ing the enemy; secondly, in that the maneuvers were not conducted on a scale sufficiently extensive to make the officers familiar with the handling of large bodies on the battlefield-the former explaining why the British were continually surprised by the flanking movements of the Boer lines, and the latter accounting for the tactical errors considered further on.

In this, the lesson for us to learn and take to heart is that maneuvers on a large scale are absolutely necessary to train the officers of an army, and now that we have such strong advocates of this as the President of the United States and the Secretary of War, the efforts of our department commanders and other progressive officers for the past fifteen years promise finally to bear fruit.

The fine marksmanship of the Boers and its great advantage to them also suggests the necessity for thorough infantry target practice, but in this respect we are probably superior to most European armies, and it is only necessary to keep up our good work.

The necessity of more thorough instruction in the care of troops in the field, in hygiene and sanitation, especially for the officers, was made evident in this war as well as in other recent wars. The British losses in killed (or mortally wounded) in battle, up to October 21, 1900, were 391 officers and 3,795 men, while those who died of disease numbered 162 officers and 6,350 men. As a general rule, losses by disease in long-continued wars far exceed losses in battle, and another fact worth noticing is that the losses in battle grow smaller as the war progresses, while those from disease grow greater, and the latter in a higher ratio for the men than for the officers.

This should teach us to introduce a thorough and systematic course of instruction in this subject not only at the Military Academy but also in each of our schools of application for officers.

War Material.-The war material of the two armies differed greatly, yet in spite of the fact that the British could draw on all the most recent inventions and scientific apparatus, in the two most essential elements on the battlefield (small arms and artillery), the Boers were superior.

The small arms used in the Boer war are of especial interest to the military world, because in this war small-calibre magazine rifles were used on a large scale for the first time in history.

The British army was armed principally with the Lee-Metford rifle 89 M. II, while the Boer army had mostly the Mauser gun-the Transvaal Boers the model '93-'95, the Orange Boers the latest model, '98. Fire effect serves as a basis for all tactical deductions, and in this respect, in spite of the other advantages of the Mauser gun, the two must be regarded as practically equal on the field.

Among the interesting lessons of this war are the physiological effects of the modern infantry arm. All authorities agree that the wounds from the small-calibre bullets are more humane than those from the older large-calibre projectiles; indeed, according to the eminent English surgeon, Sir William MacCormac, the human body can in many cases be perforated by the bullets without fatal results, most of the wounds leaving a very small opening at the points of entrance. and of exit, stopping bleeding of themselves, and healing very rapidly, so that about 96 per cent. of the wounded at the base of operations in South Africa recovered. According to Prens, in the British Medical Journal, the Mauser bullet at ranges of from 1,500 to 2,000 yards goes through bones like a needle, and only at close ranges (up to 500 yards) does it shatter the larger bones, while breast wounds heal readily; amputations are therefore rarely necessary.

The relative advantages of the British and Boer small-arms are still somewhat undecided, but the possession of a bayonet gave the British a decided advantage over the Boers (who were without one), not because hand-to-hand conflicts are liable to be very common in modern war, but because the moral effect of its possession confers tenacity on the defense and confidence and esprit on the attack.

The lesson for us then is very plain: we must possess a small-arm at least equal to that of any other nation in fire effect, and the bayonet should be retained.

The field artillery material used by the two armies is an interesting study, and warrants careful consideration, for the experiences of the war in this respect have revolutionized the world's ideas.

It so happened that about the time the war opened the field artillery of Europe was in a transition stage, but whereas on the Continent rearmament with the new material had commenced, England, slow to adopt the changes effected on the Continent, had been content with merely modifying her carriages, while the guns remained the same. Now, since the Transvaal had been arming since 1896, purchasing the best material procurable, and naturally on the Continent, the result was that the Boers were possessed of the latest quick-firers, with fixed ammunition, and the effective ranges exceeded that of the British field gun by a considerable amount.

The principal field guns of the British at the end of the year 1899 were the 12- and 15-pounders, 3-inch, breech loaders, M. 95, and the 5-inch field howitzers firing shrapnel, canister and lyddite shell. The Boer pieces carried in the field were mainly 7.5 cm. R. F. Krupp, and the same calibre Schneider-Canet guns, with a few 15.5 cm. of the latter, and a number of automatic and machine guns (Maxim and Maxim-Nordenfeldt), commonly called "pom-poms."

The British field gun had a maximum range, at 15 degree elevation, of 5,500 yards, but could fire 2,000 yards farther. They could not utilize the extreme range, however, because their sight was not graduated, and their tables were not worked out, beyond 5,500 yards; moreover, their shrapnel was timed only to 4,000 yards. The Boers, on the other hand, by burying the trail, and by firing as they usually did from above downward, could attain the extreme range of 7,000 yards, and their fuze was graduated up to 4,200 meters (or about 500 yards farther than the British), beyond which they fired shell. The British. had, therefore, nothing in the way of a field piece to oppose to the Boer fire of over 4,000 yards. The British 5-inch howitzer had a range of only 4,900 yards, and frequently failed to be of use on that account.

Small as these differences were, they proved great in effect, for they enabled the Boers with single guns to put a number of shell into a British battery before the latter could reply, and the only reason they failed to accomplish more than they did was because they had but a small number of guns and did not know the value of concentrating their fire.

At Venters Spruit* some forty British guns were forced to remain idle, while a few Boer guns shelled the crest of the hill: if only the British guns had had a little longer range they might have afforded some valuable assistance to the troops on top of Spion Kop. Again, in the demonstration against Brakfontein heights, preceding the attack on the Vaal Kranz, six field batteries were so effectually outranged that they had to stand still, to be shot at; and a few days later, the single Boer gun on the Doornkloof defied all the British guns in the plain: a howitzer of sufficient range was all that was needed to silence it.

The advantages conferred by the possession of a few guns of position were so marked in this war that they, too, are considered an essential part of a modern field army. The 15.5 cm. guns of the Boers had a remarkable effect on the tactics of several battles, and the five 4.7-inch guns taken from the ships and sent into Ladysmith before its isolation probably saved it from falling into the hands of the Boers.

The lesson taught by these experiences has already been learned by the nations, and the proper equipment of an army as regards field artillery is now considered to be a quick-fire gun, perhaps a little more mobile than the present field gun, capable of accompanying mounted troops on the march; a heavier gun of long range

*The Second Boer War. Wisser. Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co.

and a howitzer, capable of moving with infantry; and a light mountain gun in country admitting only of pack-animal transportation.

Our own Ordnance Department is now considering the following guns for field artillery: A 15-pounder, a 30-pounder and a 60-pounder gun. In the modern weapon mobility is more easily attained, and there is no doubt but what these pieces can be made sufficiently mobile to meet the demands of the service for which each is designed. There is a tendency, too, to reduce the muzzle velocity, since the new guns with comparatively low elevations are liable to turn over backward, whereas if the muzzle velocity were reduced the carriage. would be much more stable and higher elevations could be given the piece. A reduction from 1,800 ft. sec. to 1,650 would make but little difference in the remaining velocity at 3,000 yards (a good fighting range), because the velocity in the first case falls off rapidly in the first few hundred yards where it is not needed.

The pom-poms, or machine guns, in spite of their great moral effect and their mobility, proved in reality very ineffective, because the low weight of projectile limited its action in depth.

The necessity for howitzers, however, was clearly shown in this campaign, and nearly every nation of any consequence has adopted them.

Among the more scientific material which received application in the Boer war, and which will probably be made use of on a large scale in future wars, may be mentioned the heliograph, wireless telegraphy, balloons, traction engines, and searchlights.

Communication with besieged Ladysmith was kept up by means of a heliograph station on Mount Umkolumba, near Weenan, and by wireless telegraphy. Almost daily communication was kept up, and by the middle of January, 1900, over 41,000 words had been sent by heliograph alone.

There were also several balioons in Ladysmith which did excellent service, but those with the field armies in Natal and Cape Colony did not prove so useful.

Traction engines proved of such value that they are now considered an essential part of the equipment of a great army, and the more important nations of Europe have already a number in store for use in future wars.

Searchlights were part of the equipment of the traction engines, but a few were also taken from the naval vessels and mounted on railway cars. Their use in future will probably also be very extended.

The necessity for promptly repairing important railway bridges after their destruction by the enemy, has also indicated the advisability of having bridge sections on hand at the opening of a war to be

quickly shipped to points where they are required. The delay to the British, caused by the destruction of the bridge over the Tugela at Colenso, emphasized this fact, and it may be noted that the permanent repair of this bridge by sections constructed in England, in a very short period, was a remarkable feat in engineering.

Preparedness.-The degree of preparedness of a nation is a very important factor, and may have an immense influence on the strategy as well as the tactics of the campaign.

The Boers were as well prepared as they could be with their limited resources, but the English, although they had known for years that a collision with the Transvaal was inevitable, closed their eyes to the strategic situation, and kept the military forces in South Africa, with 6,000 miles separating them from the mother co entirely insufficient strength. In proof of this it is only necessary to refer to the small force left in Natal at the outset of the campaign, the weak garrisons at Kimberley and Mafeking (guarding the important railroad from Cape Colony to Buluwayo), and the insignificant forces on the Orange River, covering the Port Elizabeth railway.

In the shipment of troops and material we find other indications of unreadiness. The slowness with which the first troops were assembled and shipped was probably due to the lack of a full supply of clothing and equipment in the storehouses; and the fact that the cavalry division and the field artillery arrived after the infantry must be attributed to faults in system and organization. The want of artillery material, both field and siege, in sufficient quantity made itself felt early in the war, and was due to the lack of a chief of artillery, who could demand that the proper guns be sent, and who could be held responsible for not having them on hand in time.

STRATEGY.

The campaign in South Africa, the first to fully illustrate the effect of the modern magazine rifle and of smokeless powder, furnishes no new principles of strategy or tactics, but merely substantiates the conclusions long ago reached by the best authorities.

Three great principles of strategy, long since established, are once more substantiated by a great war, and stand out in bold relief beyond the more complicated panorama in the field of tactics.

These principles are:

1. The offensive alone, strategically and tactically, can lead to decisive results. The power of the offensive holds good, in spite of all the new power of the defense, derived from the immensely increased