that they have generally a pretty large proportion of windows, of a sufficient size. But in a Gothic edifice, upon the castle model, many large windows are evidently incongruous. At Kew, however, we find the walls perforated most abundantly with windows, large and small; which, however necessary to the great end of comfortable dwelling, and however correct in their particular formation, will certainly be found a considerable diminution of the proposed effect. Indeed, whatever may be the novelty, singularity, or merit of the design, (considered in itself) there is but little that is appropriate in placing a castle in a decorated modern garden, containing not one feature, either of nature or art, suited to the manner of the building. The entrance, it would appear, is to be from a winding road by the river side; but it would have been much better from the avenue of Kew green; more adapted to the style of the house, and the majesty of the great personages for whose residence it is intended.

From the situation of the new palace it will be necessary to take down a part at least of the wall, and to unite the two gardens, which will be no small improvement.

Still the site is unfortunately chosen. Immediately opposite, on the north bank of the Thames, are some of the worst parts of the most disagreeable village in England; the back-fronts of the houses in Brentford. And, what is worse, they are on much higher ground than that on which Kew house is built. Hence, from the entrance, the view is spoiled by the ugliest of objects, which should certainly be screened. But this does not appear capable of accomplishment, otherwise than by additional planting; the growth of which must be a work of time. From the great western road, in passing through Brentford, the situation has a very mean effect, and seems destitute of every thing that should characterize the rural retreat of royalty.

Upon the whole, if criticism be not deemed as yet premature, it may be observed, that the new house is far, very far, preferable to the old one, and has the merit of being uncommon; but it must remain subject to the disadvantage of incongruity, as to its accompaniments, and of meanness of situation. There is not a villa of any note, on the banks of the Thames, that is not better situated than the edifice now constructing at Kew for one of the residences of the sovereign.

The new house is built after the designs of Mr. James Wyatt.

CRITO.

STATE

STATE OF THE TURKISH ARMY.

[Continued from page 305 of our last.]

INFANTRY.

HERE it is that the decay of the Ottoman army is most felt.

Those famous Janissaries, heretofore the honour of the army, redoubtable to the sultan by their audacity, and to the enemy by their bravery, are now merely a numerous and weak body.

This change is chiefly attributed to the measures taken by Sultan Mahomet to enervate a corps, whose insubordination he feared. He granted them privileges, which ruined them, by rendering them more of merchants than of military men.

These privileges consist principally in exemption from certain dues of entry, which causes many merchants to make themselves janissaries, to enjoy these exemptions. Before the time of the Sultan Mahomet, none but the flower of the young slaves were admitted into this corps, who were early accustomed to the most exact discipline. At present, every body who solicits is admitted, without caring for his habits or his valour.

To this was joined another cause. The art of war was brought to perfection among neighbouring nations; and this perfection, which, with other people, had excited emulation, had with the Turks a quite opposite effect. Constant defeats, during fifty years, discouraged them; and the janissaries throwing, perhaps, their degradation upon fatality, are accustomed as much to fly as they were to conquer.

The number of paid janissaries is fixed at 40,000, of which half are assembled for ordinary service. Of these, 10,000 forms the garrison of Constantinople, the others are spread in the frontier towns. The corps is divided into 101 regiments, each designated by a number. These regiments receive as many honeraries as present themselves. The 31st, to which almost all the mariners of the Black Sea attach themselves, amounts to more than. 30,000 men. But these honorary janissaries form a sort of corporation, not subjected to any service. It is generally from this militia that levies are made in time of war, and in the following manner:

The government addresses to the ser-dam (chief of militia) a beyrak or flag. The city is, according to its importance, obliged to furnish a greater or lesser number, and which are assembled either by force, or money, which is principally raised from the Christians and Jews. The Divan sends a certain number of other flags, under which are formed so many companies, enrolled only for one campaign. These are called minili-beirak, (compagnies du fix, because the Porte gives for each a certain sum. The captain is obliged to furnish the exceedings of the expence.

What inconveniences result from such a method of buying troops must be felt. The chief, being ill-paid, pays his soldiers ill. He is consequently obliged to permit their depredations, and

he

he often sets them the example. Cities then nearly resemble places taken by assault: passengers are robbed, women and boys insulted, houses barricadoed and forced. If these pillagers are dismissed, they go elsewhere to renew their depredations. If called upon to fight, they desert.

The ser-den genk-cheti, a name which nearly answers to that of enfans perdus, are companies of volunteer janissaries, levied in time of war by officers of this corps, who conduct them, at their own cost, to the field. These are yet more dangerous than the others. There is no sort of atrocity which these wretches do not

commit.

To these species of janissaries may be added from 5 to 6000 bostandgys; nearly the same number of nendgins, or choice soldiers, destined to guard the baggage; and 2 or 3000 mehterdays, a name which signifies military musicians, and who are charged with dressing out the tents.

The government leaving to the foot, as well as the horse, the care of arming and equipping themselves, we find in the infantry and cavalry similar disorders. All the muskets are different in length and calibre. They are without conformity in any thing but in the want of the bayonet.

This arm, which is now the principal force of our European infantry, is adopted in Turkey, by only about 1000 bostandgys, and 5 or 600 tufenkdgys (fusileers.) These troops, exercised by renegado Germans, are objects of contempt to the janissaries, who reproach them with submitting to European instruction, and call them infidels. Except these fusileers, and a few horsemen armed with lances, the Turks make no use of pointed arms, and hence, perhaps, one cause of the inferiority of their troops.

Such is the general state of the Ottoman infantry. Its force is always uncertain, and depends much upon the interest the nation takes in the war. It is also augmented, or diminished, by the idea they form of an enemy, but in a sense contrary to ours. The more formidable the foe, the more a Turkish army diminishes, and less energy is developed by the soldiers. The Porte, employing all its means, could not, in the present circumstances, raise more than 100,000 foot.

The bostandgys, or gardiners, form a corps of about 12,000 men, especially charged with the care of the seraglio and houses of pleasure belonging to the Sultan. The bostandgy-bachi, or chief, holds always the government of the caique of his highness. This officer has also the police of the canal of the Black-sea, and the villages which border it.

OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN GENERAL.

The result of the preceding observations makes the whole Ot toman army not to exceed 172,500 fighting men; of whom 100,000 are infantry, 70,000 horse, and 2,500 artillery. Suppose it to be 200,000, it is evident to those who know its composition, that it could not resist even 30,000 warlike soldiers.

Let

Let us consider then 200,000 men, a multitude without order or discipline, without knowledge of evolutions or management of arms: the one scarcely armed with a short carbine, the others embarrassed with muskets three times as long; infantry half naked, horsemen enveloped in their three or four pelices: some charged with a lance, a battle-axe, two pistols, three javelins, a sabre, a catlas, a musket, a poignard, and other arms: others carrying a cutlas, or a pistol, sometimes a batoon; cavaliers, one upon a vigorous, another upon a wretched horse. Let us imagine these half savage hordes, going to war only in the hope of pillaging their own country, making their passage by atrocities and outrages of every kind, then we shall know what an Ottoman army is, and what it can perform. When arrived at the place of encampment, the tent of the commander is placed upon an eminence in the centre, the soldiers gather round him, without order, and a few centinels, posted here and there, smoke and sleep.

The spirit which animates such troops, is the same which animates the empire. It is a mixture, odious and ridiculous at once, of ignorance and fanaticism, of cowardice and rashness. They tremble if an officer tells them, how the Russians gained a great victory with a cannon that 1000 oxen could hardly draw along.. But they soon recover from their fright. One of the devout assures them, that in the musselman army their exists a chief, armed with a marvellous sabre, which lengthening itself at the moment of striking, cuts off at a single blow the heads of 10,000 infidels. A number of similar traits might be related. The Drogmans, informing the Porte of the success of the French armies, literally translated the term artillerie volante. The minister had no doubt that we had the secret of making our cannon fly!

But to what shall I attribute such forgetfulness or degradation of the faculties of man? One of the most apparent causes seems to be fatalism.

This unfortunate doctrine scarcely leaves the Turks any energy. It robs them of that sentiment of honour which dies the last in a military character. Indifferent in every thing, they profit neither. by victory nor by defeat. They seem to resign themselves equally to good and ill fortune. If beaten, it is not that the enemy has taken his measures well, or has opposed them with more warlike and better disciplined troops. "How, say they, shall we resist God and his prophet ?". Thus are their defeats without shame, and their triumphs destitute of glory.

The same fatalism presents an insurmountable barrier to the extension of science. What need to study, when learning can do nothing against destiny? Thus the officers remain uninformed, like the soldiers. They can distinguish, upon a geographical chart, merely lines, points, and colours. A Pacha of two tails, who was an old warrior, was vexed to see a village of Natolia, where he was born, represented only by a point." "At least," cried he," it might be as large as a thumb

It

It is not to be wondered at, if officers, often ignorant of the number of soldiers under their command, fail to provide them sufficiently with food. They never think of forming magazines of provisions; trust to the uncertain arrival of convoys, which have, sometimes, to come 400 leagues journey. If the march of these be retarded by rain, or any other cause, famine soon visits the army; and the Turks, who are but too much disposed to desert, profit by this pretext. Autumn often gives them the sig nal. This season increases the fatigues of the campaign; cold begins to be felt, and the greater part of the soldiers, born in hot countries, return in crowds. In vain companies are stationed to stop them. They are either forced to yield to the multitude of runaways, or glad to join them. The army must be renewed for the ensuing campaign; and as levies are made with difficulty, it is rare to find the recruits assembled before the month of June.

But above all, it is in reverses that desertion and disorder are carried to their height. The foot kill the cavalry, to get their horses, and the poor profit by the confusion, to plunder the rich. A Turkish army beaten is annihilated.

We have dilated upon the defects of the Ottoman army. Let us speak, however, of its good qualities. It has some remark

able ones.

Frugality is the first virtue of a soldier; and none in the world carries it farther than a Turk. A ration of rice, and a little manteigner to season it, suffices him, with a morsel of bread, less to eat than to use his fingers. He is satisfied with this nutriment, and thinks it luxury when he has an addition of a little coffee.

His ample cloth habit gives ease to every movement, and is extremely suitable to rest in. The greater number of the Turks, even those in better circumstances, seldom use a bed.

It must be allowed, that the ignorance and fanaticism of the Turks render their attack, at first, impetuous. A blind confidence precipitates them. But if their first shock be not a triumph, it is a defeat, and a defeat is a rout. Resistance discourages them, in proportion, as they do not expect it. Yet, so little formidable in the field, these Osmanlys defend places obstinately. The want of tactics, and the bad use of arms, are less felt by soldiers who fight from behind a wall: besides, these garrisons being permanent, those who defend them are defending their families and their property, and their extreme resistance is owing to their extreme fear. They dare not reckon upon a capitulation. How can they trust an enemy, who, in their situation, could put no faith in them?

[The Naval Force in our next.]

Statement