distinct point of view, as that there should be available everywhere an efficient force for the defence of our strongholds, as well as the nucleus of a corps at home, which would more than suffice for any call that might be made upon it in an emergency, and offer a ground-work on which, with comparatively little waste of time, a much larger field-force might be erected. Our heavy artillery, so constructed, would be in a condition to send abroad ten battalions, denuded of one company each-and to leave in the United Kingdom nine full battalions, with a provisional battalion formed out of the depôt companies of those on foreign service. Now ten battalions, of eight hundred and fiftyfive men a-piece, would go a great way to supply the garrisons of all our fortresses, properly so called, whether they be insular or continental. Take Gibraltar, which, mounting six hundred guns at the least, is, we believe, garrisoned by five battalions of infantry and five companies of artillery. We would give it two service-battalions of artillery with three of infantry; we would increase the former force from less than five hundred to seventeen hundred men, and diminish the latter proportionably, as being in some sort wasted behind stone walls. Of course, we should have so to discipline our heavy artillery that they might be able to take all guards, outpost duty, patrols, sentry duty, and so forth, as effectively as the line: and then, were the place suddenly attacked, we think no man will doubt that its defence would be materially improved. In the same view we would station one battalion at Malta, and another in Corfu and its dependencies. A fifth would go a great way to garrison Bermuda. A sixth would suffice for Canada, putting four companies into the citadel of Quebec, and distributing the remainder, as wanted, through the other fortresses. To a seventh we might commit in a great measure the care of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. An eighth, with the assistance of a regiment of negro artillery, would do for the whole of the West India islands; while the ninth might be stationed at the Cape, garrisoning the frontier redoubts, and giving detachments to the Mauritius and other posts on the African shore-the tenth in Ceylon, with three companies doing duty at Hong-Kong, and relieved from time to time as the Ceylon Rifle Corps relieves its wing, which is in like manner detached to the Chinese coast. For St. Helena (and other places similarly circumstanced) we would recommend a local artillery. We have already in that island a regiment of local infantry; add a half-battalion of local artillery, and you will have put it out of all reach of danger. And with respect to Vancouver's island-to our settlements on the Columbia and in the Archipelagan cluster-we imagine that that we shall have sufficiently provided for them, if we either use them as out-stations for Canada and Ceylon, or lend a couple of batteries for field-purposes till they shall have grown old enough to supply and pay for their own artillery. Such an augmentation of the artillery force abroad would enable the government to withdraw, of infantry, two battalions from Gibraltar, one from Malta, one from the Ionian islands, and one from Bermuda. Canada might, we think, spare a battalion; and if we hesitate about a similar reduction in Ceylon, it is only because we fear that a second Chinese business cannot be very long deferred. Meanwhile our nine battalions set apart for home service need not be idle. The garrisons of all fortified places in the United Kingdom, we should as much as possible make up of artillerymen. Portsmouth and Plymouth would give quarters to one battalion each. A third might be distributed among Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney. A fourth, having its head quarters in Dover, would supply the whole Kentish and Sussex coasts; and a fifth, in Edinburgh Castle, do a similar service to all Scotland. Ireland would probably require two battalions; thus leaving for Woolwich, the Thames, the Medway, and the east coast four battalions, including the provisional battalion which would always do duty at Woolwich itself. If to this we add the head-quarters of what may be called the brigade of field-batteries, we shall always have within an easy march of London moveable and good artillery adequate for any exigency. There are two points which, in calculating the necessary strength of our field-batteries, we must keep in view-first, the exceeding utility of this description of force in the event of a hostile debarkation; and next, the extent and condition of the provinces in which we are liable so to be attacked, as that we shall be obliged to defend ourselves by taking the field in an orderly manner and entering upon a campaign. Of these there seem to us to be only two which deserve serious notice. You must always have a respectable field-artillery in North America; and recent events suggest that it will never be safe to withdraw your batteries entirely from the Cape. Perhaps, too, considering that China looks to Ceylon for its supply, it might be well, in addition to your heavy battalion, to keep a field-battery properly horsed and equipped there; but further we would not go. The islands of the Pacific will be better served for the present by detachments from the marine artillery than from the Royal Regi It will be time enough to think of stationing a battalion of the latter there when the harbours are better fortified, and redoubts have been erected in the interior to keep the natives in check. We shall thus have abroad six batteries; and as we pro pose pose to keep on foot not fewer than thirty, there will be twentyfour for European demands and to furnish reliefs in the other three quarters of the world. Now, allowing for each battery three guns and a howitzer, four waggons, and one forge-cart, these will require on a strictly peace-establishment fifty horses at home and sixty abroad, with eighty men, non-commissioned officers and trumpeters included. The whole extent of our home force, therefore, assuming that no portion of it is on the way to relieve the batteries abroad, will be 1920 men, 1200 horses, 96 guns, 96 ammunition waggons, and 24 forge-carts. We say nothing at present of spare waggons, spare wheel waggons, small-arm ammunition-waggons, and such like. The waggons themselves may always be kept in store; and as with good management the horses for them need hardly come under fire, there would be little difficulty in pressing from the omnibuses and stage-coaches in and near London enough to meet any sudden call. We should, were this plan adopted, rise at once from 10,800 men and 1048 horses, to 20,450 men and 1560 horses; and the increase of expense, were we to adhere to our present system of organizing and officering, would be enormous. But we do not recommend a perseverance in the existing system-and though, after all is done, there must be some increase, we believe that we see our way to more than an equivalent in the reductions which might be advantageously made elsewhere. For example, our battalions of artillery are at present officered respectively by one colonel-commandant, who is always a general, two colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, ten first-captains, ten second-captains, twenty first-lieutenants, and, if fully appointed, ten secondlieutenants. It seldom happens, however-indeed it never has happened for the last twenty years-that the Regiment has been full; and the estimates accordingly provide for no more than five second-lieutenants to each battalion. We should pro pose, in time of peace, to substitute for these per battalionone colonel-commandant, one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, ten captains, twenty first-lieutenants, and four second-lieutenants, if any. Leaving the second-lieutenants at the reduced scale, this will give us, according to the present estimate, per battalion 52 officers, independently of staff; according to the new, per battalion 38 officers, liable to a like addition. Observe that the reductions which we propose are in the ranks which receive the largest amount of pay; and that not one individual now in the service would suffer. On the contrary, the increased number of battalions will require for their supply on the reduced scale that three lieutenant-colonels be raised to the rank of colonel, and one first-captain to a lieutenantcolonelcy; colonelcy; and that not fewer than thirty-seven lieutenants shall be promoted to the rank of captain. Again, our thirty fieldbatteries undergo no other modification than is implied in the getting up for their use of a competent establishment of horses, waggons, and material. A battery of four pieces and eighty men cannot be efficiently worked without its two captains and two subalterns; increase it to six guns, and an additional subaltern becomes indispensable. For it is impossible for an officer to overlook, as he ought to do, the working of more than two guns in the field; and the whole battery requires, first, its commandant, and next, its staff officer to carry orders, which duty is discharged in a campaign by the second-captain. As our field-batteries on the present establishment muster only 100 men, and not one of these is ever complete, what we save in men or money in this branch of the service will be inconsiderable: -but take into account the suspension in time of peace of a distinct horse-artillery corps, and the balance in our favour rises again. Perhaps it might be our best plan to give in regular tables (Blue-Book fashion) the details of difference on every point between the existing establishment and the proposed establishment but we are afraid of drawing too much on the patience of civilians; and must therefore content ourselves with stating that we have reduced all to the most exact calculation of which we are capable, and have every item now before us in tables that would, we have no doubt, pass muster. The result is that, the horse-artillery under the present system costing 37,2197. per annum, we should, by our alteration under that head, save 27,1257. per annum; that our project increases the artillery officers employed, all ranks included, by the number of 412; the men of that force by the number of 10,000; the horses by 512;and that-allowing for the saving of 27,1251. per annum above stated the whole of this increase in the strength of our artillery would cost us an increased expenditure to the extent (according to our minutest calculation) of some 353,8007. per annum. Let us say, in round numbers, here is a project calling for an additional 350,000l. a-year. The question is-are there any means of meeting this outlay by judicious economy elsewhere? We think there are-and shall now beg leave to state how and where. The cavalry force of Great Britain, exclusive of the household brigade, consists of twenty-two regiments, of which five, As the necessary consequence of adopting this plan would be to check the promotion in the Regiment very seriously, we see no reason why the Artillery should not be put, as regards rank, on nearly the same footing with the Guards. We do not recommend any additional pay; but we think first-captains of Artillery should have the army-rank of lieutenant-colonel, and first-lieutenants of ten years' standing that of captain. being employed in India and put upon an increased establishment, draw their pay and other allowances from the Company. The remaining seventeen are paid, clothed, mounted, and equipped at the expense of the mother country; and constitute, with the exception of the horse-brigade, by far the most costly arm which the mother country wields. For the establishment of each, as regards the men and horses available, is absurdly small; whereas the list of officers and non-commissioned officers is kept as full as if there were twice as many private soldiers to obey them. If we except the 1st Dragoon Guards, which can show 361 troop horses and 438 men; and the 7th Dragoon Guards, which for the use of its 411 men musters 281 horses; the strength in the other regiments is 271 horses and 328 men. Now the complement of officers and non-commissioned officers to each being exactly 59-(27 of the former, 32 of the latter) we have our cavalry soldiers so admirably cared for, that whenever a dismounted parade takes place there is as nearly as possible one person in authority to look after five men; when the corps is called into the field, and all the horses chance to be effective, we have four troopers watched and kept together by an officer or a non-commissioned officer respectively. What we propose, is, that you reduce the number of regiments on the home establishment from seventeen to twelve ; that you transfer the men and horses of the corps about to be disbanded to those you keep on foot; and that, settling the strength of the latter at an average of 400 mounted men each, you retain quite as numerous and effective a force as you have now, at a considerable saving of expense in a pecuniary point of view. We do not mean to say that the saving will be very great. But we are confident that the tone of the cavalry cannot fail of being raised as soon as its members feel that the country is determined to treat them like soldiers; and this much of moral good would be worth seeking, even if it brought less than a saving of 11,000l. or 12,000l. to the Exchequer. Another step might be to reduce every one of the reserve battalions which have become, in the course of the last three or four years, quietly engrafted upon the line. If fifteen of these be dispensed with, you lighten the army estimates of more than three thousand men. But a still more important retrenchment might be made by reducing as many regiments or second battalions, as it has been shown that, by the proposed increase to your artillery force, you could spare from your foreign garrisons. Thus the establishment of two service battalions of artillery at Gibraltar lets loose an equal number of line battalions from that place. A battalion by the same process may be spared from Malta |