same changes ought, in our view, to be made mutatis mutandis in the analogous procedure of Actions of Arrestment and Sale of a ship, proceeding on arrestments used on a warrant contained in the original summons.

These changes of procedure, if adopted, will necessitate provision being made whereby, if a pursuer extracts a decree with a view to enforcing it by obtaining payment out of arrested funds or the price of arrested subjects (including a ship) when sold, the Extractor should treat the extract as interim so that the process may be re-transmitted to the Court.

We accordingly recommend :

(1) THAT THE ACTIONS OF FURTHCOMING AND DECLARATOR AND FURTHCOMING, AND ALSO THE ACTION OF ARRESTMENT AND SALE OF A SHIP, SHOULD BE ABOLISHED IN ALL CASES IN WHICH THEY PROCEED ON ARRESTMENTS USED ON THE DEPENDENCE OF THE SUMMONS IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION;

(2) THAT PROVISION BE MADE for enabling ARRESTED FUNDS, OR THE PRICE OF ARRESTED SUBJECTS (INCLUDING A SHIP) AFTER SALE, TO BE TRANSFERRED TO A CREDITOR BY APPLICATION TO THE LORD ORDINARY IN THE ACTION ON THE DEPENDENCE OF WHICH THE ARRESTMENT WAS USED AND DECREE OBTAINED;

(3) THAT IN SUCH CASES NO FURTHER ARRESTMENT UNDER AN EXTRACT DECREE SHOULD BE NECESSARY;

(4) THAT THE EXPENSES OF AND CONNECTED WITH THE OBTAIN ING OF AN ORDER FROM THE COURT FOR TRANSFERENCE OF THE FUNDS, ETC., BE A GOOD CHARGE AGAINST SUCH FUNDS; and

(5) THAT THE EXTRACT OF A DECREE, WHERE IT IS INTENDED THAT AN APPLICATION BE MADE TO THE COURT FOR THE ORDER ABOVE REFERRED TO, SHOULD BE TREATED AS interim AND NOT FINAL.

With regard to all these recommendations so far as relating to procedure that is common to the Court of Session and the Sheriff Courts, it may be worthy of consideration whether similar changes of procedure could not be introduced with advantage in the latter Courts as well as in the former. The limits of our Reference, however, preclude us from entertaining this question.

Recal of Arrestments used on the dependence of a Summons, and of Inhibitions similarly used.-A somewhat similar point was brought before us in connection with proceedings for recal of Arrestments used on the dependence of a Summons, and also of Inhibitions similarly used. A party raising an action against another is entitled to obtain a warrant not only to arrest the defender's moveables, but also to inhibit him from disposing of, or otherwise dealing with, his heritable property. Inhibition affects the alleged debtor's whole heritable property. This warrant when executed is registered in the Register of Inhibitions, and can only be recalled by a voluntary discharge by the creditor,

or by the Court. The present procedure for recal of Arrestments and Inhibition used on the dependence of a Summons is by Petition to the Lord Ordinary before whom the cause in respect to which the warrant was granted depends (32 and 33 Vic. c 116, s. 158), though a simple motion to the Lord Ordinary is in some circumstances allowed in practice (see Barbour's Trustees v. Davidsons, 1878, 15 S.L.R. 438). Where the Summons has not been called, the Petition is to the Lord Ordinary on the Bills. If the inhibition has been obtained in respect of the dependence of a case in a Sheriff Court, the Petition is presented to the Inner House.

We think the expense entailed by the presentation of a Petition is unnecessary so far as arrestments and inhibitions used on the dependence in the Court of Session are concerned, and we recommend that IN SUCH CASES THE RECAL SHOULD BE BY SIMPLE MOTION IN THE INNER OR OUTER HOUSE, ACCORDING AS THE Case HappenS TO BE IN THE ONE OR THE OTHER. In the event of arrestments or inhibitions having been used on two or more Summonses against the same defender, the application should be brought before the Inner House (if any of the Summonses are before the Inner House at the time) or (if all the Summonses are before the Outer House) before the Senior Lord Ordinary available at the time.

We think it right to add that there appears to be good ground for restricting the extent to which Inhibition on the dependence can be used. In the case of an arrestment, the creditor can only arrest in the hands of some particular person who holds funds or moveables belonging to the debtor. But an Inhibition applies universally and without discrimination to every piece of heritable property owned by the debtor whatever its value, great or small, with the result of paralysing his powers of disposal over one and all of them. In the hands of the creditor, the Inhibition may be said to partake of the character of a shot in the dark which, however, is certain to hit all the debtor's heritable property, whatever or wherever it may be. It would not, we think, involve any injustice to the creditor if he were compelled when executing the warrant of inhibition to describe by reference the particular heritable subjects which the debtor is being inhibited from selling, burdening, or otherwise alienating or affecting.

Petitions for Limitation of Liability under the Merchant Shipping Acts. Another instance in which, as it appears to us, the expense of a consequential proceeding could be mitigated occurs in connection with the right of an unsuccessful defender in a maritime collision case to limit his liability under the Merchant Shipping Acts. For instance, the owner of Ship A sues the owner of ship B for damages caused by a collision between the vessels, and the sum decerned for is in excess of the limit of the owner of ship B's liability under the Merchant Shipping Acts. Under the present procedure, the owner of ship B has to present a petition to the Inner House to have his liability limited after consignation of the amount of his statutory liability. The owner and cargo owners of

ship A then lodge claims on the consigned sum, and the competition among the various claimants is carried through in the Inner House.

We think and we so recommend-THAT THE WHOLE PROCEDURE IN CONNECTION WITH THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION. The expense and delay of separate proceedings by Petitions to the Inner House would thus be obviated.

Caution for recal or loosing of Arrestments in Salvage Actions, and the fixing of Security under section 552 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.-There is a weakness in the procedure in Scotland in connection with the fixing of the security to be given by the owners of a vessel against which an action of salvage has been raised. The difficulty arises in connection with the recal or loosing of arrestments used in cases of this kind, and in connection with the fixing of security under section 552 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. The usual practice is for the solicitors of the respective parties to arrange voluntarily the question of security; but, where that cannot be done (and the difficulty of arriving at the salved values in the case of salvage claims is great), the only method by which the amount of security can be fixed is by presenting a Petition to the Court with a view to the amount of security being fixed. Even so, there are no means whereby, except with the consent of the parties, the Court can have the value of the res ascertained by a Valuator to be appointed by the Court. The procedure, accordingly, where the parties cannot agree as to the amount of the security, is not only expensive, but involves delay, the arrested vessel being detained pending the recal of the arrestments upon caution being found. The loss of the use of the vessel during such detention may be heavy and involve great hardship on the owners of the ship, without any fault on the part of the salvors.

We therefore recommend THAT PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE WHEREBY THE COURT COULD IN SUCH CASES ex proprio motu REMIT TO A VALUER TO BE APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO FIX THE VALUE OF THE SHIP OR GOODS.

There is not, in our opinion, any reason for altering the present procedure in collision, as distinct from salvage, cases. In a collision case the pursuer knows what loss he has suffered and there is therefore not the difficulty that arises in salvage cases in formulating the claim in respect of which arrestments have been used.

Form of Conclusions in Salvage Actions.-Some of the witnesses who appeared before us expressed the view that it should be unnecessary in an action relating to salvage to conclude for any definite amount. The reason given was that in many, if not in most, cases it is impossible for the salvor when the action is raised to state with any degree of accuracy the amount of his claim. The amount depends on the value of the res salved, which can hardly be known to the salvor, and in many cases remains unknown to

him until in the course of the action he is able to obtain access to the documentary evidence which shows the values of the ship, cargo and freight. In this respect the procedure in Scotland differs from that followed in England. In the latter country it is not necessary to specify a definite sum, even in the Statement of Claim when lodged. According to English procedure the form of the Plaintiff's claim is for (1) such an amount of salvage as to the Court may seem just, (2) the costs of the action, and (3) such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.

The point is not one of much importance, but on the whole we think it is undesirable that the pursuer in a salvage action should be compelled to conclude for a sum which he has no real means of quantifying, and we therefore recommend THAT IN ACTIONS FOR SALVAGE SERVICES THE CONCLUSION SHOULD BE NOT FOR A DEFINITE SUM, BUT FOR PAYMENT OF SUCH AN AMOUNT AS TO THE COURT MAY SEEM JUST.

The Action of choosing Curators.-During the lifetime of a father, or after his death if he has not appointed anyone to act as curator to his minor children, a minor has the right to obtain the protection of curatory for his estate by raising an action of choosing curators under the Act 1555, cap. 35. In this action there is usually included a conclusion providing for the curator making up a complete inventory of the minor's estate (1672, c.2). The Summons is directed against two of the nearest of kin on the father's and two on the mother's side. If the nearest of kin or any of them are furth of Scotland, a Petition requires to be presented to dispense with the citation of such as are outside the jurisdiction, after which the action is directed against the nearest of kin on each side resident in Scotland.

It is unnecessary to detail the procedure, which is so cumbrous and expensive as to discourage resort to an otherwise useful proceeding. It ought, in our opinion, to be simplified and cheapened. We recommend that IN ANY CASE WHERE A MINOR DESIRES TO CHOOSE CURATORS HE SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO DO SO BY PRESENTING A PETITION TO THE OUTER HOUSE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF ANY PERSON WHO IS RESIDENT IN SCOTLAND, OR (IF HE IS NOT SO RESIDENT) WHO PROROGATES THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF SESSION, AND FINDS SECURITY. The Petition should set forth particulars of the minor's estate and be served (a) upon two of the nearest of kin on both the father's and mother's sides resident in Scotland, and (b) edictally, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that anyone interested may have notice of the application.

Form of Extracts.-The form of Extracts is regulated by 50 Geo. III c. 112, sec. 10; 1 and 2 Vic. c. 118, s. 18; 31 and 32 Vic. c. 54 and the Codifying Act of Sederunt (C.A.S., B. vi. and Sch. A). It has been the subject of progressive simplification and abbreviation. We think it might with advantage be still further simplified. We therefore recommend THAT THE EXTRACT SHOULD SIMPLY CONTAIN THE NAMES, DESIGNATIONS, AND ADDRESSES

OF THE PARTIES, AS THESE APPEAR IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE DECREE IS PRONOUNCED, AND A COPY OF THE INTERLOCUTOR CONTAINING THE DECREE WHICH IT IS DESIRED TO EXTRACT. An extract in this form should be held as granting warrant to Messengers-at-arms to give the charge and execute the diligence specified in Schedule A of the Codifying Act of Sederunt. It ought also to be competent to order an extract immediately, without waiting for the reading in the Minute Book.

Poor's Roll.-A few suggestions were made to us for modification of the existing law and procedure regulating the position of poor litigants in the Court of Session. These suggestions proceeded mainly upon three assumptions, viz. (a) that the existing system does not sufficiently ensure the exclusion from the Roll of applicants who are not poor enough to be entitled to its benefits, (b) that it tends to some delay owing to the length of the Court vacations, and (c) that some provision should be made to secure agents against loss of actual and necessary outlays in the conduct of a "poor case. This is a matter of no little delicacy. It is no doubt objectionable that litigants who are not really poor should insinuate themselves on to the Poor's Roll, but it would be no less objectionable if people too poor to litigate, but by no means paupers, were subjected to an inquisition appropriate only to professing paupers. Similarly, it is unfortunate that Agents and Counsel giving gratuitous services should sometimes be out of pocket in "poor" cases, but if the alternative is to insist upon poor litigants making a deposit in advance to meet necessary outlays, the only practical effect would be the total denial of justice to certain classes. Poor's work is one of the duties undertaken by the legal profession in return for its privileges, and although occasional actual loss is an incident of that work, there are compensations in the experience gained and opportunities given. So long as the burden is equitably distributed amongst the profession, we think that no real hardship is involved.

There is, we think, no substance in the complaint of exceptional and unnecessary delay. Upon the whole, and particularly looking to the considerations mentioned above, we do not think there is any good ground for disturbing existing law and practice in this

matter.

Shortening of Time Limit for Appeals to the House of Lords.The time for appealing to the House of Lords has been successively reduced from two years to one year and from one year to six months, which is the period at present in force. The period is, in our opinion, still too long, and entails hardship upon litigants. We recognise that the step of appealing to the House of Lords, in view of the heavy expense of doing so, requires the most anxious and careful consideration by Counsel and Solicitors, but six months is in our opinion too long a period to allow the unsuccessful party to keep a litigation in abeyance pending his decision on the subject. We recommend that THE TIME FOR APPEAL TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO THREE MONTHS.