divine inspiration. They rather pride themselves on condemning in the lump all which these sacred records reveal; and despise a sentiment, however beautifully or reasonably expressed, the moment they discover it to be a text of Scripture. This is not mere carelessness, but determined opposition. Can this be innocent? If the young are peculiarly liable to be drawn aside to such conduct, may it not be hoped, that an attempt to exhibit the dangers of it will be listened to? Or will the self-conceit and hasty determination of that age, be found sufficient to make them set argument at defiance, and spurn all expostulation? If so, this can hardly be the result of serious, wellconsidered conviction; but rather of a consciousness that their notions will not bear examination; and a fear lest the gay loose conduct, founded on those opinions, should be proved dangerous; and a suspicion that their actual state before God is hopeless, upon such vague and ill supported principles. Surely it is worth while for any, to examine if all that is most important is secure or not. If they are right, the examination will be satisfactory; and if wrong, it may save them from ruin. " With many, we find, the statement that mental error is venial, passes as an undeniable axiom. On any doubt of this being expressed, a couplet from Pope (but a poor divine) is quoted, as settling the point conclusively : "For modes of faith let furious bigots fight, Here it is taken for granted, that a life is in the right, if a man is just, and especially if he is benevolent, to his fellow creatures; as if its regard to man were the only criterion of our conduct, and its regard to God were absolutely nothing. Yet it is evident, that the principle of action, the motive, is often the exact, nay the sole measure, of excellence or malignity. The preaching of Christ may seem to be a good action; yet many preached him out of contention, hoping to add to Paul, who was in bonds, an additional affliction. This base motive made the conduct base. It is taken for granted, too, that if one has any concern for divine truth, one must be a furious bigot. Whereas, an earnest desire to found right conduct upon right principles is not bigotry; nor is a man necessarily furious because he is in earnest. It is taken for granted, too, that bigotry can only be on one side. There are bigots to unbelief as well as to faith; to modes of scepticism, as truly as to modes of believing. And perhaps not less fury may show itself in those who clamour against religion, as harsh and severe. Men may be uncharitably urgent for charity; and oppressively insolent for freedom of thinking. They, would confine this liberty to themselves, which is the very principle of bigotry, and in its most hateful, because most barefaced, form. Those who wish to consider mental errors as venial, maintain that a man cannot believe as he pleases, or as he wishes; that he cannot force his mind to think what he does not think. Now this is greatly a false statement, and so far as it is true, it is not to the point. It is a false statement; for these very persons do form their faith, at least their notions, according to their wishes. They wish to have their minds left quite at liberty to embrace what notions may suit them, and therefore maintain, that any error in their opinions cannot be sinful. They wish to have the notions they thus form true, and therefore adhere to them at all events. They form to themselves in imagination a god according to their wishes, altogether such a one as themselves; because any other notion, any scriptural representation of the divine Being, would control their reason in a way their pride cannot bear, and curb their passions so as sensual indulgence dislikes extremely. They maintain, that believing any statement depends upon the evidence concerning it presented to the mind. Now this is in part true; evidence must be presented. Yet it is in part false; because, whatever evidence may be produced, if the mind will not examine it, or even look at it, the most weighty arguments can have no avail. Weakness in the visual organ, may prevent our discerning what is plainly set before us; and a wilful closing the eyes takes place frequently when we suspect that what is to be seen will be disagreeable to us. The disposition of the mind has therefore much more to do with our actual believing than the mere quantum of evidence. The perverseness and obstinacy of the will are extremely influential. All these points involve guilt, and make the error so held to be deeply criminal. It is "with the heart man believeth unto righteousness;" while therefore a heart of unbelief operates in a man, he will not believe on the Saviour, let the evidence produced be what it may. Prejudice forms a principal ingredient in unbelief; but prejudice supposes there has not been any suitable examination; the opinions formed under this influence most likely are erroneous, and so far as they are so, the error must incur guilt. If prejudice and pride, wilfulness and sensual appetites, are innocent, then the opinions formed under the influence of such principles may be innocent also. But the affirmative in this case can hardly be supposed; and if asserted and defended, it will only prove the evil to be deeper than is suspected by the parties, and beyond the power of mere evidence, how bright soever, to remove. The notion of mental error being venial, is full of evil influence on the mind in many ways. It takes away all fear of error, and sets the mind loose from every bond which might engage it to carefulness in its reasonings upon religi ous subjects. That hold which the revelation of divine truth ought to have is weakened. The mind feels at more ease without such shackles, and is soon induced to shake them off. When they have thus forsaken the word of the Lord, what wisdom is in them? |