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given a new theory as to its genealogy or descent; and detected some very gross inaccuracies in the opinions and reasonings which were formerly prevalent on the subject.

If Dr. Beattie had been able to refute these doctrines, we cannot help thinking that he would have done it with more temper and moderation; and disdained to court popularity by so much fulsome cant about common sense, virtue, and religion, and his contempt and abhorrence for infidels, sophists, and metaphysicians; by such babyish interjections, as "fy on it! fy on it!"-such triumphant exclamations, as, 'say, ye candid and intelligent!" or such terrific addresses, as, ፡፡ ye traitors to human kind! ye murderers of the human soul!"-"vain hypocrites! perfidious profligates!" and a variety of other embellish ments, as dignified as original in a philosophical and argumentative treatise. The truth is, that the Essay acquired its popularity, partly from the indifference and dislike which has long prevailed in England, as to the metaphysical inquiries which were there made the subject of abuse; partly from the perpetual appeal which it affects to make from philosophical subtlety to common sense; and partly from the accidental circumstances of the author. It was a great matter for the orthodox

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scholars of the south, who knew little of meta physics themselves, to get a Scotch professor of philosophy to take up the gauntlet in their behalf. The contempt with which he chose to speak of his antagonists was the very tone which they wished to be adopted; and, some of them, imposed on by the confidence of his manner, and some resolved to give it all chances of imposing on others, they joined in one clamour of approbation, and proclaimed a triumph for a mere rash skirmisher, while the leader of the battle was still doubtful of the victory. The book, thus dandled into popu larity by bishops and good ladies, contained many pieces of nursery eloquence, and much innocent pleasantry: it was not fatiguing to the understanding; and read less heavily, on the whole, than most of the Sunday library. In consequence of all these recommendations, it ran through various editions, and found its way into most well-regulated families; and, though made up of such stuff, as we really believe no grown man who had ever thought of the subject could possibly go through without nausea and compassion, still retains its place among the meritorious performances, by which youthful minds are to be purified and invigorated. We shall hear no more of it, however, among those who have left college.

(November, 1810.)

Philosophical Essays. By DUGALD STEWART, Esq., F. R. S. Edinburgh, Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. 4to. pp. 590. Edinburgh: 1810.

and to constitute, in this way, a signal example of that compensation, by which the good and evil in our lot is constantly equalised, or reduced at least to no very variable standard.

THE studies to which Mr. Stewart has devoted himself, have lately fallen out of favour with the English public; and the nation which once placed the name of Locke immediately under those of Shakespeare and of Newton, The progress of knowledge has given birth, and has since repaid the metaphysical labours of late years, to so many arts and sciences, that of Berkeley and of Hume with such just ce-a man of liberal curiosity finds both sufficient lebrity, seems now to be almost without zeal or curiosity as to the progress of the Philosophy of Mind.

The causes of this distaste it would be curious, and probably not uninstructive, to investigate but the inquiry would be laborious, and perhaps not very satisfactory. It is easy, indeed, to say, that the age has become frivolous and impatient of labour; and has abandoned this, along with all other good learning, and every pursuit that requires concentration of thought, and does not lead to immediate distinction. This is satire, and not reasoning; and, were it even a fair statement of the fact, such a revolution in the intellectual habits and character of a nation, is itself a phenomenon to be accounted for,-and not to be accounted for upon light or shallow considerations. To us, the phenomenon, in so far as we are inclined to admit its existence, has always appeared to arise from the great multiplication of the branches of liberal study, and from the more extensive diffusion of knowledge among the body of the people,

occupation for his time, and sufficient exercise to his understanding, in acquiring a superficial knowledge of such as are most inviting and most popular; and, consequently, has much less leisure, and less inducement than formerly, to dedicate himself to those abstract studies which call for more patient and persevering attention. In older times, a man had nothing for it, but either to be absolutely ignorant and idle, or to take seriously to theology and the school logic. When things grew a little bet ter, the classics and mathematics filled up the measure of general education and private study; and, in the most splendid periods of English philosophy, had received little addition, but from these investigations into our intellectual and moral nature. Some few individuals might attend to other things; but a knowledge of these was all that was required of men of good education; and was held ac complishment enough to entitle them to the rank of scholars and philosophers. Now-adays, however, the necessary qualification is prodigiously raised,—at least in denomina

elements of mathematical learning; and were even suspected of having fallen into several heresies in metaphysics, merely from want of time to get regularly at the truth!

If the philosophy of mind has really suffered more, from this universal hurry, than all her sister sciences of the same serious complexion, we should be inclined to ascribe this misfortune, partly to the very excellence of what has been already achieved by her votaries, and partly to the very severe treatment which their predecessors have received at their hands. Almost all the great practical maxims of this mistress of human life, such as the use of the principle of Association in education, and the

tion; and a man can scarcely pass current in the informed circles of society, without knowing something of political economy, chemistry, mineralogy, geology, and etymology-having a small notion of painting, sculpture, and architecture, with some sort of taste for the picturesque, and a smattering of German and Spanish literature, and even some idea of Indian, Sanscrit, and Chinese learning and history,- -over and above some little knowledge of trade and agriculture; with a reasonable acquaintance with what is called the philosophy of politics, and a far more extensive knowledge of existing parties, factions, and eminent individuals, both literary and political, at home and abroad, than ever were re-generation and consequences of Habits in all quired in any earlier period of society. The dissipation of time and of attention occasioned by these multifarious occupations, is, of course, very unfavourable to the pursuit of any abstract or continued study; and even if a man could, for himself, be content to remain ignorant of many things, in order to obtain a profound knowledge of a few, it would be difficult for him, in the present state of the world, to resist the impulse and the seductions that assail him from without. Various and superficial knowledge is now not only so common, that the want of it is felt as a disgrace; but the facilities of acquiring it are so great, that it is scarcely possible to defend ourselves against its intrusion. So many easy and pleasant elementary books,-such tempt ing summaries, abstracts, and tables, such beautiful engravings, and ingenious charts, and coups-d'œil of information,-so many museums, exhibitions, and collections, meet us at every corner, and so much amusing and provoking talk in every party, that a taste for miscellaneous and imperfect information is formed, almost before we are aware; and our time and curiosity irrevocably devoted to a sort of Encyclopedical trifling.

periods of life, have been lately illustrated in the most popular and satisfactory manner; and rendered so clear and familiar, as rules of practical utility, that few persons think it necessary to examine into the details of that fine philosophy by which they may have been first suggested, or brought into notice. There is nothing that strikes one as very important to be known upon these subjects, which may not now be established in a more vulgar and empirical manner, -or which requires, in order to be understood, that the whole process of a scientific investigation should be gone over. By most persons, therefore, the labour of such an investigation will be declined; and the practical benefits applied— with ungrateful indifference to the sources from which they were derived. Of those, again, whom curiosity might still tempt to look a little closer upon this great field of wonders, no small part are dismayed at the scene of ruin which it exhibits. The destruction of ancient errors, has hitherto constituted so very large a part of the task of modern philosophers, that they may be said to have been employed rather in throwing down, than in building up, and have as yet established In the mean time, the misfortune is, that very little but the fallacy of all former phithere is no popular nor royal road to the pro-losophy. Now, they who had been accusfounder and more abstract truths of philosophy; and that these are apt, accordingly, to fall into discredit or neglect, at a period when it is labour enough for most men to keep themselves up to the level of that great tide of popular information, which has been rising, with such unexampled rapidity, for the last forty years.

Such, we think, are the most general and uncontrollable causes which have recently depressed all the sciences requiring deep thought and solitary application, far below the level of their actual importance; and produced the singular appearance of a partial falling off in intellectual enterprise and vigour, in an age distinguished, perhaps, above all others, for the rapid development of the human faculties. The effect we had formerly occasion to observe, when treating of the singular decay of Mathematical science in England; and so powerful and extensive is the operation of the cause, that, even in the intellectual city which we inhabit, we have known instances of persons of good capacity who had never found leisure to go beyond the first

tomed to admire that ancient philosophy, cannot be supposed to be much delighted with its demolition; and, at all events, are naturally discouraged from again attaching themselves to a system, which they may soon have the mortification of seeing subverted in its turn. In their minds, therefore, the opening of such a course of study is apt only to breed a general distrust of philosophy, and to rivet a conviction of its extreme and irremediable uncertainty: while those who had previously been indifferent to the systems of error, are displeased with the labour of a needless refutation; and disappointed to find, that, after a long course of inquiry, they are brought back to that very state of ignorance from which they had expected it would relieve them.

If anything could counteract the effect of these and some other causes, and revive in England that taste for abstract speculation for which it was once so distinguished, we should have expected this to be accomplished by the publications of the author before us.-The great celebrity of his name, and the uniform

men were in reality aware of its existence, and acted upon it on all important occasions, though they might never have made its laws a subject of reflection, nor ever stated its general phenomena in the form of an abstract proposition.

clearness, simplicity, and good sense of his | ple, while it was admitted that the case was statements, might indeed have failed to attract somewhat different, it was observed, that all those whom similar merits could no longer tempt to look into the pages of Locke or of Berkeley. But the singular eloquence with which Mr. Stewart has contrived to adorn the most unpromising parts of his subject,-the rich lights which his imagination has every where thrown in, with such inimitable judg ment and effect, the warm glow of moral enthusiasm which he has spread over the whole of his composition, and the tone of mildness, dignity, and animation which he has uniformly sustained, in controversy, as well as in instruction; are merits which we do not remember to have seen united in any other philosophical writer; and which might have recommended to general notice, topics far less engaging than those on which they were employed. His former work, on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, has accordingly been more read than any other modern book on such subjects; and the volume be-assuredly, if any thing inconsistent with it is fore us, we think, is calculated to be still more popular.*

But it is in the second part of the Preliminary Dissertation that we take the chief interest as Mr. Stewart has there taken occasion to make a formal reply to some of our hasty speculations, and has done us the honour of embodying several of our transitory pages in this enduring volume. If we were at liberty to yield to the common weaknesses of authors, we should probably be tempted to defend ourselves in a long dissertation; but we know too well what is due to our readers and to the public, to think of engaging any considerable share of their attention with a controversy which may be considered in some measure as personal to ourselves; and therefore, however honourable we think it, to be thus singled out for equal combat by such an antagonist, we shall put what we have to say within the shortest possible compass.

The observations to which Mr. Stewart has here condescended to reply, occur in an early number of our publication, and were intended to show, that as mind was not the proper subject of Experiment, but of Observation, so, there could be no very close analogy between the rules of metaphysical investigation, and the most approved methods of inquiry as to those physical substances which are subject to our disposal and control;-that as all the facts with regard to mind must be derived from previous and universal Consciousness, it was difficut to see how any arrangement of them could add to our substantial knowledge; and that there was, therefore, no reason either to expect Discoveries in this branch of science, or to look to it for any real augmentation of our Power.

With regard to Perception and the other primary functions of mind, it was observed, that this doctrine seemed to hold without any limitation; and as to the Associating princi

A portion of the original article, containing a general view of the subject of these Essays, is here omitted, for the reasons stated at the head of this division.

To all this Mr. Stewart proceeds to answer, by observing, that the distinction between experiment and observation is really of no importance whatever, in reference to this argument; because the facts disclosed by experi ment are merely phenomena that are observed; and the inferences and generalisations that are deduced from the observation of spontaneous phenomena, are just of the same sort with those that are inferred from experiment, and afford equally certain grounds of conclusion, provided they be sufficiently numerous and consistent. The justice of the last proposition, we do not mean to dispute; and

to be found in our former speculations, it must have arisen from that haste and inadvertence which, we make no doubt, have often betray ed us into still greater errors. But it is very far from following from this, that there is not a material difference between experiment and observation; or that the philosophy of mind in not necessarily restrained within very nar row limits, in consequence of that distinction. Substances which are in our power, are the objects of experiment; those which are not in our power, of observation only. With regard to the former, it is obvious, that, by wellcontrived experiments, we may discover many things that could never be disclosed by any length of observation. With regard to the latter, an attentive observer may, indeed, see more in them than strikes the eye of a careless spectator: But he can see nothing that may not be seen by every body ; and, in cases where the appearances are very few, or very interesting, the chance is, that he does see nothing more-and that all that is left to phi losophy is, to distinguish them into classes, and to fit them with appropriate appellations. Now, Mind, we humbly conceive, considered as a subject of investigation, is the subject of observation only; and is known nearly as well by all men, as by those who have most diligently studied its phenomena. "We cannot decompose our sensations," we formerly observed, "in a crucible, nor divide our percep tions with a prism." The metaphor was something violent; but, the meaning obviously was, that we cannot subject those faculties to any analogous processes; nor discover more of their nature than consciousness has taught all the beings who possess them. Is it a satisfactory answer, then, for Mr. Stewart, to say, that we may analyse them by reflection and attention, and other instruments better suited than prisms or crucibles to the intellectual laboratory which furnishes their materials? Our reply is, that we cannot analyse them at all; and can never know more of them than has always been known to all to whom they had been imparted; and that, for this

plain reason, that the truth of every thing that is said with regard to the mind, can be determined by an appeal to consciousness alone, and would not be even intelligible, if it informed men of any thing that they did not previously feel to be true.

With regard to the actual experiments to which Mr. Stewart alludes, as having helped to explain the means by which the eye judges of distances and magnitudes, these, we must observe, are, according to our conception, very clearly experiments, not upon mind, but upon matter; and are only entitled to that name at all, in so far as they are carried on by means of the power we possess of disposing certain pieces of matter in certain masses and intervals. Strictly considered, they are optical experiments on the effects produced by distance on the light reflected from known bodies; and are nearly akin to experiments on the effects produced on such reflected rays by the interposition of media of different refracting powers, whether in the shape of prisms, or in any other shape. At all events, they certainly are not investigations carried on solely by attending to the subjects of our Consciousness; which is Mr. Stewart's own definition of the business of the philosophy

of mind.

In answer to our remark, that "no métaphysician expects, by analysis, to discover a new power, or to excite a new sensation in the mind, as the chemist discovers a new earth or a new metal," Mr. Stewart is pleased to observe

"That it is no more applicable to the anatomy of the mind, than to the anatomy of the body. After all the researches of physiologists on this last subject, both in the way of observation and of experiment, no discovery has yet been made of a new organ, either of power or of pleasure, or even of the means of adding a cubit to the human stature; but it does not therefore follow that these researches are useless. By enlarging his knowledge of his own internal structure, they increase the power of man, in that way in which alone they profess to increase it. They furnish him with resources for remedying many of the accidents to which his health and his life are liable; for recovering, in some cases, those active powers which disease has destroyed or impaired; and, in others, by giving sight to the blind, and hearing to the deaf, for awakening powers of perception which were dormant before. Nor must we overlook what they have contributed, in conjunction with the arts of the optician and of the mechanist, to extend the sphere of those senses, and to prolong their duration."-Prelim. Diss. pp. xlvi, xlvii.

when he removes those outer integuments, and reveals the wonders of the inward organisation of our frame. His statements do not receive their proof from the previous, though perhaps undigested knowledge of his hearers, but from the actual revelation which he makes to their senses; and his services would evidently be more akin to those of the metaphysician, if, instead of actually disclosing what was not previously known, or suspected to exist, he had only drawn the attention of an incurious generation to the fact that they had each ten fingers and ten toes, or that most of them had thirty-two teeth, distinguishable into masticators and incisors.

When, from these, and some other considerations, we had ventured to infer, that the knowledge derived from mere observation could scarcely make any addition to our power, Mr. Stewart refers triumphantly to the instance of astronomy; and, taking it almost for granted, that all the discoveries in that science have been made by observation alone, directs the attention of his readers to the innumerable applications which may be made of it, to purposes of unquestioned utility.

"In compensation," he observes, "for the inability of the astronomer to control those movements of which he studies the laws, he may boast, as I already hinted, of the immense accession of a more useful power which his discoveries have added to the human race. on the surface of their own planet. It would be endless to enumerate all the practical uses to which his labours are subservient. It is sufficient for me to repeat an old, but very striking reflection, that the only accurate knowledge has been derived from the previous knowledge he which Man yet possesses of the surface of the earth, had acquired of the phenomena of the stars. Is it possible to produce a more apposite, or a more undeniable proof of the universality of Bacon's maxim, that knowledge is power,' than a fact which demonstrates the essential aid which man has derived, in asserting his dominion over this lower world, from a branch of science which seems, at first view, fitted only to gratify a speculative curiosity; and which, in its infancy, served to amuse the leisure of the Chaldean shepherd ?"-Prelim. Diss. pp.

Xxxviii, xxxix.

To this we have to answer, in the first place, that astronomical science has not been perfected by observation alone; but that all the elements which have imparted to it the certainty, the simplicity, and the sublimity which it actually possesses, have been derived from experiments made upon substances in the power of their contrivers;-from experiments performed with small pieces of matter, on the laws of projectile motion-the velocities of falling bodies-and on centrifugal and centripetal forces. The knowledge of those laws, like all other valuable knowledge, was obtained by experiment only; and their application to the movements of the heavenly bodies was one of those splendid generalisations, which derive their chief merit from those inherent imperfections of observation by which they were rendered necessary.

Now, ingenious and elegant as this parallel must be admitted to be, we cannot help regarding it as utterly fallacious-for this simple reason that the business of anatomy is to lay open, with the knife, the secrets of that internal structure, which could never otherwise be apparent to the keenest eye; while the metaphysical inquirer can disclose nothing of which all his pupils are not previously aware. There is no opaque skin, in short, on the mind, to conceal its interior mechanism; But, in the second place, we must observe, nor does the metaphysician, when he appeals that even holding astronomy to be a science to the consciousness of all thinking beings of mere observation, the power which Mr. for the truth of his classifications, perform Stewart says we have obtained by means of any thing at all analogous to the dissector, it, is confessedly a power, not over the sub

stances with which that science is conversant; | have been but a remote and casual auxiliary but over other substances which stand in some to him whose genius afterwards found the relation to them; and to which, accordingly, means of employing those phenomena to that science is capable of being applied. It guide him through the trackless waters of is over the earth and the ocean that we have the ocean.-Epxeriment, therefore, necessariextended our dominion by means of our know-ly implies power; and, by suggesting analo ledge of the stars. Now, applying this case gous experiments, leads naturally to the into that of the philosophy of Mind, and as- terminable expansion of inquiry and of knowsuming, as we seem here entitled to assume, ledge:—but observation, for the most part, that it has invested us with no new power centres in itself, and tends rather to gratify over mind itself,-what, we would ask, are and allay our curiosity, than to rouse or inthe other objects over which our power is in- flame it. creased by means of our knowledge of mind? Is there any other substance to which that knowledge can possibly be applied? Is there any thing else that we either know better, or can dispose of more effectually in consequence of our observations on our own intellectual constitution? It is evident, we humbly conceive, that these questions must be answered in the negative. The most precise knowledge which the metaphysician can acquire by reflecting on the subjects of his consciousness, can give him no new power over the mind in which he discovers those subjects; and it is almost a self-evident proposition, that the most accurate knowledge of the subjects of consciousness can give him no power over any thing but mind.

After having thus attemped to prove that experiment has no prerogative above mere observation, Mr. Stewart thinks it worth while to recur again to the assertion, that the philosophy of mind does admit of experiments; and, after remarking, rather rashly, that "the whole of a philosopher's life, if he spends it to any purpose, is one continued series of experiments on his own faculties and powers," he goes on to state, that

the prodigies effected by human art in all the objects around us;-laws,-government,-com. merce, religion:-but above all, the records of thought, preserved in those volumes which fill our libraries; what are they but experiments, by which Nature illustrates, for our instruction, on her own grand scale, the varied range of man's intellectual fashioning his mind?"-Prel. Diss. pp. xlv, xlvi. faculties, and the omnipotence of education in

hardly any experiment can be imagined, which has not already been tried by the hand of Nature; displaying, in the infinite varieties of bu man genius and pursuits, the astonishingly divers fied effects, resulting from the possible combina tions, of those elementary faculties and principles, of which every man is conscious in himself. Savage There is one other little point connected the different callings and professions of individusociety, and all the different modes of civilization; with this argument, which we wish to settle als, whether liberal or mechanical; the prejudiced with Mr. Stewart. In speaking of the useful clown;-the factitious man of fashion;-the vary. applications that may be ultimately made ofing phases of character from infancy to old agethe knowledge derived from observation, we had said, that for the power or the benefit so obtained, mankind were indebted-not to the observer, but to him who suggested the application. Mr. Stewart admits the truth of this-but adds, that the case is exactly the same with the knowledge derived from experiment-and that the mere empiric is on a footing with the mere observer. Now, we do not think the cases exactly the same;-and it is in their difference that we conceive the great disadvantage of observation to consist. Whoever makes an experiment, must have the power at least to repeat that experiment -and, in almost every case, to repeat it with some variation of circumstances. Here, therefore, is one power necessarily ascertained and established, and an invitation held out to increase that power, by tracing it through all the stages and degrees of its existence: while he who merely observes a phenomenon over which he has no control, neither exercises any power, nor holds out the prospect of acquiring any power, either over the subject of his observation, or over any other substance. He who first ascertained, by experiment, the expansive force of steam, and its destruction by cold-or the identity of lightning and electricity, and the consequent use of the conducting rod, plainly bestowed, in that instant, a great power upon mankind, of which it was next to impossible that some important application should not be speedily made. But he who first observed the periodical immersions and emersions of the satellites of Jupiter, certainly neither acquired nor bestowed any power in the first instance; and seems to

If experiment be rightly defined the inten tional arrangement of substances in our power, for the purpose of observing the result, ther these are not experiments; and neither imply, nor tend to bestow, that power which enters into the conception of all experiment. But the argument, in our apprehension, is chargeable with a still more radical fallacy. The philosophy of mind is distinctly defined, by Mr. Stewart himself, to be that which is employed "on phenomena of which we are conscious;" its peculiar object and aim is stated to be, "to ascertain the laws of our constitution, in so far as they can be ascer tained, by attention to the subjects of our consciousness;" and, in a great variety of pas sages, it is explained, that the powers by which all this is to be effected, are, reflection upon our mental operations, and the faculty of calm and patient attention to the sensations of which we are conscious. But, if this be the proper province and object of the philoso phy of mind, what benefit is the student to receive from observing the various effects of manners and situation, in imparting a pecu liar colour or bias to the character of the sav age and the citizen, "the prejudiced clown, and factitious man of fashion? The obser vation of such varieties is, no doubt, a very

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