Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - CognitionCambridge University Press, 28.06.2004 - 369 Seiten Where does the mind begin and end? Robert Wilson establishes the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. He blends traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. Wilson then develops novel accounts of mental representation and consciousness, discussing a range of other issues, such as nativism and the idea of group minds. Boundaries of the Mind re-evaluates the place of the individual in the cognitive, biological and social sciences (what Wilson calls the fragile sciences) with an emphasis on cognition. The book will appeal to a broad range of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioral and human sciences. Robert A. Wilson is professor of philosophy at the University of Alberta. He is author or editor of five other books, including the award-winning The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MIT Press, 1999). |
Inhalt
IV | 3 |
V | 4 |
VI | 8 |
VII | 9 |
VIII | 14 |
IX | 17 |
X | 19 |
XI | 22 |
LVIII | 143 |
LIX | 144 |
LX | 145 |
LXI | 147 |
LXII | 150 |
LXIII | 155 |
LXIV | 162 |
LXV | 172 |
XII | 24 |
XIII | 27 |
XIV | 30 |
XV | 31 |
XVI | 36 |
XVII | 40 |
XVIII | 41 |
XIX | 45 |
XX | 48 |
XXI | 50 |
XXII | 51 |
XXIII | 54 |
XXIV | 56 |
XXV | 60 |
XXVI | 65 |
XXVII | 67 |
XXVIII | 68 |
XXIX | 72 |
XXX | 75 |
XXXI | 77 |
XXXII | 79 |
XXXIII | 82 |
XXXIV | 87 |
XXXV | 90 |
XXXVI | 93 |
XXXVII | 96 |
XXXVIII | 98 |
XXXIX | 100 |
XL | 101 |
XLI | 102 |
XLII | 103 |
XLIII | 104 |
XLIV | 105 |
XLV | 107 |
XLVI | 111 |
XLVII | 114 |
XLVIII | 117 |
XLIX | 120 |
L | 121 |
LI | 125 |
LII | 128 |
LIII | 130 |
LIV | 133 |
LV | 137 |
LVI | 139 |
LVII | 141 |
LXVI | 174 |
LXVII | 178 |
LXVIII | 179 |
LXIX | 181 |
LXX | 183 |
LXXI | 184 |
LXXII | 187 |
LXXIII | 189 |
LXXIV | 198 |
LXXV | 206 |
LXXVI | 210 |
LXXVII | 214 |
LXXVIII | 215 |
LXXIX | 217 |
LXXX | 221 |
LXXXI | 225 |
LXXXII | 232 |
LXXXIII | 238 |
LXXXIV | 240 |
LXXXV | 242 |
LXXXVI | 244 |
LXXXVII | 246 |
LXXXVIII | 252 |
LXXXIX | 255 |
XC | 260 |
XCI | 263 |
XCII | 265 |
XCIII | 267 |
XCIV | 269 |
XCV | 274 |
XCVI | 280 |
XCVII | 282 |
XCVIII | 284 |
XCIX | 286 |
C | 288 |
CI | 293 |
CII | 295 |
CIII | 299 |
CIV | 302 |
CV | 303 |
CVI | 306 |
CVII | 309 |
335 | |
355 | |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
abilities argued argument behavior biological bodily Brain Cambridge University Press causal powers Chapter claim cognitive development cognitive science cognitive systems collective psychology tradition conception consciousness core realizations cultural David Sloan Wilson debate developmental discussion dispositions doppelgängers editors encoding entities entity-bounded environment evolutionary example external minimalism thesis externalist Fodor folk psychology fragile sciences function group mind hypothesis group selection human idea individual individual's individualistic innate intentional Jerry Fodor John Tooby Keil language Leda Cosmides locationally Marr Marr's theory memory mental representation metaphysically metaphysically determined narrow content nativism nativist nativist views notion organism Oxford University Press paradigm particular perception phenomenal intentionality phenomenology Philosophical philosophy of mind physical problem processes of awareness qualia role sense simply social manifestation thesis social sciences standard view structure sufficiency thesis superorganism superorganism tradition supervenience taxonomic theory of mind thought tion total realization view of realization vision visual experience wide realizations Wilson York
Verweise auf dieses Buch
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