THE L. R. HAMERSLY CO.

49 Wall St., New York City.

L. R. HAMERSLY, Pres't. R. B. ROOSEVELT, Jr., Treas'r. L. R. HAMERSLY, Jr., Sec'y.

Do You Know

how fascinating English history really is? That England, during the past thousand years, has given to our literature more heroes and heroines than all the rest of the world and ages? What do you know of the private and personal lives of her queens, who, as well as being stately sovereigns with passions of love and hate, were living, palpitating women ?

Do you know of that king and queen who stood barefooted, and "all naked from their waists upward," in the great hall of Westminster? Or what plumber's dog licked the blood of a king? Or why Henry VII hanged his four English mastiffs as traitors? Or what king apologized for taking so long to die? Or why Marlborough and his duchess were disgraced?

Do you know the story of Thomas à Becket and the Emir's daughter? Of fair Rosamond Clifford's bower in the labyrinth at Woodstock, and the telltale silken thread on Henry's golden spur that led to her becoming a nun? Of Richard II and the fatal trap-door of Vidomar? Of the dreadful warning that hung over the bed of Isabella of Angoulême? Of the queen who was discovered in London, disguised as a cook-maid?

Do you know how the mere fact that the Duchess of Marlborough putting on, by mistake, the queen's gloves, changed, as Voltaire says, the destinies of Europe? Or why the great Elizabeth and her prime minister had to deal secretly with Catherine de' Medici's tailors? Or what that which passed between "Nan" Boleyn and King Hal beneath the yew-tree in the cloistered shade of Sopewell nunnery, meant to Wolsey?

Those who are interested may have specimen pages of a work that will show how English history may be had in quite a different way from that presented by Hume, or Rapin, or Macaulay, or Guizot, or Hallam, or Froude.

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EDITED BY L. R. HAMERSLY.

FEBRUARY 1902.

THE LESSONS OF THE BOER WAR. *

THE lessons to be drawn from the war in South Africa are of especial interest to us because of the fact that both of the armies opposed to each other bore points of resemblance to our usual war army, composed as it always has been, and probably always will be, of a nucleus of well-trained regular army and a great mass of partially trained volunteers, with some very superior material among the latter.

The subject naturally divides itself into three great branches, viz.: preparation, strategy and tactics, which will be considered in turn. But before proceeding to the discussion of the lessons taught by the war, it should be remarked that at first innumerable false deductions were made on all sides, partly because many principles, well understood by military men before the war, became for the first time the world's property, and partly because several new elements appeared for the first time on a large scale, such as small-calibre magazine rifles and heavy field guns of position. By this time, however, all these false. deductions have been moderated, assimilated and corrected by further experience and calmer and better judgment. The conclusions now reached may be accepted as guides for future wars, as they are largely the combined wisdom of the best military experts of the world's nations.

* The military movements referred to in this paper are described in full in the author's work, entitled The Second Boer War, published by Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., Kansas City, Mo.

VOL. I. T. S.-No. 2.

8

PREPARATION.

In general character the opposed armies differed widely, indeed, they stood in marked contrast to each other: on the one hand, a crude militia, on the other a modern European army. The Boer army was insufficiently organized and trained in time of peace, but composed of excellent though undisciplined material, well trained as marksmen from their youth and continuing this accomplishment by their mode of life, surpassing probably, in this respect, all European armies, but untrained in tactics, hence incapable of the tactical offensive, so indispensable for decisive results. The British army was composed of a large nucleus of regular troops, disciplined and trained, but its greater part militia and volunteers of variable quality, generally only partially trained, with all the technical and scientific means of carrying on war at its disposal.

The character of the individual and the spirit which actuates him are of prime importance in an army, and depend on home training, on the laws and institutions of the country, and on other general characteristics of a nation too subtle for analysis. In these respects the men of our own army, regular and volunteer, leave nothing to be desired, as exemplified in all our wars from the Revolution to the war with Spain.

Recruitment. The method of recruitment of the British army is, as with us, by voluntary enlistment, whereas in the continental armies it is by conscription, every able-bodied citizen being required to serve a certain term in the army. The early defeats of the British in the Boer war gave rise to much discussion on this subject even in England. On the continent the military writers attributed a large part of the disasters to the method of recruitment, and found therein a conclusive argument in favor of compulsory enlistment, but in England public opinion gradually settled down to a feeling of satisfaction that voluntary enlistment was still the best for their army. We have, therefore, nothing to learn on this point, since our method still has a strong advocate in Europe, and this after a war that tried the country's resources to the utmost.

Training. The best training is, of course, actual war, but the more recent wars of the British had not been of a character to teach them what an active and energetic enemy is liable to do on the battlefield, consequently their army lacked this war experience. Next to actual war come field exercises and maneuvers, but it appears from what the British officers themselves say that this kind of peace training was inadequate in their army: first, in that it did not include on a sufficiently large scale flanking movements by the troops represent