by a proper use of the means afforded us, the objection against the doctrine of human accountability in matters of faith is fully answered.

It appears, then, that our religious opinions are not so entirely independent of our wills, are not so wholly beyond our control, as we are apt to imagine. That is not the true view of faith which represents it as a necessary result produced by the mechanical operation of certain influences on the mind. Let anyone who has arrived at fixed opinions on religious subjects examine the history of those opinions, and he will find that in the formation of them he was guided and controlled to a very great extent by the action of the will. He will find that where probabilities in favour of particular doctrines were equally balanced, it was the will which determined the preponderance and decided the election. He will find that when new light suddenly dawned upon him, it was the will which determined him to follow its guidance. But if it be true that the will has such an influence in determining our faith, there can be no doubt as to the equity of the law which makes faith an object of legislation, a ground of retribution. Our notions on the subject of faith, it is to be feared, are much too lax and altogether unworthy the age in which we live. What are the current maxims of the day in relation to this subject?

No matter what a man believes, provided he is sincere in his belief." As if it were possible to be sincere in the belief of a doctrine essentially false, at a time when the means of distinguishing falsehood from truth are in everyone's hands. Again: "It matters but little what a man's faith is, provided his actions are right." As if righteousness and truth could be separated, as if it were possible to walk according to the law of God without following the light which God has provided for our direction. It is important that men should know and feel the solemn obligation which rests upon them to think right as well as to act right. The one is as much the end and object of our being as the other. We were created to pursue and enjoy truth; and every error which is received into the mind and allowed to dwell there must have a great and pernicious influence on our destiny. It is of great consequence what we believe, and he who asserts that truth is of no importance except in the sense of sincerity knows not what truth is.

It will be readily understood that these remarks are chiefly applicable to infidels, to those who reject Christianity altogether; and it is when viewed in this bearing that the im→ 33

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portance of the subject is most apparent. The danger to be apprehended from the infidelity so prevalent at the present day consists not so much in the temptations which it presents as in the indulgence with which it is received. By what flimsy arguments do we often hear it justified! The infidel is represented as one who by the laws of his mind is compelled to believe as he does, as one who after a candid and careful examination is forced to reject the gospel. It is difficult to say whether in such representations ignorance of human nature or indifference to truth is most predominant. But it is not difficult to perceive and to show that such representations are very false and very injurious. It is impossible for me to believe in Christianity, and at the same time to believe that anyone of sound mind, with all its evidences before him, can conscientiously reject it. It is said that the lives of these persons are a sufficient warrant for their sincerity, that it is impossible that men who are so correct in their morality should be dishonest in their professions. But is it true that the lives of infidels are generally correct? Far from it. The history of the past and the observation of the present bear witness to the contrary. For one unbeliever whose moral character is unimpeachable you shall find hundreds whose lives are bad, and not only bad but infamous. Besides, if the fact were as it is represented, the argument built upon it would have no weight. May not a man be correct in some things and faulty in others? The speculative philosopher, who spends most of his time in seclusion, has but little temptation to those sins which attract public notice. His transgressions are intellectual. In him opposition to the truth is the direction and form assumed by those evil propensities which in another man would have manifested themselves in sensual indulgence or in acts of fraud and violence.

But though the Scripture-doctrine of accountability in matters of faith applies principally to infidels, it applies also, in a greater or less degree, to those errors and false doctrines maintained by professed Christians. Trifling errors, such as consist rather in imperfect views of the truth than in wilful departure from the truth, and do not argue any moral obliquity on the part of those who hold them, may not essentially affect our character or happiness. It is comparatively of little consequence whether I attribute the retribution that awaits the sinner to the wrath of God or to the natural and necessary effects of sin, but it is of great consequence whether I do or do not believe in any retribution. It

is of little consequence whether in thinking of Christ I consider rather his human nature or the divine nature that was manifested in him, but it is of great moment whether I believe the man Jesus to have been identical with or inferior to the only true and living God.

Finally, in this as in all things, our responsibility is exactly proportioned to the advantages we have enjoyed and to the circumstances in which we have been placed. The pagan is not to be condemned for his unbelief in Christianity whose evidences have never been presented to him. The uneducated Christian brought up in all the ignorance of the Romish church is not responsible for the errors which he has inherited from his fathers. We are to be judged according to our means; and where the means are abundant, as they are among us at the present day, the responsibility they impose is great, and the judgment which awaits those who neglect them will be great also. Well, then, does it become us to examine our convictions and to inquire into the groundwork of our faith, that we may know whether we have conscientiously followed the light that was given us. "I believe, Lord help thou mine unbelief," was the cry of one who had caught a glimpse of the truth, and was anxiously struggling to realize its full and perfect illumination. So must we struggle and so must we pray. A distant glimmer of the truth is granted to us all; it is our business to search and study till that faint glimmer expands into a full and consistent faith.

F. H. HEDGe.

[We do not remember to have anywhere met with so condensed and at the same time satisfactory a statement of the evidence for the Unitarianism of the Christian church during the first three centuries, as is presented in the essay of which the following article is a part.. It was written several years ago by a gentleman of Meadville, Pennsylvania, since more generally known as the founder and principal patron of the Unitarian church in that village, and as the editor of "The Unitarian Essayist." Only a small edition of it was printed, and its circulation was almost entirely confined to the immediate vicinity of Meadville. As but few of our readers have, therefore, probably met with it, we believe we shall need no apology for reprinting it in this journal. - ED.]

A Letter on the Unitarianism of the First Three Centuries of the Christian Era.

TO THE READER.

THE following letter was originally written for "The Craw

ford Messenger." The length to which it has been extended, and the importance which in my opinion belongs to the subject of inquiry, cause it to be now presented to the public in its present shape. Unitarianism is often represented as a new thing which has sprung up of late, and which, therefore, cannot be true. It was to remove the injurious tendency of this error that the following letter was written. As a literary man I have no pretensions. My only aim has been to state, in a plain, perspicuous manner, the evidence belonging to the subject, so as to enable everyone to judge for himself respecting an important point of ecclesiastical history, and rendered doubly interesting on account of the consequences which result from it. To the labours of Dr. Priestley I have been indebted for the extracts given from the Fathers. I have also availed myself of the historical researches of Mosheim and Gibbon; and my task has in a measure been limited to the collection of the evidence, and to embodying it in a shape which should render it perfectly accessible to all classes of readers.

I have endeavoured to conduct this inquiry with the respect due to the faith held by numbers of my fellow-Christians, but at the same time, too, with that fearless freedom of research which ought to characterize all our inquiries after truth. But we are told that the doctrine of the Trinity is a mystery, that is, something totally incomprehensible, and therefore not the subject of human reason and human inquiry. But by whom are we told this? Not by the Deity, not by Christ, or his apostles, but by men, who, feeling themselves unable to defend a favourite dogma against the objections which reason brings against it, have invented this screen to save it from investigation. And why should we not subject its truth or fallacy to this test? Surely, if there be one thing certain under the sun, it is that the doctrine of the Trinity, whether true or false, rests entirely on human reasoning. That this dogma is not explicitly taught in the Scriptures is admitted by all; but we are told that there are certain passages found there from which the perfect equality of the Son and the Holy Spirit with the Father may be inferred. The doctrine is, therefore, one of inference. To draw inferences is to reason; and thus we see that this dogma, concerning which we are told that we must not reason, is entirely the offspring of human reasoning. But it is evident that by drawing fair inferences from correct premises we can never arrive at a proposition which is a mystery, in the popular sense of that term, that is, something

incomprehensible. The result of human reasoning must always be something which the human understanding can take in and appreciate. If it be maintained that there are passages in Scripture which teach that the Son and the Holy Spirit are each of them God, equally with the Father (a thing which I totally deny), the result is not a mystery, but a very plain dogma, teaching that there are three Gods. If it be said that other passages in Scripture teach the Divine Unity, and that this constitutes the mystery, I admit the fact, but deny the inference. We have then not a mystery, but a plain, palpable contradiction, which would shake the very foundation of revelation. And such, too, has been but too often the effect of this dogma. I have met with several men in life, who, though educated as Christians, had ceased to believe in revealed religion, and everyone of these had been driven into infidelity by the impossibility of believing the doctrine of the Trinity and the dark dogmas of Calvinism. I am the friend of Christianity, because I believe it to be the cause of human happiness; and if this letter should save anyone from rejecting Christianity, or should serve to remove even only some one troublesome or perplexing doubt, my labour will not have been fruitless.

Meadville, November 17, 1830.

A writer in "The Crawford Messenger" of the 11th November, under the signature of " A Presbyterian," has deemed proper to make the assertion that the Christian church, during the first three centuries, was Trinitarian. Of this I shall certainly not complain. Perhaps I ought to thank him for furnishing me with the opportunity of entering somewhat more fully than I have formerly done into the inquiry as to the opinions held on this subject during the first three centuries, as that is a subject well deserving of a careful examination. I could have wished that this investigation had devolved on some one more capable of doing justice to it than I am, or that, when it fell to my share, I might have had more leisure to bestow on it than my avocations will allow of; but I flatter myself, that, with the proofs which I can at any moment command, I shall be able to satisfy the reader that "A Presbyterian" is mistaken in every one of the positions he has taken. The only thing in that gentleman's essay which I have seen with regret is the strong personal feeling which