The next set of slides at the briefing detailed the fifteen recoveries of weapons that had already taken place during Operation Fast and Furious. Following a map indicating the locations in both the United States and Mexico of these recoveries were detailed slides for each recovery, including the number of guns recovered, the purchaser, the transporter, and the intended recipient in the Sinaloa cartel.

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For example, the slide pertaining to the Mexicali seizure indicated that the 12 detained suspects were all from Sinaloa, Mexico, "Confirmed Sinaloa cartel." The slide also catalogs the full recovery: "41 AK-47s, 1 AR-15 rifle, 1 FN 5.7 pistol, 421 kilograms of cocaine, 60 kilograms of meth, 392 miscellaneous rounds of ammunition, $2 million U.S., and $1 million Mexican pesos. In addition, the slide graphically depicts the relationships between the straw purchasers and the weapons seized. And finally, the slide on the El Paso recovery links Operation Fast and Furious to a Texas investigation and to the "plaza boss" in the Sinaloa cartel that Fast and Furious ultimately targeted."

1184

85

Given the rich detail in the presentation, it is clear that the guns bought during Operation Fast and Furious were headed to the Sinaloa cartel. As Martin testified:

The volume of guns purchased and the short time-to-crime for many of these guns clearly signaled that the Sinaloa cartel received the guns shortly after their purchase in Arizona. If ATF had attempted to interdict the weapons, it is likely that hundreds of these weapons would not have ended up with this dangerous cartel or entered Mexico.87 Martin agreed that was clear:

For a complete discussion of the shortcomings of ATF's investigation, see generally The Department of Justice's Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents, Joint Staff Report, 112th Congress, June 14, 2011.

87

83 Martin Transcript, at 50.

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Several individuals, such as Ray Rowley and those in OSII, had already expressed their concerns, only to have them fall on deaf ears. Others, however, remained silent, despite the ominous consequences:

The only person that did speak up during the March 5, 2010 presentation was Robert Champion, SAC for the Dallas Field Division participating by videoconference, who asked "What are we doing about this?"90 According to Lorren Leadmon, in response, Joe Cooley from Main Justice simply said that the movement of so many guns to Mexico was "an acceptable practice."

Shortly after the March 5, 2010 presentation on Operation Fast and Furious, OSII stopped giving briefings on the program to ATF management during the weekly Tuesday meetings. OSII personnel felt that nobody in field operations heeded their warnings, and OSII no longer saw the point of continuing to brief the program.

V. Kept in the Dark

FINDING: ATF and DOJ leadership kept their own personnel in Mexico and Mexican government officials totally in the dark about all aspects of Fast and Furious. Meanwhile, ATF officials in Mexico grew increasingly worried about the number of weapons recovered in Mexico that traced back to an ongoing investigation out of ATF's Phoenix Field Division.

Not surprisingly, ATF officials in Mexico grew increasingly alarmed about the growing number of weapons showing up in Mexico that traced back to the Phoenix Field Division. Yet, when they raised those concerns, ATF senior leadership both in Phoenix and Washington, D.C. reassured them that the Phoenix investigation was under control. No one informed them about

Interview with Lorren Leadmon, Intelligence Operations Specialist, in Wash., D.C., July 5, 2011.

89 Id. at 103-104.

91 Id.

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the details of Operation Fast and Furious. No one informed them that ATF was knowingly allowing guns to be sold to straw buyers and then transferred into Mexico.

ATF leadership in Mexico started noticing an "abnormal" number of weapons flowing from Phoenix into Mexico as early as the end of 2009. Former ATF Attaché Darren Gil explained:

I asked my analyst, because I was fairly new. I said, why is this
abnormal. He says, look, Darren, we have all these trace results
and they come from a variety of FFLs, but then you have a high
correlation here with this one particular investigation coming out
of Phoenix where we're getting this way and above the number of
recoveries we get from all these other Federal Firearms Licensees.
So it stuck out to my analyst who presented that to me that it was
an abnormal, his terminology actually, abnormal number of
recoveries.92

The "abnormal number of recoveries" concerned Gil and his agents in Mexico. Gil sought

answers:

Q.

And when your analyst made you aware of this uptick, what was
the next step that you took?

Gil Transcript, at 61-62.

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B.

A.

Pretty much a review, show me what you're talking about, which
he did. And then the phone call to Phoenix. And then after the
phone call to Phoenix, which I spoke of, throughout the rest of the
time it was primarily dealing with ATF headquarters, primarily
with the chief of international affairs, Dan [Kumor]."3

93

Reassurances from Phoenix and Washington, D.C.

Attaché Gil initially reached out directly to the Phoenix Field Division to express his concerns about the growing number of weapons. Gil explained:

Q.

A.

So when your staff in Mexico determined that a particular weapon
was tracked back to Phoenix, did they try or did you try to make
contact with some of the ATF staff in the Phoenix field office?

I did. I called the division, tried to make contact with the SAC. I
don't believe I spoke with the SAC, but I got a returned call and
spoke with the ASAC there, George [Gillett]. I identified my
concerns, hey, we're getting an abnormal number of traces. From
what I recall his response was, yes, we're aware of it. We have an
ongoing investigation. We have a ton of resources on it. We're
looking at it. We're working at it, and thanks for calling and
making us aware and then we'll follow it up from there."

Yet the seizures continued unabated, and the answers Gil received failed to better explain the underlying cause. Gil continued: