3

5

balance the Catholic abstentions all absent Romans were summoned to return and the Italian authorities had forced the railways to give free transportation to any man presenting a certificate from a prefect attesting his status as a native of Rome. Countless Italians, born in all parts of the peninsula seized this opportunity for an excursion to the Eternal City, and only too easily secured registration cards with which they swelled the affirmative vote.1 Contrary to the decree, those who had been under judicial sentence for crime were also registered, they assert, while those known to be against the union were omitted. Even camp-followers were allowed to vote and whole companies of Italian soldiers, as well as boys under age. As electoral certificates bore no designations as to district, and need not be surrendered on casting a vote, with one such certificate a man might vote in as many districts as he pleased, and many strangers availed themselves of the opportunity. To calm the fears of the timorous that a vote for union would cause the Powers, and especially Prussia, to look with disfavor on Italy, copies of a spurious letter purporting to be from the King of Prussia to the Pope in which the King refused to aid in a protest against "his brother the King of Italy," were sold by thousands on the day of the election. Further propaganda of a nature most unfair to the papacy was carried on by means of posters which ridiculed the papal rule and misrepresented its policy. Bribery and falsification of the returns is also charged. Had the plebiscite been honestly taken, however, the church would still have held it invalid on the ground that the people had no right to transfer their civil allegiance from the Pope.s

It had been intended not to attempt to take a vote in the Leonine City but to leave it to the Pope. At the earnest desire of some of the inhabitants, however, Cadorna assumed the responsibility of placing in a neighboring district an electoral urn for the votes of the city.

The returns from the communes and the city of Rome were received by the giunta, verified, and proclaimed from the Capitoline stairs. In the whole They give no citations, however, and no trace of the document can be found in any of the usual collections. By the decree Non Expedit, of February 29, 1868, Pius had already forbidden Catholics to participate in parliamentary elections under the Italian government.

1 Der Italienische Raubzug, p. 207. De Beauffort, p. 392. Guggenberger, p. 340. Donat Sampson, op. cit, p. 170

2 Der Italienische Raubzug, p. 208.

3 De Beauffort, p. 392.

Rev. Richard Brennan. Life of Pope Pius IX.

Guggenberger, p. 340.

6 De Beauffort, p. 392.

Letter of Cardinal Antonelli to the papal nuncios, November 8, 1870, Acta Sanctal Sedis, 1870-71, vol. 6, p. 216. Cf. also ibid., Appendix V, p. 251.

8 The whole Papal side of the Roman Question was set forth in the Encyclical Letter of November 1, 1870, entitled Respicientes ea omnia. Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 6, pp. 136–145. The papal condemnation of transfer of allegiance had been repeatedly stated. Cf. espe

territory, it was announced, there had been 135,291 votes cast in favor of union and 1,507 against.' In Rome itself 68,466 had voted. Several of the commentators assert that it was a physical impossibility for so many votes to be cast in the time and with the facilities offered.2 Owing to the papal interdiction, not a single negative vote had been cast in the Leonine City.

The presentation to Victor Emanuel of this last and crowning act of union was made with great ceremony on October 9. The King, surrounded by the royal suite, the Ministry, both houses of parliament, and the high military officials received the delegates from the Roman giunta, and those from each of the provinces. The King accepted the votes, declaring that they completed Italian unity and reconsecrated the foundations of the national pact, and a royal decree, confirmed later by parliament, incorporated Rome in the kingdom" in view of the result of the plebiscite by which the citizens of the Roman Provinces have declared for union with the Constitutional Kingdom of Victor Emanuel II and his successors.'

MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA, 1857

The year 1856 marks not only the end of the Crimean War but also an innovation in international diplomacy. For the first time in history an international congress of great Powers, which had met to settle the future of a small, weak, and disunited people, postponed their action until they should have ascertained the desire of the people themselves, and, as a further innovation, they provided that this desire should be expressed by a vote taken under the supervision of an international commission.

The two Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which now form the State of Rumania, although of the same racial texture, had from the beginning maintained a separate existence from each other, and had developed a separate history. In the Middle Ages the struggle for self-preservation cially the Encyclical of December 8, 1864. As for universal suffrage, Pius IX, in 1873, characterized it as "une plaie horrible qui afflige la société humaine . . une plaie destructive de l'ordre social et qui mériterait à juste titre d'être appelée le mensonge universel." Cf. "Le suffrage universel jugé par Pie IX," in the Revue catholique des institutions et du droit, 1874, vol. 3, p. 66. The quotation is from a speech of Pius to the French pilgrims on May 5, 1873.

1 Documents, post, p. 715. The population of the Roman provinces in 1871 was 836,704, of which number 267,467 were males over 21. It is stated by a Jesuit writer that four months later a formal petition was signed by 27,161 Romans, born or legally domiciled, male, of voting age, and enjoying civil rights, stating that they remained faithful to the overturned government. Charles van Duerm, Vicissitudes politiques du pouvoir temporel des papes de 1790 à nos jours. p. 422. He cites La lettre du pape et l'Italie officielle, 64.

2 Cf. article by John Francis Maguire, Dublin Review, January, 1871, vol. 16 (new series), p. 32.

8 Documents, post, p. 720, note.

against the attacks of Turks, Hungarians, Poles, and Tartars had proved too great for the tiny Principalities. At last, in the 15th and 16th centuries, each, although Christian, had sought peace through the protection of Turkish suzerainty. In the Capitulations then entered on each had retained its autonomy, which included the right to make treaties with foreign Powers. The constant turmoil and intrigue consequent on the political jealousy of the contending claimants to the thrones of the Principalities soon furnished Turkey with an excuse for substituting princes of her own choice as governors, and the autonomy of the Principalities gradually became a name only.

The growth of Turkish power in the Principalities had awakened the alarm of Russia, intent as she was on the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the control of the Bosphorus. To counteract the growth in Turkish influence, she had put redoubled vigor into pushing her claim to the championship of all the Christians of the East, and with such success that the Russian protectorate over the Principalities had been formally recognized by the Porte in a series of conventions ending with the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Turkish suzerainty, however, was still recognized by the payment of annual tribute and the right of investiture of the hospodars.

The unity of the Rumanian race had been a favorite doctrine of the Moldavian historians of the 18th century, but the movement had assumed no practical importance until the beginning of the 19th century, when the nationalist idea spread to the two Principalities from the Rumanians of Transylvania, who were held under Magyar and Hapsburg domination. Perpetuation of the separate existence of the Principalities had favored Turkish encroachment and had therefore been a cardinal tenet of the Turkish rule. Russia, willing to strengthen them against Turkey as well as hopeful of their eventually accepting a Russian prince, had shown sympathy with the unionist idea, and under the Russian protectorate the two Principalities had been given a joint administration. By the Treaty of Adrianople, it had been agreed that the internal constitution of the Principalities should be regulated by an organic act, to be drawn up according to the wishes of divans of the notables of each territory. In the final act, drawn up under the tutelage of Russia, confirmed by the Turkish and Russian governments and promulgated in 1834, were placed two articles expressing a desire for ultimate union.1 This Or

1 ORGANIC ACT, SECTION 5, ARTICLE 425.- L'origine, la religion, les usages et la conformité de langue des habitants dans les 2 Principautés, ainsi que le besoin mutuel, contiennent, dès le principe, les éléments d'une union intime qui a été entravée et retardée par des circonstances fortuites et secondaires. Les avantages et les conséquences salutaires résultant de la réunion de ces 2 peuples ne sauraient être révoqués en doute. Les éléments de la fusion du peuple Moldo-Valaque sont déjà posés dans ce règlement par l'uniformité des bases administratives des 2 pays. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 32, 1843-1844, p. 786.

ganic Act, although a conservative document perpetuating the feudal structure of society, nevertheless paved the way for union by establishing the same laws for the two Principalities and a further step was taken, when in the forties the tariff duties between the two were suppressed. The revolutionary movement of 1848, although its primary object in Moldavia and Wallachia was the overthrow of Russian influence rather than union,1 nevertheless gave the unionist cause a great impetus through the resulting banishment of the political leaders who, in their exile in western Europe and particularly in Paris, came in touch with the new spirit of nationality aflame among the liberals and, in their turn, by painting the sufferings of the Rumanian people, supplied to the generous spirit of those liberals an object for their sympathy. The most influential of these disciples of the Rumanian patriots was Napoleon III, whose devotion to the principle of nationality was at once enlisted in the interest of this eastern outpost of the Latin race.

Such was the situation in the Principalities when, in 1853, war broke out between Russia and Turkey. In the next year Great Britain and France made common cause with the Ottoman government and undertook the Crimean expedition. From the beginning the paramount aim of the allies was the abolition of the protectorate exercised by Russia over the three Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia, and the substitution of the collective guarantee by all the Powers of the privileges of the Principalities, as well as the freedom of navigation of the Danube, the limitation of the Russian fleet on the Black Sea, and the cessation of the Russian pretensions over the other Christian subjects of the Porte.

To these terms, embodied by Great Britain, France, and Austria in the notes of Vienna of August 8, 1854, the Russian government acceded, but with an interpretation so far from the intention of the allies as to necessitate a conference. In preparation for the conference, and in order to obviate any further misconceptions, the three Powers, on December 28, sent to Gortchakov, the Russian Minister at Vienna, a memorandum explaining and amplifying the meaning of the original note, and discussing separately the four points at issue. Regarding the Principalities, the memorandum stipulated that the Russian protectorate must cease and that the details of their future organization which was to be guaranteed by the Powers, should be arranged later and in such a manner as to give " full and entire satisfaction to the rights of the suzerain Power, to those of the Principalities, and to the general interests of Europe.2

It was obvious that the first question of organization to be settled was that

1 A clause of the draft constitution of 1848 of Moldavia, however, expressed such a desire.

2 Documents, post, p. 727.

of union. France made every effort to induce the conference to endorse it. Not only was Napoleon III devoted to the principles of nationality and selfdetermination, but the embarrassment which such a union would hold for Austria, by stimulating racial aspirations in Transylvania and Bukowina, would also harmonize with French policy. The opposition, however, was a strong one. To Turkey, union portended the eventual independence of the Principalities from the suzerain Power. To Austria, it promised not only another rising in Transylvania, but also meant the failure of her ambition to gain economic control over the full extent of the Danube. The British Cabinet supported Turkey and Austria. At the opening session the first point of the preliminary memorandum was so developed, on the initiative of Austria, as to leave the details of organization to the Porte, an arrangement which would ensure the separation of the two countries.1 For the same reason that Turkey, Austria, and England opposed the union, however, Russia strongly favored it and, as it was obvious that the hope of direct endorsement by the conference was futile, the Russian plenipotentiaries chose an indirect but equally sure method. At the second session, Gortchakov answered the Austrian proposal by a counter proposition to the effect that the wishes of the two Principalities should be directly consulted through representative divans, pointing out that this procedure was the more suitable as the Organic Act of 1834, which would necessarily be the subject of discussion, had been drawn up in similar fashion.2 At the same time de Titoff, the second Russian plenipotentiary, presented a more formal proposal to the same effect, providing that the Porte should "in the first instance" consult the wishes of the country before determining the final provisions. In spite of the significance of the Russian proposal the opposition accepted it, and de Titoff's draft, with the omission of the words “in the first instance," was adopted by the conference with little debate.3 At the sixth session the French plenipotentiary made a final effort to obtain a direct endorsement of the union, but discussion was prevented by the opposition of the British delegates. The negotiations were wrecked on the remaining point of the memorandum, namely, the guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the limitation of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The conference closed in June, and discussion was not reopened until, deprived of the support of Austrian neutrality, owing to the addition of Sardinia to the allies in 1855, Russia was forced, by the fall of Sebastopol, to capitulate.

1 Documents, post, p. 728.

2 Documents, post, p. 730.

3 It is asserted by some historians that France desired union as a check to Russian expansion and that Russia was really against union and supporting it only in order to induce her enemies to defeat it. The action of the Russian delegates at Vienna would seem to prove the opposite. For the draft of de Titoff and the final action of the conference, see Documents, post, pp. 728, 730.