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The sight of that young crescent brings
The hopes of early years;
The passing shower of tears.
Comes out upon the air;
On the soft promise there.
Most welcome to the lover's sight,
For prattling poets say,
Beneath its gentle ray.
Forsaken and forgiven;
Like that new light in heaven.
[A friend and contributor has furnished us with the original letter from the Danish minister, Count Van der Naath, to the king of Spain, in relation to the ministry of Mr. Zea Bermudez. It is a curious and interesting document, from the pen of an extra-ultra royalist. It has not yet appeared in any of the public prints; and presuming it will be interesting to our readers, we subjoin a close translation, prefixing an extract from the letter already published in the newspapers, from the gentleman by whom this address was transmitted to this country. The writer is speaking of the representatives of the foreign powers :)
“ One only of the number took a different course, and this was the minister from Denmark, Count Van der Naath. He, probably without the least authority or instruction from his court, which does not in fact pretend to intermeddle in the internal concerns of other nations—a privilege reserved exclusively to two or three great powers, that claim a divine right to rule all other countries as well as their own-undertook, entirely of his own head, and from the mere motion of his superabundant zeal in the cause of the Altar and the Throne, to sustain and assist the party opposed to Mr. Zea. This he did at the moment when the conspiracy of
Bessieres was in agitation, with so much warmth and so little discretion, that the minister, as was understood, became dissatisfied, and procured his recall, which in fact took place about this time. Piqued to the quick by this proceeding, the Danish minister determined, if possible, to have his revenge ; and accordingly drew up a memoir upon the adininistration of Mr. Zea, which he presented to the king in person, when he took leave. Copies of this document have been handed about in private circles, and I have succeeded in obtaining one, which I send you herewith. Though not a very powerful production, it is somewhat curious, as illustrating the views of its author and the party to which he belongs, upon the general politics of Europe. You will observe that his orthodoxy is of ihe very highest proof. Moderation with him is contemptible (pitoyable.) Messrs. de Villele and Pozzo di Borgo, who pass for ultras with the world at large, are no better than jacobins. I should be curious to know what name he would give to the nation's guest and Mr. Benjamin Constant. The count seems, in fact, to have wrought himself up into a complete frenzy-as was done by some of our own political partisans during the late struggles at home, and this from the mere effect of closet speculations--since his position withdraws him entirely from any personal concern in the conduct or issue of these contentions. It is not likely that his memoir had any great influence in producing the change of ministry. Engines much more powerful and pressing were at work. As it happened, however, the event nearly coincided in time with the count's demarche, and he will doubtless of course take to himself the whole credit of it, and will go home with the satisfaction of having obtained a signal revenge upon his adversary.”
ADDRESS TO THE KING, IN RELATION TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF M. LE CHEVALIER DE ZEA BERMUDEZ. A COMPARISON of the situation in which M. de Zea found the affairs of Spain, with that in which they are placed a year after his assuming the duties of his office, forms the severest criticism on bis administration. The return of Mr. Ofalia, and still more that of General Cruz, had appeared to the royalists (which is equivalent to saying to the nation) a pledge, that the king would no longer admit into his councils any others than men whose sentiments in favour of monarchical government should be beyond suspicion. The episode of Tarifa necessarily awakened the apprehension of a wide conspiracy, which was to lead to revolutions; and those who were highest in office in the provinces, and even in the immediate cabinet of the king, suffered themselves to indulge for a moment, perhaps too far, in doubtful surmises. The revolutionists had their feare ; those who had been drawn into their measures trembled, under the belief that they were about to pay dearly for their weakness or compliance; numerous arrests, and the language of those in power, made them fear that the hour of vengeance had sounded for them; but their terrors, excited by the voice of conscience, produced no disturb
ance in the state. It was soon seen by the issue of the enterprise at Tarifa, that it was only a blow struck in despair; and men no longer feared that they were treading over a mine which was about to explode. T'he debarkation on the coast of Murcia, proved that the people were able, alone, to repulse their enemies, and those of the throne, and, in the month of September, 1824, Spain reposed in complete tranquillity.
A wise statesman would have marked out, during this period of quiet, the line which he meant to pursue. To show an entire confidence in the royalists, to give them all places of public employment, was, and still is, the infallible means of lulling passion to rest, and producing even an oblivion of past errors ; a thing so desirable, when those who have committed them, who are nothing in comparison with the whole nation, are yet too numerous not to make it imprudent to drive them to des. pair. M. de Zea took an opposite course. Whether it was that he had imbibed at Paris, the notion that to tranquillize Spain, the royalists must be forced, by the exhibition of all royal authority, not to hate that which is detestable, to make no exclusive pretensions to the kindness and confidence of their sovereign, and willingly to concede, that those who had neither energy enough to do harm, nor courage enough to promote good, by declaring in favour of their king-I mean the moderates--should be the favourites of a government, which seeks to acquire strength, not by its union with the nation, but from a system which can result only in a desire to change its subjects into irrational puppets, moved at the will of the showman; or whether this system originated in the character of M. de Zea, and in his confidence that he could never be the head of the royalists ; the effect has been precisely the same. Spain, so calm on his arrival, is now agitated to an alarming degree.
His being continued in office, contrary to the will of the nation, which cannot be unknown to the king, and to the danger of setting it at defiance, almost induces the belief that M. Zea has succeeded in persuading his Catholic Majesty, that an independent and almost mutinous spirit pervades the royalists in the army; and that the others will abandon the cause of the king, if he does not abandon his authority to their arbitrary will, and deliver up the liberals and moderates to their hatred. It is at once a falsehood and a calumny. The exemplary conduct of the 100,000 armed volunteers, while the king has not 30,000. soldiers, and probably not 200 officers on whom he can rely, proves how well the royalists understand the paramount duty of obedience; and the whole history of Spain,
since 1808, is a guaranty to Ferdinand VII. of the devotion of his subjects. He has no enemies among his people: if there be
any who censure him, it is only because they cannot enter into the motives, not comprehended by them, which sometimes induce the king not to yield to his sentiments of gratitude towards the royalists.
The excitement is only produced, because their feelings are irritated against an administration which shows as much jealousy and mistrust of the royalists, as predilection for the contemptible moderates. M. de Zea has entirely misunderstood both the character of the nation, and the situation of the government. He has believed that he could compel the former to renounce sentiments which, even when exaggerated, are too noble not to merit the highest respect, and that he could give to the latter a power over the nation never possessed even under Charles I. or Philip II. ; against which it revolts from a mixture of independent feeling and profound respect for the
person of the king; a power now more than ever impracticable after two grand crises, in which this nation, through the strength of its attachment to monarchy, has saved the king, when it was entirely abandoned to itself; and which is utterly unattainable, since M. de Zea has almost affected to make it appear that this influence belongs rather to the minister than the king. Spaniards have never obeyed ministers, do not now, and never will.
If, up to this time, therefore, it is only against the ministry that the Spaniards have been ready to revolt, as they formerly did against Godoy, there is not less reason to fear that their discontent may end by becoming dangerous to the king himself; and it is of the highest importance to anticipate the period, when contrary sentiments, which M. de Zea unadvisedly seeks to subdue, may take a direction opposite to that which produced the noble and glorious resistance to the man who had conquered all Europe.
Should the king dismiss M. de Zea, and form a cabinet entirely of royalists, having for its head, not a man distinguished for the first time in his life by the decree of the 31st of December, and who has no party of his own, but one whose character has weight, whose former acts are guaranties of his future ministerial conduct, as they will be that all the nation will rally around a throne, which, under his administration, can only be an asylum for royalists; if, 1 say, his Sacred Majesty should adopt this resolution, Spain would be immediately restored to tranquillity, and Ferdinand VII. might prescribe bounds to animosities without the dread of opposition. If his Catholic
Majesty should not think fit to hazard this measure, every one capable of observation, and not blinded to the course of events, must anticipate great danger. It is not by arrests, banishments, executions, that Mr. de Zea can succeed in assuring to the Peninsula, the mournful tranquillity which results from the absence of all generous sentiments. The Spaniards may be restrained for a short time, by the novel sight of a government which wishes to control its subjects by terror; but soon it will only tend to inflame their passions, which are to be feared, and what is still worse, their inditlerence, which will infallibly produce a third revolution. I say, this hazard should be run, because, certainly, the support which France lends, and which Europe appears to lend, to Mr. de Zea, ought to form a prominent consideration in the mind of the king.
If his Most Catholic Majesty were unhappily so situated, as to be obliged to choose between the discontent of his own subjects and that of a foreign power, the choice ought to be made; for the former have strong claims to the gratitude of the king, and might become formidable if pushed to extremities, while the discontent of foreign powers would soon terminate, though Mr. de Zea were dismissed. The king may fear that his ministers may induce France to increase the number of her troops in Spain, thereby diminishing his power and authority, and wounding to the quick a people already regarding the French armies with a jealous eye, since they believe themselves capable, unassisted, to put down the enemies of their king. But his majesty has no reason to fear that that power would arm itself to sustain or restore a minister; and, were such a supposition admissible, which it is not, his majesty would only show himself worthy of his subjects, by braving the storm, in order at once to satisfy their wants, the genuine effusion of loyalty, the proper sense of dignity, and the necessity of independence in his resolutions; as he has braved death and certain ruin in defending his own rights, and their independence, against a colossal power. But, happily, the king is not reduced to this unpleasant alternative. Even under the supposition, not yet proved to be well founded, that Mr. de Villele, and the conference of Paris, which is entirely under the control of General Pozzo, were willing to support Mr. Zea with the same warmth that their agents exhibit here, Mr. de Villele is not France, and the conference is not Europe. Led into error by the false alarms of the Spanish minister, proclaiming the danger in which the royalists are placing the throne, the king of France may perhaps send a few more regiments into the Peninsula, to restrain what has been for six