degree proportionate to, the freeing of experienced constructors from control by Army officers. This leads to the conclusion that neither Military Academy training nor Army experience can of itself insure fitness or ability to handle construction work.

Consolidation of all construction bureaus would train up a strong organization which would be effective in time of war but would not lead to undesirable militarization of Government construction in time of peace. Under war conditions the Army could then devote all its energies to military problems and qualified civilians would handle all other work.

A general construction bureau or department charged with the design, construction, maintenance and repair of all Government buildings and structures would work in cooperation with the other departments requiring construction work. This consolidation of construction activities now scattered would enable the Government to estimate, plan and handle such work in a better and more businesslike manner than has heretofore been possible and make more reliable estimates of expenditures. If these were based on a centralized system of accounting and auditing of costs and operating expenses the making of appropriations on a budget system would be facilitated and responsibility for both estimates and actual costs would be properly fixed.

Future nonmilitary construction expenditures will aggregate a large percentage of the total annual Government disbursements and will occupy such a prominent place in its economic and industrial life as to necessitate direction by an independent construction organization of appropriate standing and full authority, which should report to a Cabinet officer.

The above mentioned matters have been discussed with experienced contractors, consulting and constructing engineers and members of the national engineering societies and with others both in and out of Government service whose opinions carry weight. Of those last named some were men now or formerly commissioned in various War Department bureaus and others have held Government positions of responsibility. The questions submitted to them were, first, whether Government construction should be consolidated as herein described; and, second, who should have charge of the work if this were done.

The answers to the first question were almost unanimously in favor of consolidation and the opinion was generally expressed that failure to take such action would be a grave mistake.

The answers to the second question varied, but generally agreed that all Government construction should be administered by a civilian organization; that executives of wide business or construction experience would be necessary, and that this specification would

exclude Army officers lacking practical construction experience along commercial lines however well qualified they might be for handling military engineering work.

At a hearing of the Board of Review, held March 5, 1919, J. W. Joyes, colonel, Ordnance Department, United States Army, Chief of the Nitrate Division of the War Department, was asked for an expression of his views respecting the handling of all Government construction by one organization and made the following statement: In order for the performance of all construction by one body, such as a construction division to handle work for other Government bureaus, to be successful, effective steps must be taken to secure proper coordination between the bureaus doing the construction, the requisitioning and the designing work as well as between the user and the Government.

This is especially true of technical work, such as nitrate plants, powder plants, bag-loading plants, chemical warfare plants, and other technical work. The responsibility for the disposition and arrangement of machinery should lie with the user or tenant organization, or else with the Government bureau making the initial requisition. Construction standards, dimensions, etc., which are not of importance to the construction bureau, should not be arbitrarily fixed by it but, rather, controlled by the wishes of the requisitioning body, whose representative should be accorded every consideration and whose views should be met so far as practicable and not overruled because some happen to be inconsistent with certain existing standards or preconceived ideas of the construction bureau.

In short, the construction bureau and its designers should act as a constructing architect would and use every effort to meet the views of its clients, giving advice freely whenever any dispositions desired by client would entail structural unsoundness, excessive cost, or like defect, on which a construction viewpoint may shed light, but leaving to the client the decision as to whether such disadvantages are offset by the needs of the work to be done or processes to be used in the plant.

This will require a higher order of liaison work than in the past and one which shall be reasonably proof against friction or delays arising from conflicting personalities, each having a measure of authority. Of course with accommodating personalities on both sides matters will naturally work out satisfactorily in any event.

A statement along similar lines appears in a report made October 7, 1918, by M. F. Chase, director, explosives division, War Industries Board, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, giving the results of an investigation which was made at the request of the latter of construction of the Tullytown and Seven Pines bag-loading plants for the Ordnance Department, from which the following is extracted:

It is my opinion that the men identified with this work, as representatives of the various interested parties, are all capable men and are considered so by everybody connected with the job.

I would sum up the situation by stating that the underlying cause of delay in the construction of these two plants was due to the fact that the work was not conducted under the direction of a single responsible head and that a final authority was wanting for settling promptly questions of layout, design, and specification. In view of the fact that the plants as now constructed seem to be extremely well adapted for the purpose for which they were intended, and also that the construction work has generally been well done, if the work had been conducted under the direction of a single

head the other elements in the situation which have added to the delays would not, even if they had existed, been serious.

I am quite confident that the arrangement made as to the relation between the various interested parties in this case if followed in any case involving the building of industrial plants will be entirely inadequate to permit of the greatest possible speed of construction.

The fundamental difficulty is the manner of stating requirements. I am strongly of the opinion that requirements must be either stated in the most general terms and the division responsible for constructing the plant to take care of these requirements should have full and complete authority without being required to obtain the approval or consent of the bureau requesting the building as to the method of procedure, it being understood, of course, that the method of procedure in all cases must be in conformity to the general rules and regulations of all Government agencies having a direct interest in any element of the work, or the requirements must be stated in a most complete form and finished drawings handed over to the division doing the construction work, and the division doing this work should not attempt to criticise or change any drawings or specifications and should proceed on the theory that their work is merely to administer the contract and that the department or bureau asking for the work take the full and complete responsibility comparable to that taken by a designing and supervising engineer.

At a hearing of the Board of Review held December 20, 1918, attended by Thomas A. Gallagher, lieutenant colonel, and Harold Bennington, lieutenant colonel, being, respectively, the executive officer and assistant chief and the chief of the accounting branch, Department of Military Aeronautics, discussion was had of the effect of placing all war emergency construction work with the Construction Division of the Army; also as to the desirability of consolidating all Government construction in peace time. Both officers expressed the opinion that their department, formerly the construction division of the Signal Corps, could have accomplished satisfactory results during the war period if it had continued to handle its own construction work, which consisted principally of flying fields and accessories. The latter officer summarized by stating:

In peace time no corps or bureau should have a separate construction branch. I think, however, it was unwise to make that change when it was made. We had a very efficient construction organization in our organization and were getting results and by having the construction work taken away from us we were obliged to see work done in a way which was not to the advantage of the Government.

The conclusion expressed in the first sentence is of present interest and is shared by the Board of Review. The opinion expressed in the balance of the statement relates to issues not now active and regarding which the board has found differences of opinions to exist.

After full consideration the Board of Review finds that Government construction work for public use should not be done by the War Department and that the execution of some of the construction now assigned by law to that department should be transferred to a civilian construction bureau.

SECTION 46.

CONSOLIDATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT.

War Department procurement for construction comprised the purchase, or the acquisition from other bureaus, of material and equipment and their inspection, expediting, and delivery to project sites. Speed, economy, and labor cost were so vitally dependent upon the prompt and orderly delivery of construction supplies needed to keep the labor forces actively employed that satisfactory results could be secured only by the most effective cooperation of the engineering and procurement organizations. By keeping the engineering force in close touch with varying market conditions, it was enabled to make quickly whatever changes were needed in plans and specifications to expedite procurement..

The Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic recommended that it be given charge of the procurement of construction material. If this plan were adopted, satisfactory speed on construction could not be secured and labor costs would be increased, as the necessary coordination between the designing and the purchasing bureaus would not be possible. Any advantages that might be obtained from the inclusion of construction material in centralized purchasing would be far outweighed by the delays and extra costs entailed, except as to materials purchased for and issued from storage. The claimed advantages of the plan recommended by the Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic would be retained, without incurring the disadvantages mentioned, by proper cooperation between such division and the purchasing branch of the bureau doing construction work. In its field inspections the Board of Review saw apparently ample supplies of materials and heard no complaints by contractors as to shortage of supplies.

SECTION 47.

CONSOLIDATION OF GOVERNMENT INSPECTION.

Large technical organizations, expert in testing and inspection, have been organized to meet the demands of private business for proper inspection on construction and production work. By having numerous clients, they are able to supply a high order of inspection service at a low cost. The use of numerous Government inspectors from different departments on the same duties is wasteful and results in lower efficiency and poorer inspection work than could be secured by assigning the responsibility to a single properly organized bureau of experts.

The restrictions placed on Government inspectors, their lack of authority and frequent lack of judgment, increased materially the

cost of work to the Government. Contractors often consider Government work unattractive because of trouble arising from these causes and add to their bids a sum to offset the expenses and delays that these inspections create.

The works manager of a company which supplied shells and cases to Great Britain, France, Russia, and later the United States, expressed the opinion that enemy interests were aided materially by delays caused by unnecessary and unwise rejections by inexperienced United States Ordnance Department inspectors of quantities of nearly finished munitions acceptable to the European Governments; and that these inspectors thus unwittingly rendered great service to the enemy at a time when munitions were badly needed, through their incompetent or overzealous utilization of all possible grounds permitted by the specifications for rejection of articles meeting practical requirements.

The Board of Review finds that the consolidation of Government inspection under one competent and thoroughly experienced bureau is most desirable.

SECTION 48.

OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS.

The Officers' Reserve Corps was authorized by the national defense act, approved June 3, 1916. War Department General Order No. 321, of July 28, 1916, quotes the pertinent sections of this act and the regulations prescribed by the President to carry it into effect. The corps consists of sections corresponding to the various Army, staff, corps, and departments of the Regular Army. The total personnel was fixed at 50,000, divided in the same proportions as the existing bureaus or corps of the Regular Army.

Commissions in the Officers' Reserve Corps are issued without upper age limit for a period of five years unless sooner terminated in the discretion of the President. A member is not subject to call for service in time of peace, and whenever called for service may not, without his consent, be so called in a lower grade than that held by him in the Reserve Corps. In time of actual or threatened hostilities the President may order its officers to duty with the Army, in which they may be promoted to temporary vacancies with the pay and allowances of such Army grade. Enlisted men, if United States citizens, are eligible for examination for commissions.

The passage and application of this act offered an opportunity for training and service, of which advantage was taken by large numbers of men who received commissions in various corps. As there was no allotment of commissions for a distinct Construction Corps, the Construction Division, which was formed from a branch of the