There seems to be little to criticize in the conduct of the action on the Parliamentary side; certain it is that, despite the unquestionable valour of their opponents, they were able to carry out their object, that of marching on London. This point must be clearly kept in view. The destruction of the King's army, and the pursuit that should always follow a victory in order to reap the full results of the success, were not necessary here. The Earl wanted the right of way and he obtained it. Though the King's army still held Newbury, it had been definitely forced back into the town. The pursuit effected by Rupert was practically barren of results, and cannot be taken as a proof that the King could claim to have won the hard-fought field. If a few enthusiastic troopers could, as they did, follow the plume of the dashing cavalier, the rest of the army could not. The barren occupation of the battle-field, which can be the only grounds on which the Royalists could base their claim, was solely possible because Essex did not want it. The advance of the weak force by Guyer's Lane on the passage of the Kennet may be looked as a mere petty reconnaissance on that side, and could exercise no influence on the fortune of the day. To get hold of the river line and Newbury was not Essex's object, and no importance should be attached to this affair. The value of the reserves and their usefulness in checking the counter attack of the Royalist cavalry on the then exposed left flank of the left wing, resting as it was almost "en l'air," in the field, is clearly noticeable, and on this side the fight was ably and well conducted; but it is difficult to see why the attack of the right wing was not more vigorously pressed.

A more determined advance by Trundle Hill would have taken in flank and soon in reverse the line of Royalist guns, already fully engaged with the musketeers and artillery of the left wing from Skinner's Green. Moreover an advance in echellon from the right, that is gradually advancing that wing further than the other, without destroying connection and communication between them, would not merely have brought his force across the flank of the Royalist army, but have prevented altogether an advance of the King's right on the Kintbury road, which was always possible and might have been dangerous. The probable explanation is that the open nature of the ground rendered the advance on this flank difficult against troops that could display such bravery and tenacity as the cavaliers of the King.

Turning to the Royal forces there is less to criticize, the more so as the details of their dispositions are somewhat wanting. Their left wing seems to have been well posted, and to have effectually checked the advance of Essex's right; but it is a question whether the massing of all their artillery from the commencement so far back on the Wash was advisable. Evidently their chief wish was to block the way simply; and the King appeared desirous of

offering a passive resistance, so that the artillery position as selected, resting as it did with both flanks on the slope, north and south of the narrow neck of the Wash, across which the entrenchment stretched and the main road ran, seems well chosen at first glance to fulfil the object, especially bearing in mind the short range of the field artillery of the period. But the left was liable to be taken in enfilade from Trundle Hill, and the right could be threatened from the cover of the hedge-rows of Dark Lane which approached to within musket shot of the King's guns. Further the Royalist account states that they were much annoyed by the fire of the Parliamentary guns on the Round Hill, and it was owing to their position that the counter attack along the valley towards Newbury was mainly checked. It has been already pointed out that this side was for Essex that which was most vital to him.

It would have been wiser therefore for the Royalists to have prevented the occupation of the round spur above Cope Hall; and this need not have been done, as suggested by them, by the actual occupation of the ridge, but by holding with their foot the hedge-rows of Dark Lane, and placing their right wing artillery or a portion of them on the spur to the right rear of the lane, whence they could both cover the low valley towards the Kennet, and at the same time bring so powerful a fire on the "round hill" as to preclude the possibility of the guns of the attack coming into action. In fact that two batteries, one on the spur east of Dark Lane, the other at about the same position as the entrenchment actually occupied, with the left flank well "refused" or thrown back so as to meet the fire from Trundle Hill, would have made the occupation of the "round hill" impracticable. The right wing battery thus echelloned would have been protected from cavalry attack by the hedge-rows, and could have fired, over the heads of the musketeers there, on the opposing artillery when endeavouring to unlimber. Though not definitely stated, the piercing the Royal centre by Falkland Farm, which seems to have been Essex's main attack, must have been coupled by an advance of his right from Trundle Hill, and the greatest credit is due to the King's commander in having been able, as he did, to withdraw under these circumstances all his forces into Newbury without having, as is often the case, the two wings separated and driven in diverging directions from the field.

The charge of the Royalist cavalry under Falkland against the hedge-rows of Dark Lane was a daring and gallant action, but a useless waste of life. In all probability it would have been difficult even for a good horse and rider in the hunting field; how much more so with the weight of armour and the intense excitement of the charge.

The spirit lived (and let us hope it still survives) in the breasts of those who rode so gallantly to death up the Balaklava Valley

against the Russian guns; but the French Marshal's remark that "c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre," is as true of the gallant cavaliers of Charles I., as it was of the fearless horsemen of Cardigan's light brigade.

55

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX I.

A LIST OF THOSE REGIMENTS OF TRAINED-BANDS AND AUXILIARIES OF THE CITY OF LONDON, WHICH WERE ENGAGED AT THE FIRST BATTLE OF NEWBURY.

Extracted from a MS.* by Richard Symonds (author of the "Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army"), entitled:

"THE ENSIGNES† OF Y REGIMENTS IN Y CITTY OF LONDON
BOTH OF TRAYNED BANDS AND AUXILIARIES.

TOGEATHER WTH THE NEAREST NUMBER OF THEIR TRAYNED SOLDIERS,
AS THEY MARCHED INTO FINSBURY FIELDS, BEING THEIR LAST GENERALL
MUSTER.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMB. 26, 1643.

ANNO PESTIFFERÆ REBELLIONIS."

THE RED REGIMENT OF TRAYNED-BANDS.

This Regimt. was not at ye generall Muster in ffinsbury ffeilds.

Musketts

Pikes

Officers about
The Totall

Came from Newbery on Thursday, Sep. 28, 1643.

Collonel Isaack Pennington, Vsurper Maior, 1643.

Colonels Captayne Richard Verner.

The limitts of this Regimt

Cornhill, Lumbard-street, Fenchurch, the vpp. pt. of Grace
Church Street, &c.

Lieut. Col. Robt. Dauies

a Slop-maker for Seamen neare Billingsgate.

Srieant Maior Tho. Chamb'laine. O viol' a Merchant, liuing neare Lenden hall.

1. Capt. Thomas Player

a hosyer and wholesaleman for narrow wares, liuing vpon new ffish street hill.

2. Capt. Chr. Whichcott, a merchant

Colonel of the Greene Regimt. of Auxiliaries about Cripplegate.

3. Capt. Wm. Manby, clerke of Leathersellers hall.

4. Capt. Joseph Vaughan, displaced.

* Harl. MS. No. 986.

+ The Ensigns or Colours of Regiments and Companies, given in the 'Diary,' are not reproduced here.

THE YELLOW REGIMENT OF TRAYNED-BANDS.

This Regt. marched 2a into ye feild at ye generall Muster aforesaid and consisted of

Collonel Thomas Adams, Alderman, he was not at Newbury.
Collonel's Captayne Edw. Clegatt.

Limitts of this Regimt

pt. of Thames Street, beginning at St. Magnus Church and reacheth to Bread Street, Dowgate, Walbrooke, ffriday street and part of Watling Street, &c.

Lieut. Col. Francis West, A Silke man liuing in Bread street.

This West was Colonel of this Regimt. at Newbery. Capt. Edw. Stoning was his Capt.-leiut. there, and shott in the heele and dyed at Reading and buried [there].

Srieant Maior Wm. Vnderwood, a Tobacco Seller in Bucklers Bury. Capt. Rich. Hacket prceded this Vnderwood in this Regimt but left them refusing there oath of Associacon and is now in his Maties Service. Garlicke hill and Queene Hithe Company.

1. Capt. Edw. Bellamy

a Vintner at the Rost on ffleetbridge.

a ffishmonger in Thames Street neare the Bridge. Capt. Rich. Hacket was Capt. of this Company.

2. Capt. John Booker

Register to ye Com'issioners of Banckrupt.
Liuing in Wallbrooke.

3. Capt. Geo. Dipford, aly Merchant.

a Linnen Drap' neare Bow Church in the Ch. yard.
Cheape Side Company agt. the Standard.

St. Antsokins Bow-Lane, &c. Company.

4, Capt. William Coleson.

he wth his Company carried the Statues in the Church of Allhallowes to ye Parliam.

A Dyer liuing neare Dyers hall in Thames in Little All-hallowes p'ish. tenant to N.E.H.

THE BLEW REGIMENT OF TRAYNED-BANDS.

This Regimt. was not at this Muster but came from Newbery on Thursday, Septemb. 28, 1643.

It was the biggest Regimt of ye Trayned bands 1400 of them at Bramf. or Turnha' greene.