peror in the confidence of the friends of continental freedom, and of constitutional order. Had Napoleon given Italy that independence and nationality which recent events are fast teaching us she is fully competent to enjoy and use with judgment and moderation, he might have retraced his previous missteps, and secured the foundations of his empire not on a system of repressions and half measures in the direction of progress, but upon and in the hearts of the intelligent and freedom-loving men of France, and upon the good will and moral support of the constitutional states of Europe. The doubts as to his sincerity in the Italian campaign extend to the motives which have induced him to relax some of the rigors of his dynasty; and there is much plausibility in the common opinion that if he was false to Italy, he can not be true to France. At least, if he had done for Italy all that he promised, and carried out to the letter the spirit of the glowing proclamations issued at Milan, France might now be substantially a free nation. Instead of the amnesties granted to the press and political exiles, we might have a general forgetfulness of the past and of the steps by which the emperor ascended the throne, a thorough and honest popular confidence in the Napoleonic règime, and a return to those mild and lenient terms of government which can only exist when good faith and mutual respect unite the governing and the governed. NAPOLEONIC IDEAS. The European press is loaded down with bewildering and contradictory reports in reference to the projected settlement of the Italian question. It would be amusing to examine and compare the various statements which have been put forth, with an air of credibility, from time to time, within the last month [Oct., 1859]. Not long since, it was announced that the Zurich conference had certainly and finally closed its sessions; but at the latest advices the plenipotentiaries were busily applying themselves to the task of dining and wining with the hospitable Swiss, and this seems to be the only part of their proceedings upon which the various correspondents do not contradict each other. Among other conditions of the Zurich settlement, it was stated that Austria was to give up to Sardinia two of the fortresses of the famous quadrilateral, besides the duchies of Parma and Modena; a proposition almost as absurd as the others which were announced almost simultaneously, namely, that a second son of King Leopold was to be sovereign of Tuscany, and that in the proposed congress at Brussels, England would be represented by Prince Albert. Asstria surrendering Peschiera and Mantua, which she was allowed to retain after the Imperial interview at Villafranca a German prince ruling the intensely Italian Tuscans-and the powerless and much-restricted prince consort representing Great Britain in a European congress - such are some of the absurdities to which the press is driven, in - the attempt to solve the most important problem of the day—the Napoleonic idea of the Italian question. For the meat of this difficult nut lies hid in the subtle and secretive brain of the emperor of the French, at last accounts quietly enjoying the baths at Biarritz, and slowly evolving, from the complications which surround him, the idea which first induced him to set foot in Italy, and which inspires his conduct and governs his acts now as much as it did then. There reposes the secret which one will ask in vain from the Zurich plenipotentiaries, the busy king of Belgium, the active young Metternich, or the much-troubled cabinet of Palmerston. He who planned and conducted the Italian campaign, and probably foresaw the various movements. and combinations which followed, alone holds the last link of the chain which he has forged. What is the idea for which, the Moniteur announces, France is the only nation in Europe which will fight? Is it the freedom of Italy, "from the Alps to the Adriatic," the alleged basis of the war, or only the glory of France, and the perpetuation and aggrandizement of the imperial dynasty? This is the real question which underlies the whole business. The character of a man, rather than the policy of governments, is involved; the good faith and sincerity of a monarch, rather than the designs of parties and the maneuvres of diplomatic bodies. When we find out what Napoleon means to do, we shall know very nearly what has been actually effected. Not that his power is absolute; for he knows how and when to be moderate, and to mould his plans according to cir cumstances; but he will give the general direction and shape to the settlement, whether that may embrace the actual unity and independence of Central Italy, the restoration of the dukes, or the establishment of an Etrurian kingdom, with one of the Bonapartes at its head the last a contingency, however, which the Moniteur positively denies. In the meantime, people are asking themselves, and somewhat pertinently in reference to the Italian question, whether France herself is any freer since the amnesty and the modification of the laws of the censorship; whether her people or her statesmen have any more power or influence in the government; or if the thought and intelligence of France has any wider or freer scope of utterance. They even ask each other if the evident determination of the emperor to satisfy and even gratify Austria, on almost any terms, has any connection with the acknowledged fact, that, notwithstanding the disarmament, he is now building a steel-clad fleet of war-vessels, and can lead out nearly 600,000 men under arms at a month's notice. The questioning goes still further; for all Europe is asking itself, and England throbs with anxiety at the very thought, whether the settlement of the Italian question is not the first step in the development of a secret and long-matured plan which involves the peace and security of larger and more important states in Europe. FRENCH NAVAL ARMAMENTS. Of the steel plated war vessels with which France is strengthening her navy, two, the liners, Castiglione and Massena, are finished, and great exertions are being made to speedily complete the Gloire and Invincible, which will carry engines of nine hundred horse power and forty rifled cannon. Two other liners, also steel clad, and of immense size, have been put on the stocks, the Magenta at Brest, and the Solferino at L'Orient. A Paris correspondent recently stated that a trial of one of these immense and almost impregnable marine monsters had proved entirely satisfactory. A shell of the largest size, projected from a short distance against the side of one of the completed vessels, did not effect the least injury. The London Times has stated that there are building, or under orders to be built, in the French dock yards, twenty ships of the line, ten of the very largest size, and ten of an inferior calibre. The advices by later steamers, however, throw some doubt upon statement, and it is probable that these vessels have been mistaken for twenty large transports, capable of conveying 1,500 men each. How many of the steel plated frigates, or liners, have been ordered is uncertain; but we know of at least six, enumerated above; two of them entirely or nearly completed, and all vaisseaux du combat, fighting vessels, steel plated, with iron beaks or prows. Owing to the rapid operations of French science, such vessels can probably be ready for sea within eighteen months after they are ordered. It is also announced that these and various other naval preparations are being prosecuted with energy, and that this |