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himself to the creature, moved him to create the world. For an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fulness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse sap and life, is doubtless the reason of their communication to its buds, leaves and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore, to speak strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world; and so, that the emanation itself was aimed ut by him as a last end of the creation.
Wherein it is considered how, on the supposition of God's
making the forementioned things his last end, he mani. fests a supreme and ultimate regard to himself in all his works.
In the last section 1 observed some things which are actually the consequence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in themselves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in his work. I now proceed to enquire, how God's making such things as these his last end, is consistent with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to himself in his acts and works.Because it is agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself highest; therefore I would endeavour to show, how his infinite love to, and delight in himself, will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things: or rather, how a value to these things is implied in his value of that infinite fulness of good that is in himself.
Now with regard to the first of the particulars mentioned above-God's regard to the exercise of those attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations—it is not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his perfections; inasmuch as their excellency copsists
· in their relation to use, exercise, and operation. God's love
to himself, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that which is the use, end, and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, &c. that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues. So if God both esteem and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he cannot but value and delight in the expressions and genuine eflects of them. So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in hiinselt; and in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, he makes himself his end.
And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must from the same disposition be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed, and prized by others. He that loves any thing, naturally loves the approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation of it. Thus it is when one loves the virtues of a friend. And thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies; and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities; that is, it is fit that he should take delight in his own excelencies being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections; and in making this his end, he makes himseif his end.
And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz. God's being disposed to an abundant communication and glorious emanation of that infinite fulness of good which he possesses, as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happiness, in the manner he does; if we thoroughly consider the matter it will appear, that herein also God makes himself his end, in such a sense, as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard to himself.
Merely in this disposition to cause an emanation of his glory and fulness—which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be considered as the inciting cause of giving existence to other beings—God cannot so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself. For the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This dispositon or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground even of the future, intended, and foreseen existence of the creature. God's benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken either in a larger or stricter sense. In a larger sense, it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposta
tion in his nature to communicate of his own fulness in general; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness; and to give creatures existence in order to it. This may be called benevolence, or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love. It is the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most proper senses and it has the same general tendency and effect in the creature: well-being. But yet this cannot have any particular present or future created existence for its object; because it is prior to any sucb object, and the very source of the futurition of its existence. Nor is it really diverse from God's love to himself; as will more clearly appear afterwards.
But God's love may be taken, more strictly, for this general disposition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects. Love, in the most strict and proper sense, presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence, strictly taken, presupposes an existing object, as much as pity a miserable suffering object.
* This propensity in God to diffuse himself, may be considered as a propensity to himself diffused; or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates in its own complete self. And so the disposition in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fulness, warmth, and brightness, is only a tendency to its own most glorious and complete state. So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of his infinite glory, to belong to the fulness and completeness of himself; as though he were not in his most glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ, (toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory, and the communication of his fulness,) is called the fulness of Christ; as though he were not in bis complete state without her; like Adam without Eve. And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. xi. 7.Isa. xlvi. 13. “I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel my GLORY,"* Indeed, after the creatures are intended to be crea
Very remarkable is that place, John xii. 23, 24. “And Jesus answered them, saying, The hour is come, that the son of man should be glorified. Verily, I say ynto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and ţie, it abideth
ted, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to them, in the strictest sense, in his dealings with them. His exercising his goodness, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the spring of all God's proceedings through the universe ; as being now the determined way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuse himself. Here God acting for himself, or making himself his last end, and his acting for their sake, are not to be set in opposition; they are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be considered as first and original in his regard; and the creature is the object of God's regard consequently, and by implication, as being as it were comprehended in God; as shall be more particularly observed presently.
But how God's value for, and delight in, the emanations of his fulness in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulness of good in himself, and the supreme regard he has for himself; and that in making these emanations he ultimately makes himself his end in creation, will more clearly appear by considering more particularly the nature and circumstances of these communications of God's fulness.
One part of that divine fulness which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge which must be supposed to pertain to God's last end in creating the world, is the creature's knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge ; and even the faculty of understanding would be vain without it. And this knowledge is most properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge, which primarily consists in the knowledge of himself. God, in making this his end, makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature is but a conformity to God. It is the image of God's own knowledge of himself. It is a participation of the same, though infinitely less in degree : as particular beams of the sun communicated, are the light and glory of the sun itself, in part.
Besides, God's glory is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge; he must delight in every thing of that nature: As he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light; and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested and so glorified.
alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Christ had respect herein to the blessed fruits of his death, in the conversion, salvation, and eternal happiness of those that should be redeemed by him. This consequence of his death he calls his glory and his obtaining this fruit he calls his being glorified; as the flourishing, beautiful produce of a corn of wheat sown in the ground is its glory. Without this, he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created. But from him, by his death, proceeds a glorious offspring; in which are communicated his fulness and glory : As from Adam, in his deep sleep, proceeds the woman, a beantiful companion to fill his emptiness, and relieve his solitarinens; by Christ's death his fulness is abundantly diffused in many streams, and expressed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his spiritual offspring.
Another emanation of divine fulness, is the communication of virtue and holiness to the creature: This is a communication of God's holiness; so that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creature's holiness; which is a conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightness of a jewel held in the sun's beams, is a participation or derivation of the sun's brightness, though immensely less in degree. And then it must be considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists, viz. in love, which is the comprehension of all true virtue; and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in an high esteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praise of them. All which things are nothing else but the heart exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which, as I shewed before, God necessarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves himself, and values the glory of his own nature.
Another part of God's fulness which he communicates, is his happiness. This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself; and so does also the creature's happiness. It is a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God; by which also God is magnified and exalted. Joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praise. So that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fulness which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God; and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made is thereby conformed to God, and united to him: and that in proportion as the communication is greater or less. And the communication itself is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honour, exaltation, and praise of God consists.
And it is farther to be considered, that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself which he intended through all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly shew how, in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think what God has in view, in an VOL. III.