Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq

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Cornell University Press, 2006 - 482 Seiten

Years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a loosely organized insurgency continues to target American and Coalition soldiers, as well as Iraqi security forces and civilians, with devastating results. In this sobering account of the ongoing violence, Ahmed Hashim, a specialist on Middle Eastern strategic issues and on irregular warfare, reveals the insurgents behind the widespread revolt, their motives, and their tactics. The insurgency, he shows, is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision. Instead, it involves former regime loyalists, Iraqis resentful of foreign occupation, foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and elements of organized crime. These groups have cooperated with one another in the past and coordinated their attacks; but the alliance between nationalist Iraqi insurgents on the one hand and religious extremists has frayed considerably. The U.S.-led offensive to retake Fallujah in November 2004 and the success of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005 have led more "mainstream" insurgent groups to begin thinking of reinforcing the political arm of their opposition movement and to seek political guarantees for the Sunni Arab community in the new Iraq.Hashim begins by placing the Iraqi revolt in its historical context. He next profiles the various insurgent groups, detailing their origins, aims, and operational and tactical modi operandi. He concludes with an unusually candid assessment of the successes and failures of the Coalition's counter-insurgency campaign. Looking ahead, Hashim warns that ethnic and sectarian groups may soon be pitted against one another in what will be a fiercely contested fight over who gets what in the new Iraq. Evidence that such a conflict is already developing does not augur well for Iraq's future stability. Both Iraq and the United States must work hard to ensure that slow but steady success over the insurgency is not overshadowed by growing ethno-sectarian animosities as various groups fight one another for the biggest slice of the political and economic pie. In place of sensational headlines, official triumphalism, and hand-wringing, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq offers a clear-eyed analysis of the increasingly complex violence that threatens the very future of Iraq.

 

Inhalt

EVOLUTION OF THE IRAQI INSURGENCY FROM CONVENTIONAL TO PARTISAN WARFARE DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
1
The structural organizational and societal weaknesses of the Iraqi armed forces
2
The evolution of the Sunni insurgency April 2003 to April 2005
17
ORIGINS AND MOTIVES OF THE INSURGENCY
59
Protection of Sunni Arab identity and fears of marginalization
60
Motives of former regime elements
82
Motives of former military personnel
92
Nationalism honor revenge and pride
99
CONTENDING NATIONAL IDENTITIES THE KURDS AND SHIA ARABS
214
federalism or independence?
215
The empowerment of the Shia Arabs
230
IDEOLOGY POLITICS AND FAILURETO EXECUTE THE US COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
271
Ideological lens versus political pragmatism
276
Political development basic services rehabilitation and reconstruction
288
Creation of legitimate coercive state apparatus
299
The US militarys approach to counterinsurgency
319

Tribal motives
104
Religion
108
The political goals of thc insurgency
121
THE INSURGENTS WAY OF WARFARE
125
External support for the insurgents
135
Organizational typology
151
Insurgent organizations
170
Operational goals and art
176
Targets and tactics of the insurgency
188
Weaknesses of the Iraqi insurgency
200
WHITHER IRAQ?
345
Should we stay or should we go?
348
EPILOGUE
367
The insurgencv and counterinsurgency in Tal Afar
368
The constitutional debates of 2005
380
NOTES
391
BIBLIOGRAPHY
451
INDEX
473
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Autoren-Profil (2006)

Ahmed S. Hashim is Professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. His previous books include Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment and Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, both written with Anthony H. Cordesman.

Bibliografische Informationen