The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised EditionBasic Books, 29.04.2009 - 304 Seiten A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics. |
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actually altruism Anatol Rapoport average score Axelrod based on reciprocity behavior best strategy better biological chapter choice collectively stable strategy Computer Chess Computer Tournament cooperation based decision rule developed discount parameter E. O. Wilson effective entries environment evolution of cooperation evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary example exploit Fig Wasp forgiving future game theorists genetic Gordon Tullock hypothetical tournaments important incentive individuals interaction iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma JOSS less liveandletlive system Maynard Smith meanies mutant mutual cooperation mutual defection mutually rewarding neighbors newcomers nice rules nice strategy NYDEGGER one’s other’s outcome pattern payoff matrix player cooperates player defects points political population possible previous move Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament problem programs promote cooperation proposition provocable punishment random reputation response restraint retaliation reward for mutual Robert Axelrod robust ſae second round side situation social structure submitted successful rules TAT’s territorial system theory TIT FOR TAT tournament scores trench warfare U.S. Senate