LEARNING: But that SUCH PRETENDERS TO KNOWLEDGE, SUCH EMPTY MIMICS OF REAL WORTH, MAY

NO LONGER IMPOSE upon persons of good understanding -I shall, &c. pp. 164, 165.

But though I shew this distinction to a puny truth half overlaid, which I was forced to draw from under an unwieldy heap of blunders and prevarications: yet, let it be observed, that this is only for once, and out of due regard to the first writer against me, that has condescended to say any thing truly of me: For I hope common honesty is not so rare, even amongst Answerers by profession (of all sober knaves the most corrupt) that this tribute need be paid twice unto it.

My Considerer begins his preface thus: The motive which principally induced me to publish the following collection and observations, was the strange and unjustifiable methods which some men take to advance their own SYSTEMS by depreciating and running down those of others. p. iii. The reader sees what the man would be at. Here is no disguise or reserve, however. It is the old infidel grudge against the intolerant spirit of Christianity, delivered as crudely as ever his dear friends, the philosophers, urged it against the primitive apologists. Their great quarrel to Christianity was, that its defenders endeavoured to advance their own systems, by depreciating and running down those of others*: And this, in their, and in their advocates opinion, was a strange and unjustifiable method. And how should he think otherwise? when he has so mean an opinion of the cause of Revelation, as to tell us presently after, That most of that vast number of books that have been wrote to prove the necessity and excellency of our holy religion, are thought very mean and insufficient by the unprejudiced and inquisitive adversary, but appear in a very different light to the mob of Christians, who, by the happy prejudice of education, have been brought up to doubt of nothing. But hear him in his own more emphatic words. The vast number of books and pamphlets which have of late years been so plentifully poured out, to prove the necessity and excellency of our holy religion, certainly deserve the approbation and thanks of every zealous and truly devout * See the Divine Legat. Book II. § 6.

Christian:

Christian: And though many of these performances have
been THOUGHT BY THE ADVERSARY VERY MEAN AND
INSUFFICIENT, yet they have appeared in a quite dif-
ferent light in the eyes of the bulk of mankind; WHO,

FROM THE HAPPY CAST OF THEIR NATIVITY, HAVE,
IN THEIR EARLIEST AGE, BEEN TAUGHT TO FORM A
MUCH BETTER JUDGMENT OF THINGS; AND WHO,
SELDOM HAVING ANY DOUBTS OR SCRUPLES TO DIS-

TURB THEM, are therefore the easier confirmed in the
quiet and full persuasion of these doctrines THEY AT FIRST
RECEIVED. pp. iii. iv.

86

Had I not reason to say as I did, "That the heathen philosophers of our times might be well excused in being angry, to see their ancient brethren shewn for "knaves in practice, and fools in theory; but that any "else should think themselves concerned in the force and fidelity of the drawing, was a mystery I did not know "what to make of* ?

It is therefore matter of much consolation to me, to find that the real friends of Revelation have at length left these heathen philosophers (the men whom only it concerns) to dispute this point with me. I have now got a gentleman freethinker under my hands; and, if those other folks will be but easy, I'll promise to give a good account of him.

-Our Considerer proceeds to shew the reasons why some defenders of Christianity will not acknowledge the doc-. trine contained in his book. He graciously acquits them of all malice and design, and throws it first,

1. Upon their ignorance. The first of which is the ignorance, in this particular, of by far the greatest part of them [defenders of Christianity] who really do not know that rewards and punishments in another life are any where spoken of but in the New Testament, unless it be in some dark and figurative terms, which (AS IF THERE WERE NONE SUCH AMONGST THEMSELVES) they think they have a right to laugh at and expose. They remember, perhaps, some stories in their school-books of Elysium, of Tartarus, of Cerberus, &c. and conclude, very hastily, that this was all that was ever thought of or believed by the Heathens concerning a world to: * Div. Leg. Book III. § 4. L 4

come.

come. p. v. It was not for nothing, we find, that he despised the defenders of Christianity as scribblers, whom none but a prejudiced mob would give any credit to: For the far greatest part of them, it seems, knew no more of antiquity than a few stories in their school-books. But who can enough admire the modesty of this, in one, who confesses he has forgot his Greek, and this only in order to insinuate that he has some Latin which yet sticks by him?

2. He throws it, Secondly, Upon their prejudices, that is, their great attachment to their own religion. On this head, he talks I don't know what-of captivated lovers, pious zeal, prejudice of education, interest, preferment; in short the common dog-trot of infidelity and freethinking.

At

After this specimen of his modesty, he presents us with one of his abilities. As to what relates (says he) to the subject of the following sheets, the case in fact is this. It is indisputably true, and beyond all reasonable contradiction, that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is clearly and plainly delivered and laid down in the New Testament: And it is as indisputably true, and beyond all reasonable contradiction, that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments IS CLEARLY AND PLAINLY DELIVERED AND LAID DOWN in the books and writings of the Heathens. THE TRUTH OF WHICH POINT is now submitted to the judgment of every impartial reader. p. vii. This indisputable point, which he writes a book to prove, is, I believe, strictly so. least it was never disputed by his humble servant. the contrary, I have said, the heathen philosophers were perpetually inculcating to the people the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in their discourses and writings*. But his title-page professes to prove the truth of a very different point, not quite so indisputable. Future Rewards and Punishments BELIEVED by the Antients, particularly the Philosophers, wherein some Objections of the Reverend Mr. W. in his Divine Legation of MOSES are considered. Thus we see this able writer has mistaken his question before he be got to the end of his Preface. Dios me de contienda con quien me entienda, says the Spanish Proverb, God grant Div. Leg. Book III. § 2.

On

me

me an adversary that understands me.

But, wretch that I am, after having met with such an adversary, I am now forced to contend with one that does not understand himself.

His Preface concludes thus: I thought once to have changed the order in which the quotations of the second chapter are placed. BUT METHOD IN SUCH CASES DE

PENDING ALMOST AS MUCH UPON THE FANCY OF EVERY READER AS THE REAL PROPRIETY OF THE

THING ITSELF, I chose rather to submit them as they are, &c. p. ix. By these his frank sentiments of method, it appears he has forgot his logic too, if ever he had any, as well as his Greek, which, he tells us, he had neglected, like Lord Chief Justice Hale, by a long advocation to studies of quite another nature. p. viii. Whatever his studies were, he can scarce persuade the reader to think them like Lord Chief Justice Hale's. That learned man indeed lost his Greek, but got a great deal of good sense. Our Author too has lost his Greek. And what has he got? Marry, the knack of writing without any sense at all.

II. We come now to his first chapter, the only one that I am concerned in; and therefore the only one I shall, at present, give myself the trouble of considering. As just before he had innocently blundered out of the question; so now by entering on his attendance on the Author of The Divine Legation, he has as innocently blundered into it: And thus has set all right again.

After having frankly told the reader, that the Author of The Divine Legation had not the direct and immediate discovery of truth, and the REAL and SUBSTANTIAL improvement of mankind [i. e. the recommendation of Pagan Philosophy] in his thoughts and studies, but the advancement of a certain favourite scheme [i. e. of Revelation] he goes on to quote the apologies I make for venturing to deny a commonly received opinion. On which he thus descants: By all which, and indeed his whole manner of treating this subject, he plainly discovers such a great distrust of his arguments and conclusions to convince the judgment of his reader, that, &c. pp. 1-3. I am a very unlucky Writer. If I express myself with confidence, I am supposed to distrust other men's opinions; if with diffidence, my own. But let him

rest

rest himself content. I am under no manner of diffidence. Or, if I had any, his writing against me had easily removed it. However, in this I shall never recrimmate. I confess, he writes all the way as much without fear as wit.

I shall (says our crafty Advocate) pass over his nice distinctions, divisions, and subdivisions. p. 3. Now this, I cannot but think hard. He had before made his exceptions to Greek, and I dare say he would think it unfair to have it urged against him after he had so fairly pleaded Ignoramus to it; yet a critical use of that language is alone sufficient to determine a decisive question in this controversy, namely, of the Spinozism of the ancient philosophers: and here he debars me all benefit of logic, and won't have patience while I state the question, and divide the subject. I shall pass over (says be) his nice distinctions, divisions, and subdivisions. So that because he knows neither Greek nor method, I shall Here then I might fairly dismiss this minute philosopher, who dares me to the combat, and yet excepts against all the weapons in use. But not to disappoint the company we have brought together, I will accept his challenge, and fight him with his own wooden dagger.

use none.

I proceed (says he) directly to take notice of those reasons which, IN MY APPREHENSION, any ways affect the present question; and these, I think, may be reduced to two. 1st, "That the philosophers held it lawful, for "the public good, to say one thing, when they thought "another, and that they actually did so. 2dly, That

they held some fundamental principles of philosophy, “which were altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of "future rewards and punishments." pp. 3, 4. But surely, if he will needs write against ine, his business is not only to consider what, in his apprehension, tends to the proof of my point, but likewise what in my apprehension I had said does so. For instance, in his apprehension, this argument, That the philosophers held it lawful in general to say one thing, when they thought another, and this, that they actually did so, tends to the proof of my point. And, in my apprehension, this other argument likewise, That the philosophers acted on the above principle, with regardto a future state of rewards and punishments, the very

doctrine