upon a manifold title: the Father's gift, Son's purchase, Holy Ghost's obsignation and earnest; the promises' tender; their faith's acceptance; their forerunner's prepossession: yea, 'tis their inheritance; they are children and therefore heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ, to the same glory with him. They are by him received to the glory of God, called to his kingdom and glory. Will it not contribute exceedingly to their satisfaction, when they shall look upon this glory, not as unconcerned spectators, but as interested persons? This is my happiness, to behold and enjoy this blessed God! What a rapturous expression is that,m God our own God shall bless us; and that, Thy God thy glory! Upon interest in God, follows their interest in his glory and blessedness; which is so much the dearer, and more valuable, as it is theirs: their glory, from their God. They shall be blessed by God, their own God; drink waters out of their own well. How endearing a thing is propriety! Another man's son is ingenious, comely, personable, this may be a matter of envy; but mine own is so, this is a joy. I read in the life of a devout nobleman of France," that receiving a letter from a friend, in which were inserted these words, Deus meus, et omnia; My God, and my all; he thus returns back to him, "I know not what your intent was, to put into your letter these words, Deus meus, et omnia; My God, and my all; only you invite me thereby to return the same to you, and to all creatures; My God, and my all; my God, and my all; my God, and my all. If perhaps you take this for your motto, and use it to express how full your heart is of it; think you it possible I should be silent upon such an invitation, and not express my sense thereof? Likewise, be it known unto you therefore, that he is my God and my all; and if you doubt of it, I shall speak it a hundred times over. I shall add no more; for any thing else is superfluous, to him that is truly penetrated with my God, and my all. I leave you therefore in this happy state of jubilation; and conjure you, to beg for me, of God, the solid sense of these words." And do we think, My God, and my all, or my God, and my glory, will have lost its emphasis in heaven? or that it will be less significant among awaked souls? These things concur then, concerning the object: 'tis most excellent, (even divine,) entire, permanent, and theirs: how can it but satisfy! z Rom. viii. 17. ch. xv. 7. 1 Thess. ii. 12. CHAPTER VI. What the vision of God's face contributes to the soul's satisfaction, estimated from the consideration of the act of vision itself. Wherein this pleasure surpasses that of sense. A comparison pursued more at large, between this intuition and discourse, between it and faith. This intuition more absolutely considered: Its characters, and what they contribute to the satisfaction of the blessed soul: That it is, viz. efficacious, comprehensive, fixed, appropriative. 2. THE act of vision, or intuition itself. How great the pleasure will be that accrues to the blessed from this sight of God's face, is very much also to be estimated from thea nature of the act, as well as the excellency of the object. Inasmuch as every vital act is pleasant, the most perfect act of the noblest faculty of the soul must needs be attended with highest pleasure. 'Tis a pleasure that most nearly intimates divine pleasure. And every thing is more perfect, as it more nearly approaches divine perfections. Intellectual pleasure is as much nobler than that of sense, as an immortal spirit is more noble than a clod of earth. The pleasure of sense is drossy, feculent, the pleasure of the mind refined and pure; that is faint and languid, this lively and vigorous; that, scant and limited, this, ample, and enlarged; that, temporary and fading, this, durable and permanent; that, flashy, superficial, this, solid and intense; that, raving and distracted, this, calm and composed. Whence even that great reputed sensualist, Epicurus himself, professedly disclaims, or is represented as disclaiming, the conceit of placing happiness in sensual delights. And as the pleasure of intellection excels all the pleasure of sense; so doth the pleasure of intuition excel al other intellectual pleasure. Let us, to this purpose, but consider, generally, this way of knowing things, and compare it with those two other ways, by discourse and by faith. a Res sunt perfectiores vel imperfectiores prout à summa perfectione magis vel minime abscedunt. Pet. Molin. de cognitione Dei. See Culverwel of the light of nature, speaking (as I remember) to this purpose, c. 17. Quocirca et cum universe voluptatem beatæ vitæ esse finem dicimus; longe profecto absumus, ut eas voluptates, quæ sunt virorum luxu diffluentium, aut aliorum etiam, quatenus spectantur in ipsa motione, actioneve fruendi; qua nimirum sensus jucunde dulciterque afficitur, intelligamus; veluti quidam rem ignorantes, aut a nobis dissentientes, aut alioquin adversum nos male affecti, interpretantur; sed illud duntaxat (ut res iterum dicatur) intelligimus: non dolere corpore; animo non perturbari. Gassend. Syntag. Philos. Epicur. See his Epistle to Menoceus in D. Laert. 1. Discourse. I mean (that I be not mistaken by the vulgar reader) the discourse of the mind, or ratiocination; that way of attaining the knowledge of things, by comparing one thing with another, considering their mutual relations, connexions, dependencies; and so arguing out, what was more doubtful and obscure, from what was more known and evident. To the altogether unlearned it will hardly be conceivable, and to the learned it need not be told, how high a gratification this employment of his reason naturally yields to the mind of a man; when the harmonious contexture of truths with truths, the apt coincidence, the secret links and junctures of co-herent notions, are clearly discerned when effects are traced up to their causes, properties lodged in their native subjects, things sifted to their principles. What a pleasure is it, when a man shall apprehend himself regularly led on (though but by a slender thread of discourse) through the labyrinths of nature; when still new discoveries are successfully made, every further inquiry ending in a further prospect, and every new scene of things entertaining the mind with a fresh delight! How many have suffered a voluntary banishment from the world, as if they were wholly strangers, and unrelated to it; rejected the blandishments of sense; macerated themselves with unwearied studies, for this pleasure; making the ease and health of their bodies to give place to the content and satisfaction of their minds! But how much intuition hath the advantage, above this way of knowledge, may be seen in these two obvious respects. 1. 'Tis a more facile way of knowing. Here is no need of a busy search, a tiresome indagation, (the difficulty whereof makes the more slothful rather trust than try,) a chaining together of consequences. The soul hath its clothing (its vestment of light) upon as cheap terms as the lilies theirs; doth neither toil nor spin for it; and yet Solomon, in all the glory of his famed wisdom, was not arrayed like it. This knowledge saves the expense of study; is instantaneous, not successive. The soul now sees more, at one view, in a moment, than before in a life's-time: as a man hath a speedier and more grateful prospect of a pleasant country, by placing himself in some commodious station, that commands the whole region, than by travelling b Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. c Nonnulli tædio investigandæ veritatis, cuilibet opinioni potius ignavi succumbunt; quam in exploranda veritate, pertinaci diligentia perseverare volunt. Min. Felix, Oct. 9. through it. 'Tis no pains to look upon what offers itself to my eye. Where there is a continued series of consequences, that lie naturally connected, the soul pleasingly observes this continuity; but views the whole frame, the whole length of the line, at once, (so far as its limited capacity can extend,) and needs not discuss every particle, severally, in this series of truths, and proceed gradatim, from the knowledge of one truth to another; in which case only one, at once would be present to its view. It sees things that are connected, not because they are so: As a man, conveniently placed in some eminent station, may pos sibly see, at one view, all the successive parts of a gliding stream but he that sits by the water's side, not changing his place, sees the same parts, only because they succeed; and these that pass, make way for them that follow, to come under his eye: so doth a learned man describe the unsuccessive knowledge of God; of which the glorified soul's way of knowing, is an imitation; as the very words seeing and beholding (which it is so frequently set forth by in Scripture) do naturally import. Yet that, as to them, all ratiocination shall be excluded that state, I see no reason to admit; though with God it can have no place. And, as he is reckoned to live a pleasanter life, that spends upon a plentiful estate, than he that gets his bread by the sweat of his brows; so this more easy way of knowing, must needs be reckoned more pleasing. This knowledge is as Jacob's venison, not hunted for but brought to hand. The race is not here to the swift. The unlearned idiot knows as much as the profoundest Rabbi; (at least with as much satisfaction;) and all arms are of an equal size; or are content with their own measure. 2. 'Tis more certain. For what do we use to reckon so certain as what we see with our eyes? Better (even in this respect) is the sight of the eyes, than the wandering of the desire. While here the mind is carried, with most earnest desire, to pursue knowledge, it very often mistakes its way, and miserably wanders. In our most wary ratiocinations, we many times shoot at rovers; but when we know by this vision, our mark is immediately presented to our eye. We are in no danger to be imposed upon by delusive ap d Atque ut homini sedenti ad ripam fluminis, sola aqua presens est quæ ei hoc temporis punctulo observatur; eidem vero homini, totum flumen presens esset, si supra summam aeris regionem erectus, uno aspectu fontem et ostium fluminis posset aspicere: Ita oculo Dei, &c. P. Molinæus de cognit. Dei. e Herbert. pearances of things. We look through no fallacious me diums, are held in no suspense; puzzled with no doubts, whether such consequences will hold, such conclusions be rightly inferred; and so are not retarded from giving a present unwavering assent. Here are no perplexing intricacies, no dubious hallucinations, or uncertain guesses. We see things, as they are, by a simple and undeceiving light, with both subjective and objective certainty, being secure both from doubt and error. 2. Faith. How magnificent things doth Scripture speak of this grace! which the experience also of such as have been wont to live by it (i. e. to make it the governing principle of their lives) doth abundantly confirm. How clear are its apprehensions! f 'tis the evidence of things not seen: how sweet its enjoyments! whom not seeing ye love; and though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice, with joy unspeakable, and full of glory. Even the heathen theology hath magnified it above knowledge. "What is it (saith one) that unites us with the self-goodness, and so joins us thereto, that it quiets or gives rest to all our action and motion? I will express it in one word; 'tis faith itself, which unspeakably, and after a hidden manner, doth unite and conjoin happy souls with the self-good. For (saith he) it concerns us not, either in the way of science, or with any imperfection, to inquire after the good; but to behold ourselves in the Divine light, and so shutting our eyes, to be placed in the unknown and secret unity of beings.' And a later writer gives us this, as a conclusion from that former author, That as faith, which is credulity,i is below science; so that faith, which is truly so called, is, super-substantially, above science and intelligence, immediately uniting us to God. But 'tis evident, intuitive knowledge far exceeds even faith also. 1. 'Tis more distinct and clear. Faith is taking a thing upon report; Who hath believed our report? And they are more general, languid apprehensions we have of things this way. Faith enters at the ear; it comes by hearing. And if we compare the perceptions of these two external senses, that of hearing, and sight; the latter is unspeakably more clear, and satisfying. He that hath knowledge of a foreign country, only by report of another, hath very f Ελεγχος. Heb. xi. 1. g 1 Pet. i. 8. Η Ου γνωσικώς, ουδε ατελώς, αλλ' επίδοντας, εαυτους τωι θείωι Φωτι, στο Proclus. in Plat. Theol. i Picus Mirand. k Isa. liii. 1. 1 Rom. x. 16. |