Reforming Pensions: A Short Guide
Mandatory pensions are a worldwide phenomenon. However, with fixed contribution rates, monthly benefits, and retirement ages, pension systems are not consistent with three long-run trends: declining mortality, declining fertility, and earlier retirement. Many systems need reform. This book gives an extensive nontechnical explanation of the economics of pension design. The theoretical arguments have three elements: * Pension systems have multiple objectives--consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief, and redistribution. Good policy needs to bear them all in mind. * Good analysis should be framed in a second-best context-- simple economic models are a bad guide to policy design in a world with imperfect information and decision-making, incomplete markets and taxation. * Any choice of pension system has risk-sharing and distributional consequences, which the book recognizes explicitly. Barr and Diamond's analysis includes labor markets, capital markets, risk sharing, and gender and family, with comparison of PAYG and funded systems, recognizing that the suitable level of funding differs by country. Alongside the economic principles of good design, policy must also take account of a country's capacity to implement the system. Thus the theoretical analysis is complemented by discussion of implementation, and of experiences, both good and bad, in many countries, with particular attention to Chile and China.
Was andere dazu sagen - Rezension schreiben
Es wurden keine Rezensionen gefunden.
1 The Backdrop
2 The Basic Economics of Pensions
3 Pensions and Labor Markets
4 Finance and Funding
5 Redistribution and Risk Sharing
6 Gender and Family
7 Implementing Pensions
8 International Diversity and Change since 1950
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
actuarial adjustment administrative costs annual annual management charge annuity assets average basic pension basic state pension Bolivia bonds capacity Central Provident Fund chapter charges Chile China choice cohorts consumption smoothing contribution rates coverage defined-benefit pension defined-benefit system defined-contribution pensions defined-contribution system dependency ratio depends discussed in box discussed in section earliest eligibility age earnings economic effects elderly example finance fully funded funded individual accounts future higher implementation incentives indexed inflation investment issues labor force labor market lower mandatory ment national saving noncontributory OECD option PAYG system pension benefits pension design pension reform pension system pensionable age percent person’s political portfolio poverty relief problems public pension rates of return redistribution replacement rate retirement age revenue risk sector sion Social Security spouse Sweden Thrift Savings Plan tion trend United Kingdom voluntary wage growth women workers World Bank