effect of modern fire-arms and the more extended use of field intrenchments.

2. The correct estimation of the enemy's preparedness and strength is an important factor in the art of war.

3. It is very dangerous to hold on to what appear to be important points in the theatre of operations with large portions of the army of operation, and armies should never allow themselves to be shut up in fortifications, except when there is no other means left them to save themselves from destruction.

The Boers, in spite of their original offensive advance with its brilliant results, did not really possess the spirit of the offensive strategically, and were not capable of executing the offensive tactically, as shown by the subsequent events. In the early stage of the campaign the offensive is largely with them, yet even here the limitations of their offensive power,-in failing to strike hard when they had the opportunity, and more especially in neglecting that other essential element of the offensive, pursuit,-is but too apparent. On a small scale there were, on the part of the Boers, occasional offensive attacks and pursuits, as in some of the actions in Cape Colony, but never with large bodies of troops. For cohesive attack they lacked the necessary leaders, training, discipline and tactical organization, and for energetic and prompt pursuit they lacked cavalry, for although every Boer is mounted, he is not in a true sense a cavalry

man.

With the British the spirit of the strategical and tactical offensive was innate, and in the end asserted its superiority, but in the earlier stages of the campaign it did not make itself felt because of imperfect organization and field training, which led the British to adopt an offensive that was strategically unsound, in that the forces were too much subdivided, too greatly scattered, and not applied with the best effect, and in that the enemy was greatly underrated and the general situation very imperfectly known.

The one great cause of the early British disasters was their underrating the offensive and defensive power of the Boers. Under similar circumstances, any other nation might have made the same mistake, indeed, many another has done so; for example, France in 1870, and Russia in 1877, and England had the further excuse of the great distance of the scene of action from the home country. Still, history teaches us that wars against irregular troops, defending their country and their homes, are always to be rated among the most difficult undertakings, and when in addition the nation attacking has to do so over a long line of communications, extending across the ocean for thousands of miles, and against a nation well fed, and fully armed and

prepared, the difficulties increase a thousand-fold; hence, it is all the more important under these circumstances to estimate correctly the power of the enemy.

The lesson of Metz, where France lost practically two armies, Bazaine's and MacMahon's, appears not to have been taken to heart by the British, for White's decision to hold Ladysmith, and the announced intention to retain possession of Mafeking and Kimberley, tied the hands of the British leaders in the field, and increased the difficulties of the situation. Still, simple as the correct principle of action in this case appears to be, it is often so different in practice from what it seems to be in theory, that criticism must be passed with caution. If, as is stated, the fall of Ladysmith and Kimberley would have been the signal for a general uprising of the Dutch Boers in Cape Colony, the question involves other than purely military considerations.

These are the general principles of strategy exemplified by the campaign. The special principles that apply in particular cases we will consider in the order of their historic sequence.

In the first place, let us consider the strategic position at the outset. The wedge of Natal, projecting as it does into the Boer country, appears at first sight to confer the great advantage of always operating on interior lines. With such a position a comparatively small force is able to fall on the fractions of the enemy, as his separate columns cross the borders, and destroy them in turn. But in order to do this, the force within the wedge must be at least stronger than any one of the enemy's columns, but the superior force of the Boers enabled them to overcome this strategic advantage and turn the British positions. In occupying their too advanced position at Glencoe-Dundee, the British exposed their troops to disaster, for it is a maxim of war that when a commander endeavors to cover too much he is apt to cover nothing. By dividing into two forces, one at Glencoe-Dundee, the other at Ladysmith, the British so weakened themselves that when White moved out from Ladysmith to prevent the union of two Boer columns coming over the mountains, he had but three thousand men available, which was much below the strength of either Boer column. Had the troops been concentrated at one place, as at Ladysmith, he would have had 10,000 men available, a number which would have been far greater than either Boer column.

In the next place, let us consider the plans of campaign and their execution. The Boers' plan of campaign, to concentrate their several columns on the British position at Dundee and Ladysmith, was strategically sound and its practical execution was in the main tactically

correct. The subdivision of their forces into so many small subdivisions, which are exposed to the danger of being separately attacked and destroyed before they could reunite, is open to criticism, but the nature of the country probably forced this subdivision upon them. The strategic deployment and strategic advance of the Boers, due to their unity of plan and action, was of a high order, but they lacked the spirit of the initiative and the power of the offensive, as soon appeared in their further operations.

In the defense of Dundee and Ladysmith the British showed too great a tendency to be tied to localities. Instead of adding to the strength of the British attacking forces, they weakened the strategic plan, because there can be little doubt that Buller's subsequent movements were greatly influenced by the desire to relieve these besieged garrisons; had these forces retired they would have been available later to assist the advancing columns, instead of being held in check as they were for four months. The same may be said of the defense of Mafeking and Kimberley. Buller's plan of campaign after the first reinforcements began to arrive seems at first sight to have followed good strategic principles in dividing into two main columns, one over Durban-Estcourt, the other over Cape Town-Orange River Station, concentrating on the Boer country, with Pretoria as the ultimate objective. But the total strength of his command did not warrant any division; rapid and decisive results could only be expected by concentrating against the main Boer army in Natal. In the second epoch of the campaign the same mistakes in strategy were continued by the British, in operating on three distinct lines, separated by from 150 to 300 miles-one for the relief of Kimberley, another for the direct offensive from Queenstown towards Bloemfontein, and a third for the relief of Ladysmith-instead of concentrating on one, and these mistakes brought their natural consequences.

In the third epoch the brilliant campaign of Lord Roberts illustrates the effect of combining all the reinforcements on one line of advance. By dividing the reinforcements between the two columns of Methuen on the west and French in the center, the former would have had about 25,600 men, the latter about 24,000, but by concentrating on the west column he raised that to 50,000, and the results were decisive, rapid and far-reaching. They stand out in marked contrast with the early successes of the Boers, for whereas the latter were isolated successes of no general effect, the former entailed the retreat of the Boers along their entire line of defense as far east as Natal.

The strategic advance of the Boers over such widely separated lines (Natal, Cape Colony and the west) was in accordance with

sound principles of strategy, but the three lines should have been treated differently in a tactical sense: In Natal the strategical and tactical offensive were in place, because of the presence there of the main British force, and the shortness of the line of communications, whereas on the other two lines, after gaining possession of the network of railroads or destroying them, only the tactical defensive was warranted by the small Boer forces.

The occupation of Bloemfontein by Lord Roberts was a sound movement strategically, for it placed him in communication with the columns of Brabant, Gatacre and Clements, and secured for him a strong base and a railroad as a line of supply.

The weakening of the Boer forces in Natal, on the other hand, was very poor strategy, for they failed to help Cronje, or the other western army after his defeat, and they left the road to Ladysmith open. After the fall of Bloemfontein, however, the occupation of the difficult hill country to the east and southeast of that capital was a daring plan, and promised great results, for it placed on Lord Roberts' flank a force which compelled him either to turn aside from his advance on Johannesburg, or else leave his long line of communications open to flank attack.

Roberts' advance, conducted on a broad front, turning the Boer positions successively, was brilliant and effective, but tactically, as will appear further on, he did not reap the full reward of his successful strategy.

The Boers, instead of taking up the offensive and attacking the British around Bloemfontein with determination, split up their forces and engaged in a number of minor affairs which had no real connection with the original object of their strategical advance.

In the last epoch, Roberts' third campaign against Botha to the east of Pretoria was a splendid achievement. In the first two, however, he failed, because he had not advanced Buller from Laing's Nek to take Botha in flank, the movement which finally ended the organized resistance of the Boers.

TACTICS.

The great power of the defensive was so prominently brought out in the early part of this war that many authorities began to announce an entire change in tactics. Nevertheless, closer study soon showed the necessity for adopting the offensive in order to secure decisive results; indeed, this is the one great lesson taught by the

war.

The important tactical principles corroborated by the battles in South Africa are:

1. The purely frontal attack is no longer successful.

A frontal attack must always be combined with flank attacks, and the latter, in case the enemy takes prompt counter-measures, must be extended into far outflanking movements. Many portions of the line must stand temporarily on the defensive; such portions should resort immediately to intrenchments. The tendency of the British to make simple frontal attacks, as at Magersfontein, Modder River and Colenso, is to be condemned as too great a waste of life in these days of enormous strength of the defense; moreover, such attacks were invariably failures. Whenever they tried pressure on the flanks, as at Elandslaagte and Riedfontein, they were successful. The great percentage of losses in officers (at Glencoe, 141⁄2 per cent. of the total losses)* was due to the great power of the defensive. The officer's duty is to get his men forward, and if he stops to consider his own safety he is liable to miss his main duty.

2. Thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position is an essential preliminary to battle.

Before the battle of Colenso reconnaissance had established the presence of Boer forces south of the river; nevertheless Buller advanced to attack the Tugela line without determining the strength and position of these forces. Throughout the campaign this weakness of the British subordinate commanders is painfully in evidence, and many of the disasters were due to the neglect of proper reconnaissance and outpost duty. Even on the battlefield patrol duty between the separate columns was neglected, and at Nikolson's Nek this neglect resulted in the capture of one entire column, because it had not been informed of the repulse of the adjacent portions of the general line.

3. Turning movements must be supported by a general attack along the enemy's front.

The neglect of this was the grave fault of several of Buller's battles: Spion Kop, Vaal Kranz, Pieter's Hill. The object is to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the threatened point. An energetic attack along the entire line would have prevented that constant shifting of forces by the Boers which enabled them to make such good use of their small force and their interior lines.

4. The offensive alone promises decisive results.

This is the great lesson of the war. The lack of the tactical offensive on the part of the Boers neutralized all the advantages of their brilliant strategical offensive in Natal, and enabled the British to transfer the decisive theatre to the west. So long as the Boer defensive remained

* At Spicheren the Germans lost 4 per cent.