fact which shall suggest a modification of it, or which shall distinctly interfere with it in the way of miraculous interposition, we say that such person is affirming more than he can prove. What will be discovered in the future we do not know; we have every reason to suppose from the analogy of the past, that the coming age will enlarge the generalizations of science as it exists at present. The boundaries of nature, says our Essayist, exists only where our present knowledge places them; the discoveries of to-morrow will alter and enlarge them. But who would have thought that any one pretending to the name of a philosopher would have committed himself to such a statement as the following:-The inevitable progress of research 'must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel all that seems 'most marvellous; and what is at present least understood will 'become as familiarly known to the science of the future as those 'points which a few centuries ago were involved in equal 'obscurity, but are now thoroughly understood'?

We have no time for more; but we shall not make the want of time an excuse for not presenting our readers with a definitely elaborated theory of miracles. On the contrary, we believe that no such thing is possible. God has seen fit to exhibit his power in a mode in which, in by far the largest number of instances He has permitted man to trace somewhat of His purpose, and to investigate some way into the laws of cause and effect. In certain cases He has acted in such way as to controvert all the laws which we know, or can know, except by revelation; but He has not given the power to man of drawing a definite line which shall enable any one to decide upon those numerous cases which occupy the border land between the ordinary and the miraculous. It would indeed be unlike all other parts of the scheme of Revelation if the appeal of faith were made merely to the intellect, and the evidence on which conviction was to be framed, were independent of the moral character of him to whom the appeal was made.

ART. VIII.—An Introduction to the Study of Dogmatic Theology. By the Rev. ROBERT OWEN, B.D., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. London: Masters.

THE originators of the Edinburgh Review first, we believe, introduced the practice of making a book serve as a mere peg, whereon to hang an article. The plan, though frequently found a source of convenience to the reviewer, is not always equally gratifying to the author of the book, which is thus employed. Mr. Owen's volume is one of those which deserves a more extended notice than the very brief one accorded in our last number, where it was, we must own, treated in the abovementioned rather uncomplimentary fashion. We now propose to give some account of its contents, speaking freely as we proceed respecting its merits and defects, and reserving to ourselves the right to make a few general remarks (if we can find room for them) before we conclude.

By a sort of conventional understanding it is commonly assumed, that the examiner is necessarily superior in learning to the examinee, and the reviewer to the reviewed. At the very outset we willingly, in the present instance, disclaim any such assumption. Our learning, in the particular department of knowledge which is discussed in Mr. Owen's work, is most probably far inferior to his. Such a confession need not, however, imply either that our account of his volume must be incorrect; or that we may not legitimately prefer the explanations of certain terms and propositions contained in other books; or, thirdly, that we may not with justice and propriety call attention to certain considerations which he appears to have overlooked.

The book before us is a rather closely printed octavo, of nearly 500 pages, and is divided into thirty-one chapters. A valuable preface ably points out the difficulties of composing such a treatise, and names the leading volumes, Patristic, Scholastic, or subsequent to the Reformation, whence assistance may be derived. Among these, the writings of Anglican divines are the least often appealed to, on the very reasonable ground of the facility with which they may be consulted.

On the first three chapters, which are mainly occupied with Faith, Holy Scripture, and the authority of the Church, we shall say little more than that they are well written and may be

read with profit. Exhaustive of course they do not pretend to be, for in that case the work would be a great deal more than an Introduction to this province of Theology. Among topics deserving of notice in these chapters may be mentioned-a remarkable admission of Cardinal Cajetan, respecting the inferior rank of the Apocrypha, which almost coincides with our own sixth article (p. 20); a brief extract from Origen Teρì apxav which might have saved Professor Jowett from some recent (not very wise) assertions, in reference to that Father (p. 24); a beautiful passage from S. John Damascene, on the study of the Holy Scripture (pp. 26, 7); the limitation of the use of tradition laid down by S. Vincent of Lerins (pp. 34, 5); the remarks of the foreign Protestant Chamier on S. Mary as semper Virgo (pp. 44, 5); an able statement of Cardinal Panormitan, on the representative character of Councils; and some observations of the author himself, on the primary meaning of S. Matthew xviii. 17 (p. 31), on the well-known and strange statement of S. Irenæus about Millennial Bliss (p. 41), and on other topics which exhibit a really happy combination of independence of thought with true reverence. To relieve the dulness of such an enunciation as the above, we cite, at second-hand, from Mr. Owen, a portion of the passage of Damascene, to which reference has just been made.

"He that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened." Let us knock then at the most beautiful paradise of the Scriptures, the fragrant, the sweetest, the most comely, that resounds about our ears with all kinds of songs of intellectual God-inspired birds; that lays hold of our heart, soothing it when in pain, calming it when stirred by passion, and filling it with everlasting joy; that setteth our understanding on the golden and brilliant back of the Divine Dove, and on its brightest wings leadeth us up to the Only-Begotten Son and heir of the planter of the everlasting vineyard, and through Him bringeth us near to the Father of Lights. But let us not knock idly, but rather earnestly and continuously. Let us not faint in knocking, for so shall it be opened to us. If we read once and again, and do not quite perceive what we read, let us not faint but tarry; let us converse, let us ask; for, "ask thy father," it says, "and he shall declare it unto thee, thy elders, and they shall tell thee," for knowledge belongeth not to all. Let us draw out of the well of this paradise, overflowing and purest waters springing up to life eternal. Let us luxuriate in them insatiably, let us take our fill, for they possess grace free of cost. And if we can derive any profit also from what is beside them, it is not forbidden. Let us become approved money-changers, laying up the genuine and pure gold, but rejecting the counterfeit.'

The chapter on the Existence and Attributes of God, is (for the size of the work) long and interesting. Yet it strikes us as being less complete than many other portions of the volume. Mr. Owen might, we think, have consulted with advantage Dr. Clarke's 'Boyle Lectures,' on the same subject; a volume of such merit, that even Dr. Newman, if we are not mistaken, recom

mended it to the Roman Catholic pupils under his authority during his sojourn in Dublin. Clarke sums up the Divine Attributes as ultimately referrible to these three leading ones, Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Perfect Goodness. Nor is it easy to conceive any attribute of the Almighty, which may not in some sense be considered as falling under one of these three. But Mr. Owen, while treating of those Attributes which may be classed under Perfect Power, and Perfect Knowledge, has, most unaccountably, neglected to speak, in this place, of God's Justice, Truth, and other Moral Perfections. Yet surely Clarke is justified in asserting that these last-named Perfections must, of necessity, belong to the Supreme Cause and Author of all things quite as much as the Perfection of Might or of Wisdom. Bonitas occupies a conspicuous place in the first part of the Summa of Aquinas (Qu. VI.), who lays it down quòd bonum esse Deo præcipue convenit; and is handled in like manner by Bishop Pearson in his Lectures de Deo et Attributis. Among the principles enforced by Pearson are these following; Deum esse bonum bonitate absolutá; Deum essе úπeρáуaðov; Deum adeò bonum esse, ut causa sit omnis bonitatis creatæ.1

We do not, of course, mean to imply that Mr. Owen would for a moment hesitate in admitting the truth of these and other cognate propositions, which at once commend themselves to the acceptance of every devout Christian. But their absence is to be remarked upon, because they are most intimately connected with the attribute of Omnipotence, which, at the first glance, they almost seem to limit. For if the absolute Goodness of God prevents him from altering, or dispensing with, the Moral Law, and Aquinas, Hooker, Butler, Clarke, Cudworth, Suarez, all proclaim His inability to alter or dispense with ithow can He be, in strictness, said to be Almighty? These divines, with many more, reply, that such limitation does by no means interfere with the Omnipotence of God, inasmuch as His Goodness, like each of His other attributes, is identical with Himself, and the law which He ever obeys is a law that is self-imposed. His own Perfections alone limit Him. 'God cannot lie;' because He is the absolute and perfect Truth. These considerations tend, moreover, to show the close and indissoluble connexion that exists between Dogmatic and Moral Theology; and hence arises another source of interest.

However, we must not permit our sense of an omission to obscure our perception of what this chapter really contains. It is only justice to say, that it imparts much solid information, which will not, so far as our experience reaches, be readily

1 Minor Works. Ed. Churton, vol. i. pp. 67-72.

discovered in any other English book. We may instance the explanation of the difference between the Incommunicable and Communicable Attributes of the Creator. Under the former class are ranked His Simplicity, Unity, Immutability, Eternity, and Omnipresence. These, it is evident, cannot be bestowed upon the creature. The immortality of the soul is not only unlike that of its Maker in being imparted, but likewise in that it looks forward only, not backward. To the Almighty, and to Him alone, belongs, in scholastic phrase, Æternitas à parte post et ante; to us only the Eternitas à parte post. Hence, perhaps (as we once heard a distinguished living divine remark) the extreme difficulty felt by the mind in even conceiving the idea of eternity in the past, an eternity that has had no beginning. We can much more easily bring home to ourselves the idea of eternity in the future. Indeed, the difficulty here lies on the side of all attempts to shake it off; as unbelievers have often sadly experienced. For to that eternity we were destined from our birth; whether an eternity of weal or woe lies in our own power. εἴη δ ̓ ἐπὶ νίκην, δι' Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

But there are other attributes which (in a measure) God can impart, and does impart, to his creatures. Such for example are life and wisdom. That it is possible for a created nature to partake very largely of these gifts, is shown by the way in which they have been communicated to the humanity of the Incarnate Son. For as the Father hath life in Himself, so 'hath he given to the Son to have life in Himself; and hath given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of Man. . . . In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.'

Among the many merits of Mr. Owen's volume must be reckoned the explanation of terms, which though of frequent occurrence, are by no means commonly understood. In the chapter now under consideration, he takes the opportunity of explaining the useful distinction of Peter Lombard respecting the Voluntas beneplaciti and the Voluntas signi; the former being the secret, the latter the revealed Will of God. Our author, however, refrains from committing himself to all that the Master of the Sentences alleges on this point: but cites happily, by way of illustrating the actual existence of such a distinction, the words of Moses in the book of Deuteronomy (xxix. 29), The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but the things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever.'

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1 S. John v. 26, 27; Col. ii. 3.

2 Mr. Owen says (p. 104) with reference to Peter Lombard, that 'to introduce

anything like contradiction or change into God's Will, would be to run counter