an Ariftotelian Philofopher, who goes all along upon Ariftotle's Principles, viz. The four Elements: talks much of the ro (ngor, vysor, and the other Elementary Qualities, of the Tranfmutation of the Elements, of Antiperiftafis, &c. almost in the very Words of Ariftotle in his Books of Natural Aufcultation. So that inftead of being as old as Mofes, 'tis probable he may not be much older than Simplicius or Philoponus. Phil. Let this be as it will, the Weight of the Arguments, he produces, does not depend upon the Antiquity of the Author; and those I am fure are too strong to be baffled by a little Criticism and Chronology. The Sum of the first Argument is this. If the World or Universe be generated or had a beginning, 'tis generated out of Nothing or Something. But all Men agree that Nothing can be produced from Nothing. To fay it was produced out of Something is as unreasonable; for that Something must be a Part of the Universe, or the whole Universe (because there is nothing befides the Univerfe) and that would be to make a Thing produced out of it felf, which is of all the most palpable Contradiction. ment. Cred. I know this Doctrine of the World's being Anfwer to formed out of Nothing, fat fo crofs in Epicurus his Ocellus's Brains, that it fet him upon the Scent of his Atheistical ArgOpinions, to get rid of it. For as the Story tells us, when he heard a Grammarian whom he was a Scholar to, explaining those famous Verfes of Hefiod in his Theogonia, † Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτισα Χαθ γένετ', αυτὰς ἔπειτα Chaos was first form'd by th' Eternal Mind, He very pertly asked, if the Earth was made out of the Chaos, what the Chaos was made out of? At which * Ocell. §. 2. Or. Reaf. p. 219. + Sext. Empir. cont. Math. Lib. 9. Diog. Laert. vit. Epic. Question Queftion the Grammarian being confounded, made anfwer that it was not his Province to teach fuch Things, but that of the Philofophers. With this Anfwer Epicurus being unfatisfied, he left the Grammarian, and betook himself to the Study of Philofophy. But notwithftanding this, I cannot fee any Thing in this philofophical Axiom, Ex nihilo nil fit, that should any ways make against God's Creation of the World out of nothing. Indeed this has been an Axiom in the Mouths of Philofophers of all forts, the Ariftotelian and Pythagorean, Platonist, and Stoick; but then a great many of them meant no more by it, than that it has no Place in natural Productions; but that it ought not to be extended to the primary Production of Things. For Empedocles's Verfes quoted by Plutarch and Ariftotle, are the most ancient Piece in the Gracian Philofophy, where this Axiom is urged: And he only makes ufe of it to prove, that Matter is not produced in the Generation of Things, nor destroyed in their Corruption. Νήπιοι, &c. Children in Knowledge! vainly to fuppofe And we find that the Corpufcularian Philofophers, who made Atomes the first Principles of Things, were those that did chiefly make ufe of this Axiom; to confute the Doctrines of Forms and fubftantial Effences, which Ariftotle and fome others before him did explain the Pha nomena of Nature by. And indeed this Axiom was very conclufive against that Opinion; for when by that Philofophy it fhould be afferted, that a Room was enlightned by the Generation of the Form of Light, or that Fire was extinguished by the Corruption of the Form of Fire; it was very feafonably replied in the Words of this Maxim, Ex nihilo nil fit, nothing is produced dy, but from fomething which was before; a Thing is not produced by Annihilation of the old Form, and the Production of a new Subftance, which was not before, out of nothing; for the courfe of Nature allows of no fuch fupernatural Productions; all thefe Phanomena are to be accounted for by the Alteration of the Figure and Motion of the Parts, and the different Appearances they produce in the Mind of Man. And this Dr. Cudworth in his Intellectual System has proved at large, to be the meaning of this Affertion of the ancient Atomick Philofophers. But then, Sir, be pleased to confider, what this Axiom has to do to confront the Omnipotent Power of God, in the firft Creation; unless it can be proved that it implies an abfolute Impoffibility, for God to create any thing out of nothing; which no one can reasonably affert. Now no one can fay it implies an abfolute Impoffibility; for then fuch Impoffibility must arife either from Want of Power in God to do it, or from fome natural Repugnancy in the Thing it felf. It cannot proceed from Want of Power in God; for he is the Origin of all Power, and every Thing that is poffible to be done can be done by him. To fay the Impoffibility arifes from the Part of the Subject is as incongruous. For fuch Impoffibility must be caufed from a Power of refifting in that Thing, or from a Contradiction, which the doing thereof would imply. But there can be no Power of refifting in any Thing which is able to refift the Divine Activity; because that and all other Power came from Him, which argues in Him a greater Power. But as for the Subject of Creation, that is Nothing, and therefore, that to be fure cannot give any Refiftance. There remains only to prove, that it implies no Contradiction to produce Something out of Nothing. Indeed to be and not to be at the fame Time implies a Contradiction, but to be and not to be at diverfe Times does not; and the Reason is obvious. Because the Exiftence of a Thing in any one Inftant does perfectly exclude all Poffibility of Nonexiftence for that Inftant; but the not being of a Thing Intel. Syft. Cap. 1. p. 30, 8c 15 it by Inftant does not exclude any Poffibility of its bea afterward, when God Almighty pleafes. Now it is r from being a Contradiction for a Thing to be proed out of nothing by God Almighty, that we find (according to the Philofophy of fome) in fome Measure done even by finite Beings. For they account Accidents a fort of Beings, which are produced by Creatures themfelves, out of nothing, by a Kind of fubordinate and delegated Creation, which God has given them the Power of, by Virtue of their Beings. Thus the Mind produces Thought, the Fire produces Heat, the Sun produces Light, which are all diftinct from the Substances which produce them, and yet are generated out of nothing But however both Thought and Light and Heat, are real Beings, and do properly exift, and are compofed out of no Pre-exiftent Matter, and therefore must be produced out of Nothing; either by the immediate Power of God continually acting, which is most reasonable; or by a fubordinate Power communicated to the Creature with its Being. Now, why is it not as cafy for the Deity to pro duce Subftance out of nothing by his Almighty Power, as it is for a Creature to produce Accidents by his finite and limited One? Or why could not God-Almighty produce all Things out of nothing at firft, as well as produce thefe Accidents, Modes, or Appearances every Moment? All the Difficulty which makes fome Men un willing to allow this Power to God is, becaufe we do not fee any Inftance of this before our Eyes, being ufed only to natural and artificial Productions. We fee Blood produced out of Food, and Flesh out of Blood; we fee the Juices of the Earth turned into Wood, the Wood into Smoak and Flame, whilft the Matter remains the fame after thofe fo many Alterations; and therefore we conclude that no Production or Corruption can be made any other Way than this. We experience that a Carpenter cannot build a Ship or a Houfe without pre-exifting Materials, and therefore we are apt fillily to conclude that God himself can do no more; because we cannot coneive how he should do it, or because he must do it by other other Methods, than those which we are used to. But ation. Phil. Well! but what fay you to Ocellus's * fecond Argument? If the World be made or produced, it must follow the Laws of other Productions; it muft grow from worse to better, from its infirm Eftate to its an or Vigour, and fo decline to its old Age and Diffolution. But we find that the World always was as it is now; there has never been the leaft Decay in it, nor the leaft Improvement of its Perfection; it always ftands at the fame Stay; and fo always muft continue. Cred. To this Argument, Sir, be pleased to take this Anf. tộ Anfwer. 1ft, That it is a Thing fomewhat uncertain, Arg. 11: whether or no the World continues in the fame State it was in at the beginning; most learned Men for mahy Ages have been of the contrary Opinion, that it grows Old, and doth every Day verge towards its final Deftruction; and Dr. Hackwell, who wrote his Book of Providence about Threefcore Years ago; was the first Man that had the Boldnefs to encounter with the received Opinion, and he raised himself not a small Num-, ber of Adverfaries upon it. But truly I am fo far of that learned Man's Opinion, as not to think any very remarkable Decay is to be found in the World; for the heavenly Bodies do obferve the fame Motions, and when we efpie any Difference between the ancient and moderni Accounts, it ought to be attributed to Want of Exact hefs in the old Calculations; the Bodies of Men are of the fame Magnitude, as is manifeft by the ancient Meafures of Digits, Feet, &c. and their natural Parts or In * Ocellus Luc, Tex. 3. Oracl. Reaf. p. 211. geny |