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and Pope. This example must needs be no small honor to our constitution. But,

2. The Belgic provinces are without interruption allowed to be the subjects of a formed democracy. They in some ages past being insulted and unmercifully trampled upon by that august tyrant, the Spanish monarch, they, being his subjects, broke loose from him and set up for themselves. They assumed to themselves their original power, and, when they had got it into their hands, had the wit, and kept it, and have improved it in the form of a democracy to this day; and God has blessed them, that from the poor states of Holland, they are now grown to wear the splendid title of "their high mightinesses," and are a match for most monarchs on earth. Says Gordon of their government: "The seven provinces of Holland, being under a democratical government, are as it were several commonwealths, each province being a distinct state; yea, and every city having an independent power within itself to judge of all causes, whether civil or criminal, and to inflict even capital punishments; but all joining together make one republic, the most considerable in the world." ***

3. The English. This nation is reputed to be the subjects of the finest and most incomparable government in the world. And this original happy form of government is

(says one) truly and properly called an Englishman's liberty: a privilege to be freed in person and estate from arbitrary violence and oppression, and a greater inheritance than we derive from our parents. And this birthright of Englishmen shines most conspicuously in two things:

(1) In Parliaments, wherein the subject has, by his representatives, a share in legislative power, and so makes his own laws, and disposes of his own money.

(2) In Juries, whereby he has a share in the executive part of law, so that no causes are tried, nor any man adjudged to lose his life, member, or estate, but upon the verdict of his peers, his equals or neighbors, and of his own condition.

These two grand pillars of English liberty are the fundamental, vital privileges whereby we have been, and are still preserved more free and happy than any other people in the world, and we trust shall ever continue so. For whosoever shall design to impair, pervert, undermine either of these, do strike at the very constitution of our government, and ought to be prosecuted and punished. with the utmost zeal and vigor. For to

poison all the springs and rivers in the kingdom could not be a greater mischief, for this would only affect the present age, but the other would ruin and enslave all our posterity. * * *

JONATHAN EDWARDS (1703-1758)

Jonathan Edwards was born at East (now South) Windsor, Connecticut, on 5 October, 1703. He was the fifth of his parents' eleven children, and their only son. When he was thirteen he entered

a school at Saybrook, which was soon removed to New Haven, to become Yale College, from which he was graduated in 1720. He remained at New Haven two years more, studying divinity, and then, after a short period of preaching in New York, took his M.A. at Yale and was for two years a tutor in the College (1724-1726). At the end of this period he was called to assist his grandfather, the venerable Solomon Stoddard, in the church at Northampton. He was installed in this post on 15 February, 1727. Shortly afterwards he married Sarah Pierrepont of New Haven. In 1729 Edwards's grandfather died, leaving him in sole charge of the Northampton church. Here he remained until he was dismissed by the congregation, in June, 1750. In the following year he removed to Stockbridge, Massachusetts, where he took charge of a mission to the Indians. At this remote frontier post he lived until 1758, when he journeyed to Princeton to become President of Nassau Hall, the College of New Jersey, in succession to the elder Aaron Burr. The small-pox was present in the town, and Edwards was inoculated. From the effects of this he died on 22 March, shortly after his inaug

uration.

Such were the chief outward events in the life of the most rigorous and profound thinker whom America has produced. Even as a boy Edwards exhibited phenomenal capacities, as can be seen from his paper on The Flying Spider, written when he was about twelve years old. During his sophomore year in college he read Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which made a deep impression on him. As early as this, or earlier, he had begun his lifelong practice of reading and thinking with a pen in his hand, always ready to write down what might be useful to him, and always aiming, not at mere assimilation, but at positive thinking on his own account. And soon after his reading of Locke's Essay he began a series of notes for a comprehensive treatise on the mind, and another series for a treatise on natural science. These notes cannot be exactly dated, but it is considered certain that some of the most interesting of them date from his undergraduate days, or from about his sixteenth year, and that all, or practically all, of them date from before his twentieth year. Fragments though they are, they are amongst the most significant of Edwards's writings, and selections from them are here reprinted. They exhibit not only the early development of his intellectual powers, but also the astonishing fact that, almost certainly without knowledge of Bishop Berkeley's work, he had gone on from Locke to an idealism Berkeleian in character; and they exhibit as well the fact that he had already, after studying Sir Isaac Newton, reached independent conclusions concerning the method of science.

But Edwards's upbringing, immediate surroundings, and inner experiences all conspired to lead him aside from the glittering career as a philosopher and man of letters which he might have had, and to send him on in life as the last and greatest leader of New England Puritanism. In the Personal Narrative here reprinted-one of the classics of the world's religious literature-we are given the day, 12 January, 1723, when he solemnly dedicated himself to the service of God. On this day he also entered in the Resolutions which he had begun to draw up for his guidance, one upon which he acted unfalteringly throughout the remainder of his life: "Resolved, that no other end but religion shall have any influence at all on any of my actions; and that no action shall be, in the least circumstance, any otherwise than the religious end will carry it." The task which confronted Edwards, in his attempt to live in the spirit of this Resolution, was one of opposing the teachings of the Dutch theologian Arminius, according to which man's will was regarded as free and man consequently was asserted to have the power of initiating actions, on his own account, which might contribute to his salvation. Arminius attempted to soften Calvinism both by taking off from the Deity responsibility for the existence of evil and by legitimizing man's sense of his own dignity and worth. The intention was well enough, but, not to speak of other difficulties, practically the diffusion of Arminianism lent a certain sanction to the religious indifference which had begun to spread through New England by the early part of the eighteenth century. Edwards's task, then, was to discredit Arminian teaching, to revive genuine Calvinism, and to try to rouse the people to an effective sense of their complete dependence on God, and of the tremendous consequences of sinful disobedience.

It is significant that one of the Resolutions above referred to reads: "Resolved, to live with all my might while I do live." Edwards did so, and his own inner religious experiences partook of the nature of ecstasy. He thus brought fire as well as devotion to his life's work-a fire that shone and burned through his severely controlled and rigorously logical sermons and discourses. And for a time he seemed to be wonderfully succeeding in his efforts. In the years 1734 and 1735 he brought about an unmistakable revival of religious interest, whose extent and nature may be learned from his Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God in the Conversion of Many Hundred Souls in Northampton and the Neighboring Towns and Villages (written in 1736). And this revival prepared the way for the "Great Awakening" which swept through New England a few years later, one of the important events of which was Edwards's preaching, at Enfield, of his most famous sermon, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God. The "Awakening" must have seemed to Edwards the sign and seal of almost complete success in the practical portion of his task, and he confidently justified it against criticism in The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God (1741) and in Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New England (1742). Nevertheless, those who distrusted the "Awakening" were in the right of it, for the high-pitched excitement induced by religious ecstasy or terror could not endure, and indeed tended to subside into strong reaction. Edwards soon saw indications of this, and felt it directly in his dismissal from Northampton. The immediate causes of this painful incident scarcely account for it, and the truth is that a large portion of Edwards's congregation had come to fear the man, and were ready to seize any pretext for banishing one who failed to understand that not all men were, like himself, able and anxious heroically to devote their whole lives to the service of God. Thus Edwards's life ended in outer defeat, though he continued, held up by his own sense of "evangelical integrity," to support his cause in one way, if not in another. His later years were largely occupied by the composition of several treatises which still, in an alien age, are read with admiration, for their evidences of his religious genius and of his power of sustained and close argument. The chief of these are: A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746); A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of the Will which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency (1754); The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended (1758); and Two Dissertations: I. Concerning the End for which God Created the World. II. The Nature of True Virtue (posthumously published, 1765).

THE MIND1

EXCELLENCY

THERE has nothing been more without a definition than Excellency; although it be what we are more concerned with than any thing else whatsoever: yea, we are concerned with nothing else. But what is this Excellency? Wherein is one thing excellent, and another evil; one beautiful, and another deformed? Some have said that all Excellency is Harmony, Symmetry, or Proportion; but they have not yet explained it. We would know, Why Proportion is more excellent than Disproportion; that is, why Proportion is pleasant to the mind, and Disproportion unpleasant? Proportion is a thing that may be explained yet further. It is an Equality, or Likeness of ratios; so that it is the Equality, that makes the Proportion. Excellency therefore seems to consist in Equality. Thus, if there be two perfect equal circles, or globes, together, there is

1 All of the following selections are reprinted from the ten-volume edition of Edwards's Works (New York, 1829) edited with a memoir by S. E. Dwight.

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at irregular distances from the parallel lines. If they stand, each in a perpendicular line, going from the parallel lines (Fig. 2), it is requisite that they should each stand at an equal distance from the perpendicular line next to them; otherwise there is no beauty. If there be three of these circles between two parallel lines, and near to a perpendicular line run between them (Fig. 3), the most beautiful form, perhaps, that they could be placed in, is in an equilateral triangle with the cross line, because there are most equali

ties. The distance of the two next to the cross line is equal from that, and also equal from the parallel lines. The distance of the third from each parallel is equal, and its distance from each of the other two circles is equal, and is also equal to their distance. from one another, and likewise equal to their distance from each end of the cross line. There are two equilateral triangles: one made by the three circles, and the other made by the cross line and two of the sides of the first protracted till they meet that line. And if there be another like it, on the opposite side, to correspond with it and it be taken altogether, the beauty is still greater, where the distances from the lines, in the one, are equal to the distances in the other; also the two next to the cross lines are at equal distances from the other two; or, if you go crosswise, from corner to corner. The two cross lines are also parallel, so that all parts are at an equal distance, and innumerable other equalities might be found.

This simple Equality, without Proportion, is the lowest kind of Regularity, and may be called Simple Beauty. All other beauties. and excellencies may be resolved into it. Proportion is Complex Beauty. Thus, if we suppose that there are two points, A B, placed at two inches' distance, and the next, C, one inch farther (Fig. 1), it is requisite, in order to regularity and beauty,

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Fig. I B ċ D if there be another, D, that it should be at half an inch distance; otherwise there is no regularity, and the last, D, would stand out of its proper place; because now the relation that the space C D, bears to B C, is equal to the relation that B C, bears to A B; so that B C D, is exactly similar to A B C. It is evident, this is a more complicated excellency than that which consisted in Equality, because the terms of the relation are here complex, and before were simple. When there are three points set in a right line, it is requisite, in order to regularity, that they should be set at an equal distance, as A B C (Fig. 2), where A B, is similar to B C, or the relation of C to B, is the same as of B to A. But in the other are three terms

necessary in each of the parts, between which the relation, B C D, is as A B C: so that here more simple beauties are omitted, and yet there is a general complex beauty: that is, B C is not as A B, nor is CD as B C, but yet, B C D is as A B C. It is requisite that the consent or regularity of CD to B C, be omitted, for the sake of the harmony of the whole. For although, if C D was perfectly equal to B C, there would be regularity and beauty with respect to them two; yet, if A B be taken into the idea, there is nothing but confusion. And it might be requisite, if these stood with others, even to omit this proposition, for the sake of one more complex still. Thus, if they stood with other points, where B stood at four inches' distance from A, C at two from B, and D at six from C: the place where D must stand in, if A, B, C, D, were alone, viz., one inch from C, must be so as to be made proportionate with the other points. beneath:

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So that although A, B, C, D, are not proportioned, but are confusion among themselves; yet taken with the whole they are proportioned and beautiful.

All beauty consists in similarness or identity of relation. In identity of relation consists all likeness, and all identity between two consists in identity of relation. Thus, when the distance between two is exactly equal, their distance is their relation one to another, the distance is the same, the bodies are two; wherefore this is their correspondency and beauty. So bodies exactly of the same figure, the bodies are two, the relation between the parts of the extremities is the same, and this is their agreement with them. But if there are two bodies of different shapes, having no similarness of relation between the parts of the extremities; this, considered by itself, is a deformity, because being disagrees with being, which must undoubtedly be disagreeable to perceiving being: because what disagrees with Being must necessarily be disagreeable to Being in general, to every thing that partakes of Entity, and of course to perceiving being;

and what agrees with Being, must be agreeable to Being in general, and therefore to perceiving being. But agreeableness of perceiving being is pleasure, and disagreeableness is pain. Disagreement or contrariety to Being is evidently an approach to Nothing, or a degree of Nothing; which is nothing else but disagreement or contrariety of Being, and the greatest and only evil: And Entity is the greatest and only good. And by how much more perfect Entity is that is without mixture of Nothing, by so much the more Excellency. Two beings can agree one with another in nothing else but Relation; because otherwise the notion of their twoness (duality) is destroyed, and they become one.

And so, in every case, what is called Correspondency, Symmetry, Regularity, and the like, may be resolved into Equalities; though the Equalities in a beauty, in any degree complicated, are so numerous that it would be a most tedious piece of work to enumerate them. There are millions of these Equalities. Of these consist the beautiful shape of flowers, the beauty of the body of man, and of the bodies of other animals. That sort of beauty which is called Natural, as of vines, plants, trees, etc., consists of a very complicated harmony; and all the natural motions, and tendencies, and figures of bodies in the Universe are done according to proportion, and therein is their beauty. Particular disproportions sometimes greatly add to the general beauty, and must necessarily be, in order to a more universal proportion:-So much equality, so much beauty; though it may be noted that the quantity of equality is not to be measured only by the number, but the intenseness, according to the quantity of being. As bodies are shadows of being, so their proportions are shadows of proportion.

The pleasures of the senses, where harmony is not the object of judgment, are the result of equality. Thus in Music, not only in the proportion which the several notes of a tune bear, one among another, but in merely two notes, there is harmony; whereas it is impossible there should be proportion between only two terms. But the proportion is in the particular vibrations of the air, which strike on the ear. And so, in the pleasantness of light, colors, tastes, smells,

and touch, all arise from proportion of motion. The organs are so contrived that, upon the touch of such and such particles, there shall be a regular and harmonious motion of the animal spirits.

Spiritual harmonies are of vastly larger extent: i. e., the proportions are vastly oftener redoubled, and respect mere beings, and require a vastly larger view to comprehend them; as some simple notes do more affect one, who has not a comprehensive understanding of Music.

The reason why Equality thus pleases the mind, and Inequality is unpleasing, is because Disproportion, or Inconsistency, is contrary to Being. For Being, if we examine narrowly, is nothing else but Proportion. When one being is inconsistent with another being, then Being is contradicted. But contradiction to Being, is intolerable to perceiving being, and the consent to Being, most pleasing.

Excellency consists in the Similarness of one being to another-not merely Equality and Proportion, but any kind of Similarness-thus Similarness of direction. Supposing many globes moving in right lines, it is more beautiful, that they should move all the same way, and according to the same direction, than if they moved disorderly; one, one way, and another, another. This is an universal definition of Excellency:The Consent of Being to Being, or Being's Consent to Entity. The more the Consent is, and the more extensive, the greater is the Excellency.

How exceedingly apt are we, when we are stitting still, and accidentally casting our eye upon some marks or spots in the floor or wall, to be ranging of them into regular parcels and figures: and, if we see a mark out of its place, to be placing of it right, by our imagination; and this, even while we are meditating on something else. So we may catch ourselves at observing the rules of harmony and regularity, in the careless motions of our heads or feet, and when playing with our hands, or walking about the

room.

PLEASEDNESS, in perceiving Being, always arises either from a perception of Consent to Being in general, or of Consent to that Being that perceives. As we have shown

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