A like resolution was passed by the legis

Thomas Jefferson."* lature of South Carolina.

The entire progress of mankind is never committed to the hands of an individual; but hardly ever has one man ventured and performed as much in this way as Thomas Jefferson. The veneration felt for the experience and institutions of Europe, the natural inclination towards what is customary and known, and the dread of what is unknown and unheard of, would perhaps have caused America (notwithstanding the essential difference in her circumstances) to permit herself to be forced or talked into adopting the worn out institutions of old Europe. The opposition raised by Jefferson and his friends excluded this possibility for ever, and put an end to the strife. Then, and not till then, was a new world for the historian and statesman really created; and Jefferson remains the greatest, most active, and most peaceful republican of all that history has recorded.

CHAPTER XII.

THE RACES OF MANKIND AND SLAVERY.

Slavery in general-Justification of Slavery-Aristotle-Hobbes-Races of MenNegroes, Mulattoes, Quadroons-Mind and Morals of Negroes-History of Slavery Arguments for and against Slavery-Condition of the Slaves-Madison's and Jefferson's Slaves-Ills of Slavery-Backward condition of the Slave States-Liberia-St. Domingo-Abolitionists-Channing-Laws of the StatesAbolitionists-Emancipation, Indemnification-Jefferson's views-Partial Emancipation-Defence of the Colored Men-Antilles-Arguments in favor of the Slave States-Congress-Missouri and Columbia-Internal Slave Trade-Manumissions-Labor of Whites and Blacks-Ascription to the Soil-Subjection to Tribute-Dangers and Prospects.

WERE it my intention to write a history of the United States, I should be obliged still to confine myself to the order of time. Their development however has not been, like that of so many other states, chiefly in an external direction and for the most part impeding and destructive, but has been, on the contrary, an internal, promotive, and truly progressive one-in a word, one which, with slight interruptions, has proved essentially peaceful. Hence,

* Barbé-Marbois, Louisiana, p. 474. It is so much the more to be lamented that Jefferson's simple monument at Monticello should be in such a neglected and even ruinous condition.

after having described the liberation and founding of the United States, the further account of them may be more suitably arranged according to subjects than by years or the changes of presidents. It is only after our survey has been more widely extended, and when the state of things both material and spiritual has become better known, that the dramatis personæ will also appear to us in their true light and be more easily understood.

No question is taken up by the friends of the United States with more anxious concern, or by their enemies with more reproving wrath, than that of slavery; and now, after so much has presented itself to us in a brilliant light, it is necessary to examine into this dark or rather black side of American affairs, to explain its origin, ascertain its present condition, and contemplate its future prospects, before we can prudently and safely proceed further onward. It will not answer either to condemn slavery unqualifiedly beforehand and demand its unconditional abolition, or to look upon the fact as one which is natural and unalterable. On the contrary, the fact that slavery extends throughout the history of the world, compels us not to confine our observation to North America alone, but to set out from general principles, and to ask ourselves whether and in what manner that which is local and temporal can be regulated and judged thereby.

men.

Differences in mental vigor, moral dignity, and outward possessions, found and justify dominion and dependence among But since these differences never destroy personality, and convert a man into a mere thing, and since every one is entitled and bound to social relations, and is not excluded therefrom like the brutes, it follows that no man should have unlimited disposal over another, or, in other words, that slavery is unnatural and rests on force alone. It is a relation in which all reciprocity is wanting; where the rights are all on one side, and the compulsory obligations on the other; and where no means of dissolving this obligation is afforded or indicated by the law.

This view is said to be contradicted by: 1st, history; 2dly, the teachers of law; and 3dly, many of the most esteemed philosophers. We reply:

To objection Ist. From the mere historical existence of slavery, it by no means follows that it is either natural or just; otherwise all the follies, crimes, and sinful practices that have crept into society, might be justified in a like manner. History shows us rather, that cruelty and wrong ever meet sooner or later with their just punishment. The revolts of slaves are more natural than slavery itself.

To objection 2d. The Roman law seeks to establish and justify slavery in three ways:

a. By the jus gentium. According to the law of nations, pri

soners of war become slaves. But this so-called national right is now allowed on all hands to have been a national wrong; and from the right of putting to death, which is founded only on imminent peril, no right of reducing to servitude can be deduced after the danger is past.

b. By the jus civile. According to the civil law, he becomes a slave who sells himself to me as a slave. But for freedom and life there is, in the first place, no suitable price; and every transaction of this sort involves an enormous wrong (læsio enormis). Secondly, the purchase-money, according to the notions of slavery, usually goes at once to the master; so that in fact no compensation whatever is made. Thirdly, a man has even still less right to grant to another a despotic power over his life than he has to kill himself. Fourthly, none but a person can make a contract; but slavery destroys personality, and consequently it cannot proceed from a contract.

c. By the jus naturale. It is said, Some are born slaves. If the two preceding props of slavery are unsound, this falls away of itself, and there is left no mode of origin but through force and injustice.

To objection 3d. Aristotle says: "Wholesome as it is that the soul should rule the body, so wholesome is it that the master should rule the slave; for the difference between the two is almost like that between the soul and the body. The master stands by nature pre-eminent in excellence, mental powers, and virtue; while the slave uses only his body, and has merely sufficient intellect to comprehend that it is good for him to be governed."* I reply:

The soul's dominion over the body is by no means an unlimited one; on the contrary, there exists a reciprocity, a mutual influence exerted by the one upon the other. Neither is there an immeasurable difference as regards excellence between man and man. But even granting this to be the case, it would then be necessary to keep up a constant valuation of these differences, the results of which would to-day transport the slave into a master, and to-morrow the master into a slave.

Aristotle goes on to say, that he is by no means a defender of despotism and tyranny; that where dissension exists between master and servant, the natural slavery maintained by him (which can manifest only friendship) does not exist; and moreover, that a man of worth taken prisoner of war is not in his opinion a true slave at all.

Now as this presupposed friendship scarcely ever exists, Aristotle's theory of slavery falls wholly to the ground. Nay, he in fact admits as much himself, when he says in another place: "If *Politica, i. 4.

there be virtue among slaves, wherein consists the fundamental distinction between them and the free? And how can there be no virtue among slaves, seeing that they are still men and reasonable creatures ?"

This dilemma should have revealed to Aristotle in the first place the unnaturalness of slavery; moreover, he was by no means blind to the actual evils that arise from it.

Plato also makes mention of these evils and of the unnaturalness and danger of this relation; but he calls for no abolition of it, but merely for a mild treatment of slaves.*

It has been maintained that the Bible and the Christian religion nowhere prescribe the abolition of slavery. But the exist ence of slavery among the Jews furnishes no model whatever for imitation in our times; and if the New Testament contains none of the doctrines of the violent abolitionists, still less does it advocate the cause of the slave-dealers. How the command," Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," is to be reconciled with slaveholding, it is not easy to conceive.

It was the common opinion of the ancient world, that the greater the freedom possessed by some, the less must be that enjoyed by others. But with Christianity, the right and the recognition of personal freedom in the state, and of equality in the sight of God, were brought forward in so decisive a manner, that slavery can only continue to exist in opposition to the new doctrine that claims a release from it.

Hence, too, the pretended arguments in favor of slavery brought forward by modern philosophers, are less consistent and appropriate than those of the ancients. Thus Hobbes makes slavery originate in a contract, but allows to the master only, and never to the slave, a right to dissolve it. He contends that an injury can never be done to the slave by the master, since he has voluntarily subjected himself to the latter, and volenti non fit injuria. And along with this sophistry he has a large chapter on born slaves. Again, he maintains that if men should imprison and fetter their slaves, so as to show that they were not slaves willingly and by agreement, the latter would have a natural right not only to escape, but even to slay their masters!

Many other doctrines of modern law-teachers go no deeper into the subject: as for instance that virtue in slaves is indeed more difficult, but then it is so much the more meritorious ;consequently in order to produce such virtue, all the other institutions of the state should be so adapted as to render virtue difficult. So, too, the maxim, that it is good to have slaves and so keep them out of war, because war is thus made less sanguinary, would lead us rather to turn all the citizens into slaves, *De Legibus, vi. 177. † De Cive, viii. 4-8.

and thus after a novel fashion introduce perpetual peace into the world. Lastly, they say that the slave is better off than the freeman, inasmuch as he is released from many of the duties of citizens; but then cattle are better off still, and why not tie men up to the ox-crib at once?

It is not a subject of the slightest doubt for the philosopher, statesman, historian, and Christian of our day, that slavery and serfdom (the tyranny of the minority over the majority) are to be condemned, and that a quiet and suitable dissolution of these relations is possible. This assertion, however, holds good in the first place only for men of the same stock, of the same race. But now arises the very important and very difficult question, whether it is also applicable to men of a different stock, of different races, or whether in this case other principles and another mode of proceeding can be justified.

The view of some theologians, who connect the diversity of human races with the doctrine of original sin and a greater or less declension from God, can be of no practical use to us, inasmuch as the speculative questions respecting the how and the wherefore of this condition always remain unanswered. There is somewhat more precision in the question, whether or not all mankind descend from a single pair. The affirmative, which accords with the biblical narration, is usually held to be the most pious and religious. Naturalists, however, have very properly not allowed themselves to be deterred by this supposition from independent investigations. But while Rudolphi opposes the idea of a single Adam, and denies the degeneration of one race into others,* Prichard and Johannes Müller assert that all men are only varieties of one and the same stock, and that differences of color, size, &c. are never of so much weight and influence as to form separate species either among men or animals.

Much depends, in the first place, on what is meant by species. If the power of inter-reproduction is sufficient to determine this idea, then doubtless all men belong to one species; but this again does not establish à priori that God might not have created several pairs, whose posterity would be capable of reproduction. with one another.

The doctrine of mankind's descent from several original pairs does not by any means deny the unity of the human race; any more than the descent from a single pair can disprove the existing diversity between men, or demonstrate their perfect corporeal, mental, moral, civil, and political equality. Many, especially theological writers, have sought to find a blasphemy, an impeachment of the goodness and justice of God, in the assumption of a great and essential diversity in the races of men. But when they Physiologie, i. 50-53.