safety, they rushed to arms; and country people who had thought but little of the right of taxation, or at least had not interested themselves in the matter, felt the wrongs which the plundering soldiery inflicted on them. Bold attacks were made by Washington on portions of the British army at Trenton and Princeton; in which he came off victorious, and raised the sunken courage of the Americans to such a pitch, that they encountered greater dangers with intrepidity.

On the 11th of September, 1777, Washington was defeated at the river Brandywine by a superior English force; on the 26th of September, the victors occupied Philadelphia; and on the 14th of September, General Burgoyne reached Saratoga with a strong army, on his march from Canada. The great and judicious plan of uniting the northern and southern portions of the English army, of completely hemming in New England, and of then reducing the less zealous colonies to subjection, seemed to have already succeeded; and there was scarcely an Englishman at that moment who doubted a speedy and happy termination to the war.

But as the danger became more imminent, the activity and resolution of the Americans also increased; and while Washington watched the southern divisions of the English, they kept collecting in greater numbers to oppose Burgoyne's progress. The latter found the ways nowhere open; and while he was anxiously awaiting the arrival of his countrymen from the south, they lost time in useless maraudings, and at length turned back when they had already traversed the greater part of the way. In the meantime Burgoyne's army became more closely surrounded, his retreat was blocked up, his stock of provisions exhausted, and there remained no hope of winning a battle against his far more numerous and well posted enemies. Burgoyne was thus compelled, on the 16th of October, 1777, to surrender, at Saratoga, himself and his army to General Gates;* on condition that all should be allowed a free retreat to England, and promising that they would not again serve against America during the war. The Americans took 5,790 prisoners, 35 pieces of cannon, 4,687 muskets, and many other munitions of war, which were of great use to them.

This great and unlooked for event decided, if not the fate of America, at least the views of the European powers, especially France, concerning the revolt of the colonies. With respect to this, it has been said time and again, "the cabinet of Versailles displayed profound policy and unwonted skill. Nay, it can be affirmed that the French government has never, and on no important occasion, exhibited so much sagacity and firmness.Ӡ

*Gates was for a while opposed to and even exalted above Washington by a party. The former, however, was presumptuous, irresolute, and altogether of a mean disposition.-Life of Hamilton, i. 124, 127.

† Marten, Causes Célèbres, i. 498.

What we are to think of these praises, is shown in the printed correspondence of the American envoys and the unprinted correspondence of the English ambassador at Paris, Lord Stormont.* It deserves to be communicated in this place somewhat at length, since it gives very instructive disclosures respecting the views of the English, the Americans, and the French.

On the 7th of September, 1774, Lord Stormont writes from Paris: "I will not trouble you with the particulars of the reasonings of our philosophers, wits, and coffee-house politicians here; who all, without exception, are zealous Americans, and affect to regard them as a brave people, fighting for their natural rights, and struggling to wrest them from the hands of haughty and passionate masters. Their favorite argument is, that since the Americans are not represented in our Parliament, they ought not to render obedience to our laws. This argument they turn about on all sides, and amuse themselves with empty, vague, and general theories, the usual cloak under which men of parts conceal their ignorance. They speak in a way that must surprise every body who is not as well acquainted with this country as your lordship, who knows with what self-conceit the French talk of what they know least about, and how they make up in petulance what they lack in knowledge. Then too there are people here of quite a different stamp, who indeed grant, in general terms, that our right is very clear; but who think, or pretend to think, that it would be better for us to lay it aside and assent to the claims of the Americans, unfounded as they are, rather than bring on an open quarrel in which we must be the losers at last. These say, that by virtue of the natural and inevitable course of human affairs, in the extraordinary increase of the population, power, and trade of North America, a time must arrive when the struggle for independence in all our colonies must become general. Impelled by this spirit and conscious of their own superior power, they would cast off all dependence on the mother-country, and form an immense kingdom of their own. This event, it is said, no human prudence can avert; and by the greatest wisdom that which cannot be healed can only be hidden or postponed for a season at the most."

At that time the French ministers said nothing at all respecting American affairs, and even a year later (20th September, 1775) Lord Stormont writes: "The whole tenor of the speeches of M. de Vergennes (and he spoke on this occasion often and decidedly) convinces me that the French will grant no aid to the American rebels with the consent of the government." Yet M. de Vergennes had already, on the 7th of August, 1775, written the following to Count de Guines, to be communicated to the Ameri

• Raumer's Beiträge, v. 209-264.

cans: "We admire the greatness and nobleness of the American exertions, and have no interest in injuring them. On the contrary, we would see with pleasure the time when fortunate circumstances should put it in their power to visit our ports, where the facilities afforded them with respect to their trade would evince the esteem which we cherish for them."

These sentiments hardly remained a secret; nor did the outward show of non-compliance prevent either the ardent friends. of the Americans or interested merchants from entering with them into a variety of connexions, which the French government-in accordance with the above-did not feel itself called upon to prevent by force. Yet the important question respecting lawful and illicit trade could even now not be wholly avoided. To English remonstrances, M. de Vergennes replied: "It is not allowed to export powder and munitions of war without permission from the government, which will not be granted. The governors of the French islands shall be ordered anew to afford no sort of assistance to the Americans."

6

After the actual outbreak of the American war, the state of things became of course still more involved, and apprehensions respecting the mutual positions of France and England still greater. Of this Lord Stormont, on the 13th of October, 1775, gives the following remarkable account: "M. de Vergennes said to me, We wish to live in perfect harmony with you, and are far from meditating any thing that could add to the embarrassments of your present critical condition.' He used the words, 'Far from wishing to add to your embarrassments, we regard them with some uneasiness (avec quelque peine). What is now happening to you in America is nobody's business (n'est de la convenance de personne). I think,' he continued, 'that I perceive the consequences that must ensue, if your colonies should ever gain the independence they seek for. They would at once set about building fleets; and as all possible advantages for ship-building are at their command, they would soon do more than resist the united naval force of Europe. With such a superiority, connected with all the advantages of position, they would be in a state to take both our islands and your own. Nay, I am satisfied they would not stop here, but in the course of time would advance to South America, subdue or drive out the inhabitants, and at length would leave no European power a foot-breadth of land in that quarter of the world. All these results indeed will not ensue immediately; neither you, my lord, nor I will live to see them; but they are none the less certain because they are A short-sighted policy may rejoice in a rival's distress, without a thought beyond the present hour; but he who sees further and weighs the consequences, must regard what is be

remote.

falling you in America as a misfortune in which every people that has possessions there bears its share;-and in this light, I assure you, I have always viewed the matter.'

Maurepas said to me: We are not the people to take an undue advantage of circumstances and fish in troubled waters. Our wish and intention is to live with you in peace and friendship, and to regulate the affairs of our own country as well as we can.'

About the time of the Declaration of Independence (July, 1776) Mr. Silas Deane arrived in Paris as the secret plenipotentiary of the United States, and received from M. Vergennes the reply: "We cannot openly support the Americans, but will lay no obstruction in the way of their plans for making purchases."* About the same time Lord Stormont wrote: "Even on the supposition most favorable to us, that the preparations of France are founded merely on prudence and are intended for self-defence, the apparatus at any rate is put in readiness; and even should it not be used as long as Maurepas lives, it will be directed against us the instant it falls into rash hands. I can pass no decisive judgment on the present views and intentions of the French court. When I see their preparations, I think every thing is to be feared. When, on the contrary, I observe the state of the country and of parties in the court, the discontent in the army, the vacillation in their decrees, the exigencies of their finance, the character of the king (who does not possess the spirit of enterprise and thirst for glory from which a fondness for war proceeds), I cannot bring myself to believe that such hostile plans against us really exist as these preparations indicate. Yet there are men of consequence here, who, as I know, cherish hostile sentiments towards us, and who have often declared to their friends, that if they were in the ministry, they would amuse Great Britain with all possible promises of friendship, and then, when she least expected it, would fall on her in order to retrieve the losses of the last war and to revenge the manner in which it was begun. But none of these men are in favor, and as long as Maurepas's influence lasts, they will not come into play."

Already, before this account of Stormont's, M. de Vergennes had written, on the 10th of June, 1776, to the minister Clugny: "It seems to me that our political and commercial interests require us to treat the Americans favorably in our ports. Should they succeed in establishing the freedom of their trade, they will have already become habituated to dealing with our merchants; should they be defeated, they will at any rate have carried on for some time an exchange of commodities evidently advantageous to us. I think, therefore, we must show the greatest favor to the American ships."

*Diplomatic Correspondence, edited by Sparks, Vol. i. p. 13.

Looking anxiously into the future, M. de Vergennes read, on the 31st of August, 1776, in the presence of the king and of the other ministers, a memorial in which he carefully examined and weighed the reasons for and against war. The decision he left ' to the king's wisdom, but laid by far the greater stress on the reasons for war. These reasons in favor of war obtained a twofold weight, when the new minister of finance, Necker (who, as Lord Stormont very justly remarked, saw every thing in the fairest, but on that very account in the most erroneous light), gave in a brilliant account of the state of the French finances; and when Benjamin Franklin, in December, 1776, came to Paris, to assist Deane in his labors. Franklin's cheerfulness, simplicity, and sound sense, together with his great knowledge, insured him applause and influence. Yet it has been remarked that he sometimes showed himself cautious, cunning, and even avaricious; or that at any rate he sank in comparison with the spotlessly pure and noble character of Washington.*

To Franklin's propositions the ministers gave the following verbal reply: "As the king is determined to direct his attention to the restoration of the finances and the improvement of the internal administration of his kingdom in all its different branches, he cannot think of embarking in a war. He is inclined to listen to the proposals of the colonies, and to promote their views, as soon as they have given more consistency and stability to their assumed independence; but at the present moment, the king (unless England, contrary to all expectation, should declare war) can merely grant protection and a refuge to those persons who may resort to his country. Moreover, he is resolved not to take part in any way in the present quarrel, but to observe the strictest neutrality."+

These words receive their explanation from what took place. Numberless Frenchmen applied to Deane, to be taken into the American service; Lafayette sailed over, full of youthful enthusiasm and hindered only in appearance, to the land of new blooming freedom; Beaumarchais provided warlike stores of various kinds; and in March, Deane mentions, not without astonishment, that while cannons, muskets, and other munitions of war had been supplied from the king's magazines to be transported to America, the French minister conducted himself towards the American plenipotentiaries as if he knew nothing about it. He did every thing possible to keep the English minister quiet, and publicly prohibited what he privately allowed.

*Morellet, i. 290. Grahame's United States, iii. 426.

↑ Stormont's Report of January 1, 1777.

Diplomatic Correspondence, i. 71, 93.

Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 271.