Of the chapter on the Holy Trinity we have only to speak in terms of commendation. The Tepixopnois (in Latin Circumincessio), is well explained as 'the existence and presence of the 'Persons in one another by reason of their identity of nature 'and essence;' and is finely illustrated by the following words of S. John Damascene :

-

'We cannot speak of local distance in the case of the uncircumscribed Godhead, as we can in our own; for the persons are in each other, not so as to be confused, but so as to inhere, according to the word of the Lord, who said, “Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in Me." Now, can we speak of difference of will, or of judgment, or of operation, or of power, or of aught else, which things beget in us the practical and complete distinction. Wherefore also we do not say that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are three Gods, but rather One God, the Holy Trinity; the Son and Spirit being referred to One Cause, not composed nor commingled, according to the comprehension of Sabellius (ovvaípeow); for they are united, as we said, not so as to be confused, but so as to inhere in one another. And they have their circumincession in one another without any commixture or confusion; neither emanating or essentially sundered, according to Arius's division (diaípeow); for the Godhead is inseparable in separate (persons), and as in three suns close to one another and that are inseparable, the blending and cohesion of light is one.'Pp. 123-4. [S. Jo. Damasc., De Orthod. Fide, cap. 8.]

We observe that Mr. Owen just touches upon the deep, and probably insoluble, question, why the Holy Spirit is not a Son; or, in other words, how Divine procession may be held to differ from Divine generation. Without denying the lawfulness of reverent speculation upon such a subject, we see no reason to alter an opinion expressed in this Review some six years since; namely, that the confession which S. Augustin makes of his ignorance in this matter, is more satisfactory than the attempted explanation of Aquinas.1

From the sixth chapter of this volume, treating of the Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, we have much pleasure in quoting the following words, which proceed from the author's own pen. [We are responsible for the italics.]

'It was the usual practice of the early Christian writers, in introducing the doctrines of the faith to the consideration of the heathen philosophers, to blend the Revelation of the Second person of the Trinity with the received theories concerning the archetypal Reason or Intellect, which framed the visible universe, and emanated directly from the mysterious and hidden First Cause of all things, It may be that they erred on the side of indiscreet zeal that in their anxiety to smooth the way for the acceptance of Christianity by many

'to His attribute of Immutability.' We much doubt whether the venerable Schoolman would have allowed that his assertions did involve any change of the Divine Will. He merely says that God has at times ordered what he did not really will, 'præcepit enim Abrahæ immolare filium, nec tamen voluit, nec ideo præcepit ut id fieret, sed ut Abrahæ probaretur fides.' (Lib. i. Dist. xlv.)

Some remarks of Aquinas are cited by Mr. Owen, p. 121. For S. Augustin, see cont. Maximinum ii. 14, or Christian Remembrancer for July, 1855, p. 123..

who came as near to the Truth as unaided human reason would allow, they mixed up too much of the earthly element with the heavenly, and laid the foundation for future heresies. But it is not for us who have entered on the inheritance of the faith without preconceived ideas to be removed, or difficulties to be harmonized, whose belief too often amounts to nothing better than an indolent uninterested assent to propositions recommended by custom or authority; it is not for us to blame them lightly, or to affect the supercilious brow of an immaculate and superior criticism. Be it ours to accept the results of their stammering efforts and acquiesce in the decisions of the Catholic Church. It was necessary to assume some starting point in opening the ground which issued in the rich harvest of the Gentiles, and the fresh turn which the fathers gave to the Platonic disquisitions respecting the Logos or Divine Reason, was as legitimate as S. Paul's developing the incident of the Athenian inscription to the Unknown God," into a declaration of Him whom they ignorantly worshipped. The Jewish belief in the coming Messiah, however alloyed with dreams of His temporal splendour, and invariably falling far short of the pure spiritual type of the reality, still formed the basis whence Apostolic missionaries might win souls to the obedience of the faith. And the purest Greek philosophy was, as it were, a thinner and clearer atmosphere through which the light of the Gospel might shine forth serenely.'

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Our limits compel us to pass by two interesting chapters upon the Holy Angels, and the Fallen ones. These chapters supply valuable information respecting the famous book, once attributed to S. Dionysius the Areopagite, the convert of S. Paul. The following remarks, which Mr. Owen translates from Origen, are very sound and practical :

But

'For as in some things, the human purpose alone by itself is imperfect towards the consummation of good, for by the Divine aid is everything brought to perfection: : so also in contrary things we receive certain beginnings, and as it were some seeds of sins from those things which we have naturally in use. when we have indulged more than enough, and have not made a stand against the first motions of intemperance, then the hostile influence taking the place of this first transgression, instigates and over-urges us, by all means studying to enlarge sins more profusely; we men, indeed, supplying the occasions and beginnings of sins, but the adverse powers propagating them more widely and further, it may be, without any end. We are not, however, to suppose that aught else befalls us from the good or evil thoughts themselves which are suggested to our hearts, except a commotion only and incitement provoking us to good or to evil. For, when the malignant influence begins to incite us to evil, it is possible for us to cast away from us bad suggestions, and resist the worst persuasions, and altogether do nothing blameable. Therefore is it written, "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life," and "Be ye angry and sin not: neither give place to the devil," "Lest Satan should get an advantage of us, for we are not ignorant of his devices.'

In the chapter which follows (that, namely on the 'Creation and Government of the World,') Mr. Owen has hardly, we think, done justice to the Patristic evidence in favour of supposing the Mosaic days to be lengthened periods. We mentioned in our last number, the remarkable circumstance, that such an interpretation had occurred to the minds of Saints and Doctors, such as Athanasius, Augustin, Anselm, Origen, and others;

and

gave a few extracts1 and references, none of which appear in the volume before us. Now this is not an unimportant matter; for it is a common device of rationalistic writers of our time, sometimes despite their knowledge, but more often in sheer ignorance, to maintain that such interpretations of the first chapter of Genesis simply date from the time of geological discoveries, and were invented as a mere subterfuge from the pressure of an acknowledged difficulty. A statement of this nature is evidently implied, in a recent account of the teaching of Essays and Reviews,' by a French layman of somewhat rationalistic bias, M. Edmond Scherer.2

On the origin of Evil, our author, in the main, adopts what is perhaps the safest line, and the one which probably counts in its favour a majority of orthodox theologians; viz. to confess that it is an inscrutable mystery, and there leave it. We say in the main, because he does mention a few theories concerning it on the just and reasonable ground that, although it is hope'less to attempt an investigation of so primary a mystery, it is 'not useless to cast about for reasons to calm the human intellect, 'and to persuade it to acquiesce in the ignorance which its 'Maker has thought right to impose.' (P. 213). We have here, incidentally through S. John Damascene, the important distinction between what God permits, and what He actually operates. It may be remarked in passing, that the non-recognition of this distinction in Mohammedan theology is the fruitful source of great confusion of thought, and of miserable, however unintentional, distortion of the representation of the Divine character and attributes.

The treatment of the Creation of Man,' gives occasion for a clear and forcible statement of the arguments against the preexistence of souls. The curious, further question, whether souls are formed by separate de-cisions from the parent soul breathed into Adam, or are newly created for each body, is temperately discussed. These opposing views are, as is well known, termed respectively by the schoolmen, Traducianism and Creatianism. Our own opinion is, that Creatianism appears to have in its favour, the greater weight of argument and authority. But we are not convinced that Aquinas proves his right to stigmatize Traducianism as heretical, even when it is applied to the production of the intellectual anima; nor should we have cited his

1 Art. Dogma in relation to 'Essays and Reviews,' pp. 465-6.

2 Revue des deux Mondes, for 15th May, 1861. The Edinburgh Review for last April, represents the criticism of Essays and Reviews' in the Westminster Review for October, 1860, as hopelessly false and unfair. It is curious to see how similar is the impression made by the volume on the cool, unbiassed understanding of M. Scherer to that of the writer in the Westminster.

language on this subject, as is done by Mr. Owen, without some degree of reservation.

The twelfth chapter introduces a question, of which the proper investigation would demand a far greater space than we can at present afford. It is this; what is the amount of patristic evidence in favour of the lawfulness of a purely figurative interpretation of the early chapters of Genesis? We say a purely figurative interpretation; for it is a great mistake to suppose that when the Fathers talk of a figurative sense, they necessarily mean to deny the substratum of fact.

We quit Mr. Owen's book for a moment, to illustrate this point. In a recent pamphlet by a clergyman of note, who was Hulsean Lecturer at Cambridge in 1853, we find the following

assertions:

'S. Augustin thought that it was preposterous to assert that the beginning of Genesis might not be interpreted figuratively. . . S. Augustin held that all the account of creation might be figurative, and that “nullus Christianus dicere audebit, non esse accipienda figuraliter."-Address on Orthodoxy and Rationalism, by Rev. B. M. Cowie, pp. 12, 21.”1

Now not only does Mr. Cowie give us a reference to his author, De Genesi ad Literam, I. 1, but he translates, with perfect correctness, ten or eleven lines. The conclusion of his translated extract runs as follows. For no Christian will dare 'to say that they are not to be taken figuratively, when he gives 'heed to the Apostle saying, "All these things happened unto 'them in a figure," (1 Cor. x. 2), and reminding us that the ' record in Genesis, "And they two shall be one flesh," is a great Sacrament, referring to God and the Church.'

Now to us it seems that Augustin here raises a question which he does not completely answer. He begins with a reference to the possibility of a purely figurative meaning (figuratum tantummodò intellectum). He proceeds to prove that certain texts are to be accepted figuratively, but the word only does not re-appear. Is it to be conceived that the Bishop of Hippo understood S. Paul to signify, that because the events of Jewish history bear a typical meaning they did not actually happen, or that the matrimony of our first parents was the less a reality because it typified the infinitely sublimer union of Christ with His Church?

We cannot think that any careful student of S. Augustin will acquiesce in such a conclusion. In his work against Faustus, the Manichæan (lib. xxii. cap. 24), S. Augustin writes: say that not merely the tongue, but even the life of these men 'was prophetical, and that the entire rule of the Hebrews was

I

1 London. Bell and Daldy, 1861.

'One.

6

one mighty prophet, because [the prophet] of a certain Mighty "For all those things," as the Apostle says, "were our types (figuræ nostræ).”

9

And if this be not sufficient to show the sentiments of the writer, let us turn to the De Civitate Dei (Lib. xiii. Cap. 21). 'Hence some refer the whole of that Paradise, where the first 'parents of the human race are recorded to have been in the truth of Holy Scripture, to objects of thought (intelligibilia), 'and turn those trees and fruit-bearing shrubs into the virtues ' and morals of life; as if they were not visible and material, but said or written in that style with a view to the significa'tion of objects of thought. As if Paradise could not be a material one (corporalis) because it may likewise be regarded ' in a spiritual point of view (quia potest etiam spiritalis intelligi); as if there were not two women, Agar and Sarah, and from 'them two sons of Abraham, one from the bond-maid, one from 'the free woman, because the Apostle says that two Testaments ́ were prefigured in them, or as if water had not flowed from a rock at the stroke of Moses, because in a figurative signification Christ may therein also be perceived, since the same "Apostle says, "for that rock was Christ." Augustin proceeds to mention various possible interpretations (as e.g. that the four rivers have been taken to represent the four cardinal virtues; or again the four Holy Gospels) and then adds, "If these and any other things may be more suitably said on the spiritual sense of Paradise, let them be said without hindrance from any man; provided, however, that the truth of that history be believed, as commended to us by a most faithful narrative of events.' It may, however, be thought by some, that S. Augustin had changed his mind, and that it is unfair to answer a question proposed in one of his treatises by an extract taken from another. This doubt is easily set at rest. In the first chapter of the eighth book of this very same treatise, De Genesi ad Literam, we read as follows: 'I am not ignorant that many have said much on the subject of Paradise. There are, however, so to speak, three usual opinions on this matter. One, of those who would have Paradise understood only in a ' material sense. Another, of those who take it only in a spiritual sense. A third, of those who understand Paradise in ' each sense, at one time materially, but at another spiritually (aliàs corporaliter, aliàs autem spiritaliter). To speak briefly, 'I confess that I like this third opinion. The narative,

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then, in these books is not to be classed with discourses concerning things figurative, as in the Song of Songs, but of 'thorough facts (omnino gestarum) as in the Books of Kings, ' and the like,'

Mr. Cowie should surely have looked more closely into this