good and to put them on a class of work with which they were familiar.

The division was itself responsible for creating its present plans of organization and operation. It developed a high order of teamwork by the use of picked men having experience, enthusiasm, and selfconfidence, who seem to have been singularly free from pessimism and jealousies, handled work more by mutual suggestion and patriotic self-subordination than through orders and the exercise of authority, and realized their responsibility for promptly supplying the structures and plant facilities essential to the production work of other war bureaus. These men showed zeal, ability, and results of the highest order and were tireless in their efforts to create such a noncombatant army of workers as would ensure the quick construction of all facilities required to maintain an uninterrupted flow of supplies to the Expeditionary Forces.

The Board of Review is of the belief that this work was done at a cost which was greatly increased by national unpreparedness but which could not have been lessened by placing the work with any other military or civilian bureau.

The following statement respecting the Construction Division and its personnel was volunteered by J. W. Joyes, Colonel, Ordnance Department, United States Army, chief of the nitrate division of the War Department, at a hearing held by the Board of Review on March 5, 1919:

I was very agreeably surprised in the functioning of the Construction Division. I had been opposed to them at one time, principally because I felt that the bringing into my work of any additional outside agencies would complicate things worse than they were before; and it was only when it became apparent to me that my official superiors felt it advisable to bring them into the nitrate jobs that I gave my recommendation to that effect. However, I found the men at the head of the Construction Division very practical, very able, and very anxious to cooperate in a broad-minded manner. I would like to quote Mr. Cranford as giving the highest praise to the Construction Division.

The Board of Review is of the opinion that the Construction Division should not be disbanded after the accomplishment of its specific war work but should be utilized to coordinate and handle Army construction and related work in peace times and that the Government can further its interests in no more effective way than by continuing and extending the consolidation of its construction work.

PART II.

CREATION, HISTORY, ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, DUTIES, METHODS, PROCEDURE AND RESULTS OF THE CANTONMENT DIVISION.

SECTION 7.

CANTONMENT AND CAMP SITES.

SELECTION OF SITES.

The selective service act became a law on May 18, 1917, and it at once became necessary to provide adequate sites and camps for training and housing a large force of troops. On April 23, 1917, the Chief of the War College Division issued the following instructions:

(1) The Secretary of War having approved division of the United States into 16 training areas, steps should be taken without delay definitely to select camp sites to enable the supply departments to make arrangements necessary for sheltering, feeding, and equipping the forces.

(2) The War College Division can not of itself do this intelligently, but it is a proper function of the General Staff to outline a policy to govern in selecting sites. Such questions as sanitary requirements and transportation facilities are self-evident. Other questions are: Should there be division, brigade, or regimental camps? Should foot and mounted services be trained separately? Size of camps to afford space for maneuvers and firing?

(3) Your committee having charge of drafting of regulations for carrying out the National Army plan is designated to study this question and to submit recommendations as early as practicable. Your recommendations should include the agency to make selection of camp sites, whether department commanders or special boards or officers acting directly under War Department.

On May 4, the Chief of the War College Division reported, by memorandum for the Chief of Staff, that the division had made a careful study of the matter of selection of camp sites for training new troops and was of the opinion that department commanders should be charged with the duty of making such selections for the troops to be raised or trained within their respective departments and that they should appoint boards of officers to investigate and report upon available camp sites.

He recommended that the number of such boards in each department be left to the discretion of the several department commanders; that each board be composed of two experienced officers of the line, one of whom should, when practicable, be the division commander concerned or his representative, one an officer of the Quartermaster Corps, one an officer of the Medical Corps, and one a district engineer;