Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology

Cover
MIT Press, 1996 - 207 Seiten
Human cognition is soft. It is too flexible, too rich and too open-ended to be captured by hard (precise, exceptionless) rules of the sort that can constitute a computer programme. In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition. In place of the classical paradigm that takes the mind to be a computer (or a group of linked computers), they propose that the mind is best understood as a dynamical system realized in a neural network.

Im Buch

Inhalt

Chapter
6
The Fundamental Assumptions of Classical Cognitive Science
15
What Is Wrong with Classical Cognitive Science
31
Chapter 4
45
Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought and What That
71
Mental Causation without Rules
95
Chapter 8
127
Chapter 9
145
Notes
173
References
199
Urheberrecht

Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen

Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen

Bibliografische Informationen