As previously mentioned the original instructions were general. Each division and field auditor carried out the general instructions as seemed best to him, with the result that the system varied, although its main principles apparently were followed.

PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY.

This was dealt with in the instructions to field auditors. Property was handled as provided for in the Quartermaster's Manual in use in the Quartermaster General's office.

COST.

This was treated in the instructions to field auditors under the title "Classification of disbursements." The classification of expenditures were given in section 5 in use in the Quartermaster General's office, namely:

Barracks and quarters.

Supplies service and transportation.

Roads, walks, wharves, and drainage.
Construction and repair of hospitals.
Shooting galleries and ranges.

These were subdivided in accordance with Article II, sections (a) to (j), inclusive, of the Contract for Emergency Work, under which the construction was proceeding.

Tables 5 and 6 give the names of the cantonments and camps and the division auditors and the field auditors assigned thereto.

Office order dated May 24, 1917, stated that the engineering officerwill secure the services of consulting engineers to do all the engineering involved in water supply and sewage disposal, as this is work which must be done in the field. It may be necessary to call on engineering concerns for help on some of the other engineering details, and in case this is necessary my approval shall be obtained before any action is taken.

The intention was to place the field engineering in the hands of competent engineers or engineering concerns. The sites had not been determined at this time and it was foreseen that much of the engineering would have to be done after construction had been started.

The method of selection and employment of these engineers was placed by the committee on emergency construction in the hands of its subcommittee on engineering, with the addition of Mr. L. B. Stillwell. On June 19, 1917, the subcommittee reported in part as follows: The engineering work at individual cantonments may be done in one of three ways, viz:

1. By the employment of existing engineering organizations with competent staffs, capable of ready expansion.

2. By the organization of the entire local engineering force de novo, every job to be done under the immediate supervision, rather than direction, of the constructing quartermaster.

3. By a combination of methods (1) and (2) suggested above; that is, by the organization of a local engineering force under the direction of the constructing quartermaster and supplemented by the employment of existing engineering organizations upon special branches of the work.

The report recommended the first plan as the best and cheapest, because it would save time for organization, promote increased efficiency, and allow existing engineering organizations to be strengthened rather than impaired, to the advantage of the country.

In most cases the recommendation of the subcommittee that an engineering firm should provide all of the engineering services for one cantonment was adopted by the constructing quartermasters. Both

of the other methods suggested by the committee were also used. The success obtained depended more upon the ability of the indi vidual or firm employed and on the personality and experience of the constructing quartermaster than on the method used. The supervising engineers were, in most cases, the engineers or firms who had made the preliminary surveys of the respective sites and were familiar with local conditions. The full report of the subcommittee on engineering of the committee on emergency construction, dated June 19, 1917, with copy of each of the three contract forms which it submitted with its report, will be found in annexed Exhibit No. 4.

At the suggestion of the committee on emergency construction, it was decided to utilize the services of expert town planners to assist in adapting the typical plans to the topography at the National Army cantonment sites. These experts were selected by the subcommittee and were among the first upon the ground.

Tables 7 and 8 give the names of the cantonments and camps and of the supervising engineers and town planners employed. The latter were not used on the National Guard camps.

CONTRACTORS' ORGANIZATIONS.

The character of the organization used by different contractors doing war emergency construction varied according to the personnel and practice of each concern. The following is a description of the methods and procedure generally adopted.

One of the principals of the contracting concern, usually an official, partner or manager, was in charge as chief executive. Under him the work was divided into four or five departments, of which the principal one, the building department, was usually in charge of a general superintendent. This department was divided into numerous construction branches, each of which was usually subdivided into sections, often formed according to territory, area, or character of work. Each of these was in charge of a superintendent who was responsible for the bosses and gang foremen who had direct charge of the work

men.

In the building department there was usually a subcontracts branch which supervised the subcontractors. It was the policy of the Cantonment Division to discourage the general contractor from undertaking to perform those portions of the work for which he was not properly qualified and to encourage him to use subcontractors in trades requiring special knowledge and equipment. These usually comprised plumbing, heating, electric work, and road construction. Engineering, administrative, purchasing, and accounting departments usually operated in parallel with the building department.

On some operations the time-keeping and pay rolls were kept entirely by the contractor's organization, and on others this work was taken over in part or whole and handled by the Government.

The contractors did not generally at first appreciate the importance of keeping the time records and supporting receipts for wages in accordance with Government requirements. They often failed to realize, until work was well under way, the great amount of clerical labor needed in handling pay rolls for 8,000 to 14,000 men on rush work.

The contractors and the field auditors had difficulty in holding sufficient clerical help, as the wages, including overtime, paid to mechanics were greater than could be paid under Government regulations to clerks. Many clerks consequently resigned and went into field work.

In constructing the original cantonments and camps the contractors' organizations had to be expanded to such extent that proper supervision was difficult. It was often necessary to increase these organizations in a few days to many times their former size. The efficiency of such an organization, using scattered groups of workmen. depends on the number and ability of its superintendents, foremen,

and gang bosses. It was often necessary to use some foremen who had never been employed by the contractor and knew little of his methods or those of his superintendents. The proper balancing of crews, especially during the first few weeks, also proved very difficult.

The unloading and distributing of material from railroad cars in such manner as to keep the various forces actively employed required facilities and talent that were seldom securable. If men were laid off when sufficient material was not available to push the work as desired, they could not be obtained later when needed. These difficulties, seldom entirely avoidable, caused loss of output without reduction of pay roll. This work had to be made up later, often at extra cost from overtime. They also afforded opportunities for shirking and tended to cause labor inefficiency. It is a fact that, by the method adopted, the cantonments were completed in time for the troops, and no other method is known by which this result could have been accomplished. Expressed in dollars the excess labor costs were large, but they were negligible compared to the losses which might have been caused by a delay in housing, training, and shipping of the troops.

The successful conduct of the war depended largely upon speed in cantonment construction. As in combat work, the only way to win success was to have a large force at hand. In order to rush construction this had to be large enough to take full advantage of favorable conditions of weather and delivery of materials. Under these conditions there was often necessarily a surplus of labor on the pay roll. Underload of this character, and the other causes already mentioned, which applied to nearly all war construction, impaired labor efficiency, lowered the average output per man hour, and caused a correspondingly high labor cost per unit of finished work. These conditions appear to have developed in the war work of every nation and to be generally inseparable from it.

The conclusion of the Board of Review is that the value of the method and results used on cantonment and camp construction can not be measured in dollars or in unit costs but must largely be gauged by the usual test of Army work, success or failure. In this case all evidence obtained indicates that they achieved a degree of success much beyond that anticipated.

A chart of the field organization is given on the following page. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF COST, APPROPRIATIONS, AND COMMENCEMENT OF WORK.

Before the United States entered the war the construction and repair division of the Quartermaster Corps had prepared cost estimates of housing the new Army, and the Army deficiency bill, then