Bills of Exchange. This article is inserted only to point out an ordinance issued by the city of Barcelona in 1394, directing that bills of exchange should be accepted within 24 hours after they were presented; and that the acceptance should be written on the back of the bill. It is by no means the first instance of their use but this document proves that this method of transacting business was fully established in the 14th century, together with the present form and terms.

We have now reached the conclusion of a work, for the production of which great erudition and much perseverance were required: yet the union of these estimable qualifications has created a book which will more frequently be consulted than perused. The investigations comprised in these volumes will by many be classed with the difficiles nuga, and it will not in every instance be possible to defend the learned author from this charge.-It remains that we caution our readers against adopting implicitly the significations assigned to the passages quoted by M. Beckmann: we have remarked several that, in our opinion, conveyed a very different meaning from that which they were cited to prove.-The style of the translator is perspicuous.

ART. VII. Dr. Gillies's Translation of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. [Article concluded from the Review for May, p. 35-44.] FROM the general influence which religion and politics have on the actions and opinions of mankind, some writers of eminence have asserted that the two moft important treatises, which have come down to us from antiquity, are, the books of Cicero on the nature of the gods, and Aristotle's politics. Religious inquiries of every kind naturally lead to the sublimest speculations, and give rise to the noblest sentiments; no part of either antient or modern literature brings before the mind more pleasing and interesting imagery, than the elegant mythology of the Greeks; and no subject affords greater scope for profound observation and ingenious remark. Of this circumstance, Cicero has availed himself in the work which we have mentioned; his good sense, his powers of argument, the amenity of his style, and the penetration of his genius, appear no where to greater advantage. The triumph of Christianity over Paganism, however, is so complete, that the practical conse quences of any speculation on the religion or mythology of the antients must be inconsiderable. The politics of Aristotle have this advantage, that they are a fund of the most profound

Ham....h.

learning

learning and observation, on matters which have the greatest influence on man, in all his relations and dependencies. In the present time, his speculations are especially interesting. We have seen a power start up, which, under the pretence of benefiting mankind by ameliorating their forms of government, has subverted matry of the thrones of Europe, and threatens all that remain. The consequence naturally is, that political speculation was never so much indulged as at present. Questions of government have absorbed almost every other subject; and many topics of discussion, which were formerly ranked among the airy dreams of projectors or metaphysicians, now come home to the minds and bosoms of men, and fill them with dismay.This certainly gives particular consequence to the work now under our consideration: which contains the sentiments of the greatest political writer of antiquity, on a subject interesting and important at all times, but eminently such at the present period.

One circumstance certainly does honour to Aristotle. The partiality of the Greeks for the republican form of government, and their aversion from royalty, are well known; and it is therefore greatly to his praise that, in every part of his political works, he fhews himself far above this universal and favourite prejudice of his countrymen. A government, he says, may be excellent, whether the supreme power of the state reside in one, in many, or in the people at large: in any of these cases, also, it may be bad. Where the government resides in one, and that one governs by a due attention to the laws and welfare of his country, Aristotle calls it a monarchy; where the government is in the hands of persons who are the most distinguished by their virtues, their talents, and their natural importance in the state, he calls it an aristocracy; where it re sides in the people at large, and they act with good sense and public spirit, he calls it a republic; and in all these cases, he says, the government is good. When, however, the king disregards the laws and the welfare of his subjects, he is not, according to Aristotle, a monarch, but a tyrant; when the few, who are in possession of the government, have no other recommendation than their riches or their rank, it is not an aristocracy, but an oli garchy; when the poor have the government at their command, it is not a republic, but a democracy; and each of these governments, according to our author, is bad. Whether the arbitrary and unrestrained will of a tyrant, the contemptuous opulence of an oligarchy, or the unprincipled and indecorous poverty of a democracy, govern the state, the condition of the citizen (in Aristotle's opinion) is equally miserable.-The reader will find this sub ject investigated in the third book, with much penetration and ingenuity.

ingenuity. The author then discusses the great question, on what portion of the state the sovereignty ought to reside; and on the opinion of those who contend that it should reside with the people, he thus expresses himself:

The people at large, how contemptible soever they may appear when taken individually, are yet, when collectively considered, not, perhaps, unworthy of sovereignty. It is a trite observation, that those entertainments where cach man sends the dish most agreeable to his own palate, are preferable to those furnished by the most sumptuous delicacy of individuals. The people at large are allowed to be the best judges of music and of poetry. The general taste is thus acknowledged to be better than that of the few, or of one man, however skilful. Considered collectively, the people form a complex animal, with many feet, with many hands, with many faculties, with many virtues; each member contributing something, more or less valuable, to the perfection of the whole body. The moral and intellectual excellencies of the multitude thus differ from those of a wise and virtuous man, as the beauty of a fine picture does from the beauty of individuals; of whom some may have eyes, and others may have other features, more perfect and more beautiful than those of the picture; yet the picture, collecting only excellencies, and always avoiding deformities, will be found more beautiful and more perfect than any original in nature, with whom it can be compared. The excellencies, therefore, of that complex entity the public, may sometimes surpass those of the most accomplished prince or most virtuous council. That this commonly holds, I would not,, indeed, venture to affirm. It rather seems manifest, that to some bodies of men the argument cannot possibly apply; for if it applied to them, it would extend also to wild beasts, since wherein some multitudes differ from wild beasts it is not easy to discover.

The safety of every free government requires that the major part of the citizens should enjoy a certain weight in the administration. If this does not take place, the majority must be dissatisfied; and where the majority are dissatisfied, the government will soon be subverted. But what sort of magistracy is the humble citizen, the mere unit of the crowd, qualified to exercise? Offices of high per sonal trust, or of important executive authority, his ignorance would disgrace, or his injustice might betray. For the performance of extraordinary tasks, extraordinary virtues, as well as extraordinary abilities, are required; and such virtues and abilities are not to be expected in the individuals of a promiscuous multitude. It remains, therefore, that the people at large be intrusted with the deliberative and judicial powers of government, because the members of assemblies, senates, and courts of justice, acting, not individually, but collectively, prove mutually assisting to each other. In such popular. tribunals, virtue and passion, reason and sentiment, courage and wisdom, are harmoniously blended into one salutary composition, in which even the grossest ingredients are not without their use; for experience teaches, that the purest nourishment is not always the best, but that fine flour is most wholesome when mixed with the coarse.'

The good sense of this passage is evident; the work abounds with many that are equally striking; and we wish that the li mits of our Review permitted us to favour the reader with more of them. We must be contented with selecting, from such as are most remarkable, those in which the Stagyrite differs most widely from authors of acknowleged merit and general celebrity. His ideas of the origin of government are very different from those of Mr. Locke; and Dr. Gillies, in his introduction to the first book, shews that they are more accurate, more satisfactory, and practically more useful, than those of that great writer. In the 6th chapter of the first book, Aristotle discusses the important question of the use and real value of money. In a note to a passage of this part of the work, the translator points out in what respect Aristotle's notions of political economy, and particularly on the nature of money, differ from those of modern writers of eminence, especially those of Hume and Smith. He shews that they follow Aristotle in his great general views, and that, when they differ from him, their positions are liable to many and serious ob jections.

In the introduction to the second book, the reader will meet with a detailed account of Aristotle's notions of the nature and best improvements of representative government; and he will be surprised to find that Aristotle had such enlarged views and such profound knowlege of a subject, with which it has been gratuitously asserted that the antients were little-if at all-acquainted:

It has been the fashion,' says Dr. Gillies, of late years to maintain that the misfortunes of the Greek commonwealths did not origi nate in the source above explained, but in the general ignorance of all the free states of antiquity with regard to representative government, the highest improvement of republicanism. As this doctrine is very sedulously inculcated on both sides of the Atlantic, by those who, having overturned their own hereditary constitutions, are desirous of encouraging other nations to imitate their example, it may not be improper to examine how far such assertions are warranted by history; especially as the examination will serve to illustrate several of our author's remarks in the following Books of his Politics. That the Greeks were totally unacquainted with representative government, cannot be maintained by any who have the least tincture of learning. I need not mention the Amphictyonic council, and the Achæan league, both of which representative bodics I have described in another place. But I may observe, as a fact less generally attended to, that in the commonwealth of Mantinaa, persons chosen from the people at large were invested with the power of naming the magistrates. In this Arcadian republic, there was not only representation simply, but a double row of representatives; delegates of delegates; and it is not reasonable to conjecture that an arrangement so obvious

should

should have remained undiscovered among a cluster of free states, where all sorts of propositions were made, and all kinds of experiments were tried; where nothing was rejected which had not been previously refuted; and where institutions, seemingly the most unpromising, were condemned or approved in proportion only to the mischief or benefit visibly manifest in their effects. This is so true, that the supposed modern maxims, respecting representation and taxation, were held and practised by the Lycians; a people not obscure nor inconsiderable, but eminently illustrious both in war and peace, from the earliest to the latest period of their history. The Lycians inhabited the southern coast of the Asiatic peninsula, and were surrounded by the territories of Carian, Pamphylian, and Cilician. pirates; wretches who deformed those seas by their rapacity and cruelty, and whose cities were marts of booty and slavery, particu-. larly of captives, born free, reduced into inextricable bondage. The Lycians alone disdained this abominable traffic; and though they often commanded the sea even to the coast of Italy, yet they neverwere convicted or even accused of sacrificing honour to gain. Their equity and innocence protected them against the just vengeance which often fell on their neighbours from the Syrian and the Roman power. From the age of Homer to that of Brutus and Cassius, they continued to flourish under their hereditary institutions in domestic tranquillity and national independence. Within a circular peninsula, nearly an hundred miles in diameter, and with upwards of one hundred and seventy miles of sea-coast, Xanthus, Patara, Pinara, with three equal, and seventeen inferior cities, formed from time immemorial a federal and representative government. The national convention or congress consisted of deputies from the several members of the union; the greatest cities having three votes; the middling, two; and the smallest only one vote in the election of magistrates and all public concerns. In the same proportion they paid taxes and incurred other public burdens; their taxation and representation being regarded by them as correlatives. They had one common archon or stadtholder, whose office became in later times elective, but which may be conjec, tured, from the analogy of their history with that of their European brethren, to have been anciently hereditary.

In examining the other Greek republics, we shall find that power exercised by delegation formed a leading feature in every one of them. Athens itself, which became the most democratical of them all, was in its best times a government of representation as well as of rotation; and in reading its laws, we shall be often tempted to believe that we are perusing the code of a certain modern representative democracy. In the former commonwealth, which from the time of Theseus breathed a peculiar spirit of freedom, the comitia or ordinary assemblies of the people were not summoned as at Rome by a consul, nor by any analogous magistrate, as in many neighbouring Greek states. At Athens the political machine moved, as it were, spontaneously, with the revolution of the seasons. The astronomer Meton, who refornied the calendar ten years before the Peloponnesian war, regu lated the commencement of the Athenian year by the first new moon after the summer solstice. The year was divided into twelve months,

consisting