through a long list. The mortar is usually placed in a pit out of sight of the target and becomes thus absolutely dependent upon the range-finders, communications, etc. Owing to its short length, low initial velocity and high angle of elevation, the mortar is also subject to many sources of error from which the gun is comparatively free. The mortar shell is so long a time in the air and so easily affected by wind that movements of the ship have more effect, while the difficulties in observation of fire are correspondingly increased.

Mortars and guns differ so much in their mode of action and service that it is only by a comparison that an idea can be obtained of the inherent difficulties involved in the successful handling of a large battery of mortars in action. With the gun increase of elevation gives increased range. With the mortar the reverse is true. The charge of the gun and weight of projectile are fixed and invariable, while the mortar uses different charges according to range and weight of shell. Change in range can be obtained by changing charge or elevation, or both. The main differences outlined are reflected in all the various details of organization and service, so much so that a good mortar gunner may be unfit to serve a heavy gun and vice versa.

In no branch of coast defense is careful training and experience more necessary than in mortar work. Both officers and men, to obtain any real proficiency, must be kept at the mortars for long periods continuously,-say two years. No officer can undertake to train men thoroughly in mortar service in less than a year's time. It is hopeless to expect proficiency in both systems of fire at the same time. A great desideratum is a carefully instructed regular corps of gunners and range-finding parties who can be depended upon in time. of war. Plenty of men can be quickly obtained for the usual manual labor about a battery, but the gunner cannot be improvised. His position should then be made of sufficient importance to secure good men and also to retain them in war-time.

Under the present system, mortars are grouped in pits of four pieces each. By firing all four at the same elevation and direction, the scattering effect is relied upon to a great extent to overcome the inaccuracy of the piece and movement of target. By a careful organization and drill, with great attention paid to all the details of range and position finding, and especially in the hands of an officer of judgment and experience, results can be obtained with mortars which are surprising to those whose conclusions are founded on general theoretical considerations. Under such conditions the mortar is found to be a very reliable weapon. With haphazard methods, where much is left to luck, good results cannot be expected of any arm, much less from the mortar.

Mortars, like heavy guns, are perfectly defenseless against attacks from the rear or from landing parties. To get good results the artillery forces must be entirely free from any apprehension on that score. This requires a large mobile force as supports. While the chances of any one mortar shot hitting the ship are much less than in case of the gun, still, when once planted, its shot is more effective and more decisive. This inherent inaccuracy demands a proper distribution of mortars in batteries and a liberal ammunition supply.

It is doubtful if the mortar will ever be seriously used against a moving ship, unless possibly in case of a fleet attacking, when everything is brought to bear against it. In such a case the mortar fire is directed, not against individual ships, but along the channel whence they must advance. Such fire will be more than annoying and can be carried out at ranges beyond that customary for guns on shipboard.

Another very valuable feature is the ease with which the mortar battery can be concealed. The best arrangement would evidently be to scatter the mortars about at different points of the harbor instead of concentrating them in large batteries. A converging fire can then be obtained, while the chances of silencing the fire by landing parties or other means would be much reduced. Even if one or more such batteries are captured, the rest could render the enemy's position untenable. The fleet would have to keep on the move to avoid destruction. Owing to the conformation of most harbors it is easy to scatter the mortars about on interior lines, safe from observation and from capture. Concealment thus obtained is an especially valuable feature. The harbor commander can reserve the fire of certain groups, keeping them ready to open when possibly the enemy is hotly engaged and not suspecting an attack from that quarter. A slight rise of ground will effectually conceal the mortar, while the sea front should always be left in its natural aspect. When a ship is attacking an ordinary shore battery she can usually locate the guns and reply with a degree of certainty or even of exultation. When, however, shots are dropping around her or on her decks, the source and direction of which cannot be obtained, and to which consequently no reply can be made, it needs little imagination to picture the resulting demoralization. Known dangers can be provided against and met. It is the unknown ones which must continue to exert an immense moral effect.

In coast defense, concealment must be carefully studied. Even if in advance of hostilities the enemy learns the location of batteries, it is certain that with a sufficient number of scattered mortar batteries such knowledge would be of little practical use. The idea then

would be to hold the enemy and attract his fire by the high-power guns, and then when he is fully committed and checked in his advance, to open with the mortars. Against such tactics he has small chance of success.

Another important use of mortars is to cover a harbor or roadstead and prevent its effective use by the enemy. A blockading fleet can, by mortar fire alone, be kept fully five miles out. At night when such a fleet usually closes in, the mortars can again cover the field so effectually, by a slow continuous fire, as to make the operation extremely hazardous, and as a result it would not probably be attempted. Suppose the enemy has finally broken through and entered the harbor. Every mortar must be silenced or captured before such occupation will be of much value to him. Once in, it is essential for him to be free and unfettered. His object was possibly to rest and refit or to use harbor as a further base of operations. Such occupation the mortar effectually prevents. It can almost be demonstrated that with numerous mortars, well scattered and well supported, their capture is impossible by any force the fleet can land.

In coast operations, as in land warfare, the battle is oftenest won by direct means and hard hitting. But on this account no prudent general can afford to neglect all those elements of surprise and concealment that so frequently contribute materially to the final result. This must be obtained by careful arrangements previously made. The harbor commander must work with what is prepared beforehand in peace times, and comparatively little can be effected in the short time after the outbreak of hostilities. Adequate preparation and a careful study of the situation in all its aspects must be relied upon to give him the victory.

The moral effect of submarine mines is well known. That of mortars, while less appreciated, is scarcely inferior. Scattered batteries mean increased difficulty of communication, but with wireless telegraphy, that question may be considered as settled. The plan of battle must be so arranged that any subordinate unit can be worked independently if need be, and to the last moment. Overcentralization is to be avoided. With these main elements fixed and settled, and with men well drilled and battery commanders familiar with the mortar and understanding its proper functions under the different circumstances that may arise, we may confidently expect the mortar to meet expectations and possibly surpass them. Conversely, where there is a deficiency in the number of pieces, where distribution, discipline or instruction are faulty, or where from any reason the mortar is considered as an auxiliary only and comparatively useless, the best results cannot be obtained and disappointment in its use can be confidently predicted.

E. W. HUBBARD, Captain, Artillery Corps.

THE DRAMA OF CHARLOTTE CORDAY.

CAEN, the chief town of the Department of Calvados, formerly the capital of Lower Normandy, stands on the left bank of the Orne, at a distance of one hundred and twenty-two miles in a northwesterly direction from Paris. It is in the middle of a fertile plain, its streets and squares are spacious, and many noble specimens of ancient architecture of the Norman school adorn the old-fashioned little city. There is the cathedral of Saint Etienne, founded by William the Conqueror; and La Trinité, or the Abbaye aux Dames, founded by his consort, Matilda; besides the churches of Saint Nicholas, Saint Pierre, and Saint Jean. But little is known of Caen until early in the ninth century, when it was taken possession of by the Normans.

It was to this picturesque place that, in the year 1793, came a number of the Girondin leaders who were proscribed by the Jacobins ; and it was here that they organized the abortive attempt against the Mountain and its terrible triumvirate. Caen then became famous as the home of Charlotte Corday. Whether this remarkable woman was an instrument of the Gironde, or a self-elected avenger, is still a matter of doubt and dispute. A studious review of her career may yet serve to shed light on the question.

Marie Anne Charlotte Corday d'Armont was born July 27, 1768, in a cottage called Le Ronceray, in the village of Saint-Saturnin des Ligneries, in the Department of the Orne. Her father, Jacques François de Corday, Sicur d'Armont, was a reduced country gentleman of birth and breeding, but of little else. Her mother was named Marie Charlotte Jacqueline de Gauthier des Anthieux. There were five children in the family,-two sons and three daughters, of whom Charlotte was the second. The mother died, and the little brood were left to themselves through the neglect of their father, a literary farmer, who sometimes wrote political pamphlets on the side of revolution. Charlotte, running wild with the children over the fields of Ligneries, clad in coarse cloth, Normandy fashion, and gleaning grain and gathering fruit in their season, took in with avidity her parent's republican views before she had grown to girlhood.

The D'Armont household breaking up by stress of circumstances, Charlotte, with her sisters, became an inmate of the Abbaye aux

Dames at Caen, of which Madame Belzunce was the abbess. Here she formed an affectionate school-friendship for two young ladies, Mesdemoiselles de Fandoas and de Forbin, although at this time of a religious and retiring disposition and not seeking companionship. When the monasteries were suppressed by the government Charlotte was nineteen. Her two brothers had emigrated, one of her sisters was dead, and the other was housekeeper for the father at Argentan; so she went to live with an aunt at Caen, the only resource which offered in the family poverty. Madame Coutellier de Bretteville-Gonville, an elderly widow, of the ancien regime, lived in a respectable, gloomy old mansion at the back of a retired court. It was still styled Le Grand Manoir, in memory of past honors. In this quaint, roomy manorhouse of the time of Louis XIV. Charlotte roamed about and daydreamed. She was a granddaughter of Pierre Corneille, the father of the French tragic stage. Her person was striking in the extreme, that of a thoroughly handsome, wholesome Normandy woman of quality. Tall, graceful, dignified of deportment, with thick folds of chestnut hair, expressive eyes of deep blue, and long lashes darker than her locks, features of Grecian mould, perfect teeth, and a cloudless complexion,-her aspect united loveliness with resolution and fortitude. She was a melancholy maiden withal, addicted to solitary musing in out-of-the-way nooks of the moss-grown manse, her principal pleasure being derived from poring over the pages of Plutarch and Jean Jacques Rousseau. On one occasion Madame de Bretteville surprised her niece in tears, and to her kind inquiry as to the cause of her grief she made answer, "I am weeping for the misfortunes of my country." Her contemplations in the lonely, secluded cloisters of the cathedral of Caen did not escape notice, and as she was often seen walking in that direction, the neighbors were wont to say that she was "animated with the soul of Christ." Highly imaginative and enthusiastic, of an emotional, poetic, and religious temperament, combining the warmth and impulse of the South with the strength, decision, and persistence of the North, Charlotte, at the age of twentyfour, needed but the awakened influences of patriotism upon her spirit to assume the rôle of a second Jeanne d'Arc. At that moment there were not wanting agencies to stir up the lurking fervor and fanaticism in her nature.

In the year 1793, it will be remembered that Jacobin and Girondin were at white heat of quarrel. Said Toulongeon, "Their mutual exasperation is becoming pale rage." Radicalism and conservatism were at duel. "The weapons of the Gironde," writes Carlyle, "were political philosophy, respectability, and eloquence." They were not inaptly styled by General Dumouriez, the Jacobin soldier of France, "the