But the national debt is public wealth." Then it follows, that, if the national debt were repudiated, the nation would be three thousand million dollars poorer. Is that so? Surely not. The holders of the stocks would be poorer, doubtless, by the amount of their bonds, which entitle them to interest semi-annually, and final payment in gold; but just what they lost their debtors would gain, and the general wealth of the nation would not be affected to the amount of a dollar, except, that, in so far as the debt is due to persons abroad, the repudiation of it would save that amount to the nation. Other than this, neither the security nor the insecurity of the national debt has the least effect in determining the national wealth.

2d, But, again, it is said that "the debt is active, available capital;" and, in illustration, it is said "that a man having, say, twenty thousand dollars of the bonds, can engage in any kind of business at once, just the same as if he had so much cash capital."

Now, what is the fact? The bonds being good securities, the holder can exchange them for cash, and with this can obtain any description of capital he may need. The bonds, then, are not capital, but only the security upon which capital may be had. If the holder had notes against individuals of unquestionable credit, he could do the same. Are private notes, then, capital? Surely not. The man who, . having invested his money or capital in public securities, wishes to exchange them again for capital, can do so readily, because the nation is pledged to repayment, with interest. Bonds, while the credit of the government is sustained, are only a very convenient form of credit. They have no element of capital about them. A thousand billions of them would not add a farthing to the capital or wealth of a nation, or increase the productiveness of any department of industry.

So far from aiding production, a national debt has an effect directly opposite. It depresses industry by the

taxation it imposes, and reduces its power to compete with other countries. If a laborer pays fifty dollars per annum more for the commodities he consumes, in consequence of taxation occasioned by the interest upon the public debt, then he must have fifty dollars more wages, or reduce his style of living to such an extent as to save that sum. If the former, his higher wages will enhance the cost of products, and he will be less able to compete with the foreign manufacturer or producer.

3d, The third fallacy is, that a public debt gives stability to government.

Upon what should the security of a government depend? Evidently upon the convictions of the people that it is a good government; that it secures to them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Any people who know they have such a government, will need nothing to assure their loyalty and attachment. Where government rests upon universal suffrage, the power is wholly in the hands of the people, and no law or constitution can have any permanancy, that does not receive their approbation. Any thing that is regarded as oppressive and unjust will certainly be abolished.

France has a large national debt; yet her government has been revolutionized time and again, without any reference to that fact, and without at all disturbing the security of the rentes. National debts will be paid, if the people please to pay them; and governments will be sustained, if the people choose to sustain them.

But it is said, that, since every person who owns a part of the public debt will be interested in the permanency of the government, all such will certainly be loyal; and, as these will be in great numbers scattered over the whole country, and belonging to the most influential classes, their social and political co-operation will afford security to our political institutions. Such reasoning assumes, that every man who owns a. certificate of stock, will, on that

account, be loyal to the government. Let us examine the matter. How numerous are those bond-holders who are expected to sustain the government and its debt?

(1) There are those who directly hold the bonds.

(2) Those who have stock in State and national banks whose capital is invested in government securities.

(3) Those who have deposits in savings institutions, the funds of which are largely invested in public stocks and in banks, whose capital, as just stated, is in the same kind of investment.

These are the classes on whom reliance is placed to give stability to government, in consequence of the interest they are supposed to have in the public tranquillity, as security for the national debt.

What the aggregate number of persons in all these classes may be, we have no means to determine; but it is, doubtless, much less than most people imagine. For

(a) Some seven hundred millions of the bonds are held abroad.

(b) Many millions are held by aliens in this country. (c) A large amount is held by females.

(d) Vast sums are held by trustees and guardians. (e) Of the savings-banks depositors, who are interested to a limited extent, a majority, probably, have no vote.

(f) It is well known, that the capital stock of the currency banks is held largely by widows and orphans.

(g) A large part of the debt is absorbed by great capitalists, holding $50,000 to $500,000 each.

How many votes, then, can all these parties give? The whole number of voters in the United States is some five millions. What portion of the whole belong to the above classes? Certainly a very small share indeed.

But this is not a full view of the case. Of those who do own stocks, and can vote, very few-not one in ten, probably have a sufficient ownership to counterbalance the amount of taxation they encounter in consequence of the

debt. The average amount to the credit of each person in the savings banks of New York and Massachusetts is about $225; and we may safely assume that to be the general average throughout the country. Then it is quite certain that an immense majority have an interest in the savings banks of not over $200. What is the interest of all these small holders, in reference to repudiation?

For example, a laboring man, having $200 in bonds or in a savings deposit, expends $100 per annum, derived from his wages, for articles required in the support of his family. What amount of taxation will he incur annually, in consequence of the national debt? Is it not a very moderate estimate, that ten per cent of all his expenditures will be occasioned by the higher duties, taxes, excise, &c. Ten per cent on $400 is $40, which this man must pay annually; while his whole income from the $200 in bonds, or savingsbank deposit, is only $12. Is it for his pecuniary interest that the public faith be kept inviolate? If he must pay $40 annually, while he gets but $12, how long will it take to use up the $200 he has in government bonds? In less than eight years, he would have lost a sum equal to the amount of his stock, and then be for ever after liable to the same amount of taxation. Very clearly, the sooner the public debt is repudiated, the better for this laborer, though holding $200 in the public funds.

We make the same comparison in regard to a man who holds $1,000 in stock. His income we will suppose $2,000, which he expends. On the scale before given, he will pay, in increased prices, $200, while his coupons are but $60 per annum; a balance against him of $140. How long will his interest require that the coupons be paid? Clearly, the sooner they are worthless, and the taxation they impose removed, the better. Another view may be given, of the relations of the debt to the population of the country. It may be assumed, that the debt will be equal to about $100 to each person, if the population is thirty millions. Then a

family of five persons owe $500 of the public debt, and, on an average, must pay the annual interest upon the same; say, from $30 to $40. A little reflection will satisfy any one, that the number of families that hold $500 of the national bonds, compared with the whole number, must be very small; and, therefore, that a vast majority can have no pecuniary interest in securing the payment of the national indebtedness.

In these illustrations, we see the folly of the assumption that a public debt gives security to government. Of all who are directly or indirectly owners of the public obligations, not one in twenty has so large an interest that he would not be greatly benefited by its repudiation. Of those who vote, probably not one in fifty has an interest in the public debt sufficient to counterbalance the taxation he must endure in consequence of its existence. How idle, then, to talk of the stability a national debt gives to a republican government, under which the will of the people is the su preme law!

On the other hand, who does not see plainly that such a debt, from the necessary taxation it imposes, must be a constant source of irritation and dissatisfaction; that a party will inevitably be formed for its overthrow, and that in such a party will be found sectionalism and all the bad and dangerous elements of society? The future peace and prosperity of the nation is more endangered by the national debt. than by all other causes. In a country where the people have little or no power at the ballot-box, a public debt may, doubtless, be made an effective engine of tyranny, and contribute to the enslavement of the masses; but it is quite otherwise where suffrage is universal.

4th, A fourth fallacy is, that a national debt ensures protection to home industry, since the heavy taxation it causes will, if laid on foreign goods, secure that object. Having already discussed the question of protection, we need not now enter upon it; but remark, that a large national debt