Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold WarCambridge University Press, 16.08.2010 Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized. |
Inhalt
3 | |
International | 37 |
High Linkage and Democratization Eastern Europe | 85 |
Linkage Leverage and Democratization in the Americas | 130 |
The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism | 181 |
Transitions without Democratization | 236 |
Diverging Outcomes in Asia | 309 |
Conclusion | 339 |
Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism | 365 |
Measuring Leverage | 372 |
References | 381 |
493 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War Steven Levitsky,Lucan A. Way Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2010 |
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War Steven Levitsky,Lucan A. Way Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2010 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
abuse Africa Confidential Albania Armenia autocrats Belarus Benin Botswana Cambodia Cameroon candidates coalition coercive capacity cohesion Communist competitive authoritarian regimes Conaghan conflict constitutional countries crisis Croatia Decalo defection Democracy democratizing pressure difficult domestic Dominican Republic economic electoral elite emerged European external finance financial first fraud Freedom House Frelimo Fujimori Gabon Georgia Ghana Guyana Haiti high leverage high linkage Human Rights incumbents independent influence institutions Kenya leaders Madagascar major Malawi Malaysia McFaul medium Mexico military Miloˇsevi´c Moldova Mozambique National Nicaragua ODIHR office officials opposition challenges opposition forces opposition parties organizational power organizations parliament percent Peru playing field police political post–Cold President presidential protest regime outcomes regional repression Romania rule Russia score security forces Serbia significant Slovakia Soviet stable Taiwan television tion transition triggered turnover U.S. Department Ukraine United University Press Unstable Authoritarianism Vachudova 2005b vote weak Western Yeltsin Zambia Zimbabwe