composed mainly of Sclaves, and assembled for the purpose of determining on what principles the Austrian State should be reconstructed. He felt convinced that the further execution of the scheme which he had originally concocted with Esterhazy had now become impossible, and hoped that by this means, although the arrangement with Hungary could no longer be prevented, it might, perhaps, be paralysed. At the same time, by proposing the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," Belcredi stultified the whole of his past federalistic policy, for the new representative body was only to be elected from that portion of the empire which is on this side of the Leitha, and thus excluded Hungary altogether. It cannot be doubted that Baron Beust insensibly led him on to adopt this plan, in order that the way might once more be cleared for the erection of the parliamentary tribune in Western Austria. The political short-sightedness of many who did not perceive the true object of these diplomatic tactics, has since led them to accuse Baron Beust of inconsistency, because he had signed his name to the patent calling together the "Extraordinary

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Reichsrath." They forgot that he had only been a very short time in the service of Austria,—that he was not the omnipotent statesman whose will was alone decisive, and that, notwithstanding, he had managed so cleverly that in the face of the September Patent," which was still in existence, the first step had been taken to rehabilitate a constitutional central parliament in Cis-Leithania. Count Belcredi, as we have seen, took this step with a very different object--that of bringing about the rejection of the compromise with Hungary. His line of conduct and that of Baron Beust were in direct antagonism; and the latter carried his point by ultimately getting rid both of Belcredi and his "Extraordinary Reichsrath." The solidarity which had developed itself between Baron Beust and the constitutional parties since his entrance into the Austrian Cabinet, became manifest by their jointly combating the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," and the credit of Belcredi's downfall, which he modestly attributed to the opposition of the German party, really belonged to him. His object was simply the restoration of a constitutional régime; and this he attained when, simultaneously

with the dismissal of Belcredi, Western Austria was once again placed in possession of her parliamentary rights. If Count Belcredi, on the one hand, imagined that he could use the Sclaves in the "Extraordinary Reichsrath" as a sort of counterpoise to the Hungarians, Baron Beust, on the other, conceived the idea, which was politically correct, that, like the Magyar element in Hungary, the German element in Western Austria, by virtue of its superior civilization, historical traditions, and, above all, the duration of the rights to which it laid claim, was essentially adapted to assume a prominent leading position. He deemed, and rightly, that there was no necessity, nor was there time in the then urgent state of affairs, to reconstitute Austria either by making a tabula rasa of its past and present political institutions, or by creating and establishing new principles of government by means of a constituent assembly. The first step to be taken was to effect the compromise with Hungary; and this, according to the tenor of the project which then already existed, was based upon the principle of a dualism which as clearly defined the position of the Germans in

Western Austria as that of the Magyars in Hungary. Public opinion was neither prepared for, nor favourable to, the idea of a federalistic formation of the Cis-Leithan Empire, which would have rendered a compromise with Hungary impossible. Political creations in constitutional states are always the result of the situation for the time being, i. e., the expression of the political exigencies of the moment. It was therefore necessary to hold fast to that which existed-the Constitution of February—and to that which was already projected the compromise with Hungary. Thus that continuity of rights, upon which the German party so strenuously insisted, would be re-established, and the February Constitution at the same time modified in accordance with the new dualist organization. The German party demanded the restoration of the Constitution and the immediate convocation of the ordinary Reichsrath, declaring that their participation in the "Extraordinary Reichsrath" was altogether out of the question, as the proposal to summon the latter was nothing but a futile attempt to compensate them for the "inhibition policy." Here we may ask, Were

these demands unreasonable? was it possible or right to disregard them at a moment when the sad events of 1866 had severed that connexion of the German element with their mothercountry which had existed for a thousand years -when the verdict had been pronounced excluding them from any further participation in its destinies ?

Meanwhile, Count Belcredi still continued to pursue the ignis-fatuus of his "Extraordinary Reichsrath," in the hope, by attaining it, of succeeding in his design to create a predominant Sclavonic representative body, and thereby prevent the Hungarian compromise, which Baron Beust had now seriously taken in hand. But Count Belcredi, whilst reckoning upon the Sclavonic opposition, lost sight of the heterogeneous nature of the elements and opinions which composed it, and which had, consequently, never yet contributed to any statesmanlike calculation, or assisted in the achievement of any positive result. Both Czechs and Poles resolved to bide their time; and being certain, in consequence of the electoral agitation which had been powerfully influenced