ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind and capacity of nature, and every thing else sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.

SECTION V.

CONCERNING THE NOTION OF LIBERTY, AND OF
MORAL AGENCY.

THE plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting, in any respect, as he wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word liberty, in the ordinary use of language, as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no such thing as will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor

* I say, not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, &c. are instances of persons' conduct, about which liberty is exercised; though they are not so properly called doing.

be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore, to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense, if we judge of sense and nonsense by the original and proper signification of words. For the will itself is not an agent that has a will; the power of choosing itself has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of the will, and not the will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and liberty of flying. To be free, is the property of an agent who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or persons, and not the properties of properties.

There are two things that are contrary to this, which is called liberty in common speech. One is constraint; the same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction, which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the subject of these things.-I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth with so great clearness in his "Essay on the Human Understanding.'

But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct

as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause or original of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition, whether it was caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.

What has been said may be sufficient to shew what is meant by liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification. These several things belong to their notion of liberty. 1. That it consists in a selfdetermining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to liberty, in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity,

or any fixed and certain connexion with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever he may be at liberty to act according to his will.

A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.

The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth its fruits ; but it is not a moral agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral agents: the actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet, seeing they have no moral faculty or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not

PART II.

WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED, WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN
BE ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL AS THAT
WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE

LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY
SUCH THING EVER
OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.

SECTION I.

SHEWING THE MANIFEST INCONSISTENCE OF THE ARMINIAN NOTION OF LIBERTY OF WILL CONSISTING IN THE WILL'S SELF-DETERMINING POWER.

HAVING taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human liberty, and particularly observed what liberty is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the freedom of the will, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been described as the thing meant by liberty in common speech be not sufficient, and the only liberty which makes, or can make, any one a moral agent; and so properly the subject of these things. In this Part I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that freedom of will which