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CHAPTER IX.

Efforts to make the purchase of Florida. Embassy to France. Letter to Wilson C. Nicholas. Disposition of parties towards England and France. Policy of the administration. Letter to William Duane— To the Emperor of Russia. Rival candidates for the presidency. Letter to Mr. Monroe. Negotiation with England. The appropriation of two millions. Letter to Mr. Gallatin. Annual Message. Proposes amendments to the Constitution. Repeal of non-importation law. Burr's projects. -Measures of the administration to defeat them. Bill for suspending the Habeas Corpus passes the Senate-Rejected by the House. System of national defence. Suppression of African Slave trade. Letter to John Dickinson-To Wilson C. Nicholas.

1806-1807.

LET us turn to the measures of the administration abroad. As soon as Congress had decided on making the appropriation of two millions for the purchase of Florida, the president determined on making a last effort to effect an amicable settlement at Paris of all matters of dispute with Spain. He appointed General Armstrong, of New York, and Mr. Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, joint commissioners for that purpose, and proposed to add Colonel Wilson C. Nicholas, of Virginia, as a third. But on that gentleman's declining the mission, the whole was left to the management of the two first. In a subsequent letter he remarks to Colonel Nicholas, that "an unjust hostility against General Armstrong will, I am afraid, show itself whenever any treaty made by him shall be offered for ratification." He re

grets the absence of his former senators, Mr. Giles and Colonel Nicholas himself. "A majority of the Senate," he says, "means well. But Tracy and Bayard are too dexterous for them, and have very much influenced their proceedings. Tracy has been of nearly every committee during the session, and for the most part the chairman, and of course drawer of the reports. Seven federalists voting always in phalanx, and joined by some discontented republicans, some oblique ones, some capricious, have so often made a majority, as to produce very serious embarrassment to the public operations; and very much do I dread submitting to them, at the next session, any treaty which can be made with either England or Spain, when I consider that five joining the federalists can defeat a friendly settlement of our affairs."* Alluding to Randolph's late course, he remarks, "the defection of so prominent a leader threw them into dismay and confusion for a moment; but they soon rallied to their own principles, and let him go off with five or six followers only. One half of these are from Virginia. His late declaration of perpetual opposition to this administration, drew off a few others who at first had joined him, supposing his opposition occasional only, and not systematic. The alarm the House has had from this schism, has produced a rallying together and a harmony, which carelessness and security had begun to endanger."

It would seem that the ostensible grounds of division among the republican party were as to the course to be pursued towards England and Spain. Many of those who had once warmly espoused the cause of France, as that of civil liberty, and who had even found forgiveness or excuse for the worst excesses of the revolution, had greatly cooled in their affection after Bonaparte had been permitted to exercise his sovereign power under the title of first consul. But when he threw aside the forms and name of a republican, and assumed the title of emperor, and when it was seen that all France either acquiesced or

*The Senate then consisted of thirty-four members, and two-thirds being necessary to the ratification of a treaty, it of course required twenty-three members.

openly rejoiced in the change, their hopes of support to the cause of liberty, from this powerful nation, were entirely extinguished. They saw in the French emperor a new and more formidable enemy to free government and national independence; and in the same degree that he became an object of dread or aversion, was England regarded with sentiments of conciliation and respect. This alteration of feeling, it must be confessed, extended to but a small portion of the community. The great mass of the nation, especially of those who called themselves republicans, were slow to change their national animosities and predilections. Long attached to France, first as an ally in the American revolution, and then as a fellow labourer in the republican cause, they soon loved it for its own sake, and were disposed to tolerate, if not approve every thing that was there done; and the victories won by French armies under the auspices of Napoleon, gave them almost the same satisfaction as when they were fighting for the right of self-government.

There were others of the republicans who, though they regarded Napoleon as an apostate from the principles which he had professed, and as intoxicated with the love of that power to which his talents and fortune had elevated him, yet apprehended no danger to our institutions from his success, and still less conceived that Great Britain was fighting the cause of mankind. They saw in the contest between France and England two mighty nations inflamed by a long course of hostility and rivalry, struggling for the mastery, and, which ever should obtain it, that the victory would be sure to be abused, not only towards the vanquished foe, but to all the rest of the world. Nor did the conquerors of Europe lord it with a harsher or more absolute sway on the land, than the English did on the ocean. It so happened, moreover, that the people of the United States were more exposed to this tyranny, and had even an experimental knowledge of it, whereas the other they only knew by report; and report too, which, coming through suspicious channels, did not receive implicit credit. They therefore thought that the United States were interested in wishing that neither nation should prevail in the contest farther than to lesson the other's

power of doing mischief; or if we were more interested in wishing success to one party rather than the other, that our friendship could not much assist either, but would materially injure ourselves, by depriving us of the benefits of our neutral position; and that therefore a pacific policy was imperiously enjoined on us. Such are believed to have been the sentiments of Mr. Jefferson and of his cabinet at this time. They knew that peace was the real interest of the country, and they determined to spare no pains to preserve it, notwithstanding the perpetual provocations received from Great Britain by the impressment of American seamen, and by interruptions of American commerce, and although it was also endangered on the part of her great rival, in consequence of our misunderstanding with Spain. And as when a similar pacific policy had prevailed in General Washington's administration, the more ardent portion of the republicans wished to urge the United States in a war against the enemies of France, so now, most of the federalists would have had the nation throw its weight into the scale with England; and it is believed that the small band of seceders from the republican party united with them in this feeling, and made the querulous and jealous temper exhibited by Spain the pretext for furthering their more important purpose.

In answer to a letter received from William Duane, the editor of the Aurora, a leading republican print, Mr. Jefferson on the 22nd of March says, in reference to this subject, "That Mr. R. (Randolph) has openly attacked the administration is sufficiently known. We were not disposed to join in league with Britain, under any belief that she is fighting for the liberties of mankind, and to enter into war with Spain, and consequently France. The House of Representatives were in the same sentiment, when they rejected Mr. R.'s resolutions for raising a body of regular troops for the western service. We are for a peaceable accommodation with all these nations, if it can be effected honourably. This, perhaps, is not the only ground of his alienation; but which side retains its orthodoxy, the vote of eightyseven to eleven republicans may satisfy you."

He further denies that there was any want of harmony in

the cabinet, or had ever been; and remarks, "while differences of opinion have been always rare among us, I can affirm that, as to present matters, there was not a single paragraph in my message to Congress, or those supplementary to it, in which there was not a unanimity of concurrence in the members of the administration." He also positively denies that the expedition of Miranda had been countenanced by him, as had been pretended by those who were engaged in it, first to gain supporters and friends, and afterwards for their own vindication. In speaking of the impossibility of escaping censure, he presents an epitome of what is experienced by every administration in every free government. "Our situation is difficult; and whatever we do is liable to the criticisms of those who wish to represent it awry. If we recommend measures in a public message, it may be said that members are not sent here to obey the mandates of the president, or to register the edicts of a sovereign. If we express opinions in conversation, we have then our Charles Jenkinsons, and back-door counsellors. If we say nothing, 'we have no opinions, no plans, no cabinet.' In truth it is the fable of the old man, his son, and the ass over again."

A general peace in Europe was now expected from the fact of Mr. Fox being in the English ministry, and from the supposed desire of Napoleon for peace, at least long enough to cement his power, and renovate the strength of the French nation. It was with a view to this probability that Mr. Jefferson now took occasion to address a letter to Alexander, Emperor of Russia, in behalf of neutral rights.

In this letter, after speaking of his gratification at seeing advanced to the government of so extensive a portion of the earth, and at so early a period of his life, a sovereign whose ruling passion was the happiness of his people, and whose philanthropy was extended to "a distant and infant nation, unoffending in its course and unambitious in its views," he further compliments the emperor on his efforts towards the pacification of Europe, and reminds him of the common interest which the United States and the northern nations of Europe have in preserving neutral