the disposal of the governor or of some central financial agency. The purpose of itemization is to secure a greater degree of legislative control and to ensure proper use of funds. While this purpose is attained, the resulting harm from a non-adjustable appropriation brings about evils which require relief by some one of the methods here described. Examination of a considerable number of states seems to indicate a tendency to cure the evil not by freeing the hands of the divisions but by setting up a general contingent fund at the disposal of the chief executive. On grounds of easy adjustment of funds a single large contingency fund is preferable. On grounds of the power which control of such funds vests in chief executives some fear has been expressed. It is an open question for which no answer has been found in the course of this study as to what extent sympathetic consideration has been given to requests for contingent allotments from the funds of the chief executive, as compared with requests for other than scientific purposes. The need for a contingent fund varies from bureau to bureau, depending in part upon the amount, and in part upon the character, of expenditures. Large institutions dealing with changing problems experience great need for contingent funds; and likewise the character of research is such that a good claim for such freedom can be sustained. In the interests of economy, however, the writer sees no objection to providing contingent funds for the scientific bureaus by means of a departmental fund to which it will have access on the same terms as do other bureaus.

In the matter of travel allowances to attend conventions beyond the borders of a state, many of our commonwealths have a rather provincial attitude. From the point of view of attainment of scientific achievement the opportunity to attend scientific conferences of various sorts is, of course, indispensable. If a conference is held within the state, the views of the division or department as to attendance prevail. If the conference is in another state, however, the consent of the governor or the finance department is commonly required. So far as could be ascertained, no serious trouble has arisen on this point; but it is undoubtedly true that many requests for travel allowance are not made because a refusal is anticipated. Moreover, this sort of a decision is not one which the chief executive of any state should be called upon to make. The sensible solution of the question would seem to be to allow the finance officer to fix the maximum amount allowed for travel, if it is not fixed in the appropriation act, and to allow the head of the division to employ the sum agreed upon as he thinks most desirable. It may be noted in passing that in the case

See the article by Governor A. E. Smith, How We Ruin Our Governors, in National Municipal Review, Vol. X, p. 277.

of universities with which the writer is familiar there is a control on travel for university purposes, and in most cases universities do not undertake to pay the expenses of their faculties for attending scientific or professional meetings, unless, of course, they specifically represent the university.

The writer has been impressed with the dangers inherent in the lack of continuity of state government. This danger increases pari passu with the integration of responsibility, and is the more serious where successive elections swing in favor of one party and then another. These tides of political success and failure sweep into the key offices of government, men who many times are inexperienced in the conduct of public affairs and who, once they get in touch with the work of the divisions over which they preside, are too commonly replaced by others equally inexperienced. The present experiment in integrated and unified control of state administration cannot be productive of its expected results unless by law or by tradition the element of continuity, which was much more characteristic of the old régime, can be retained. Scientific work above all requires persistence, steadiness, regular financial support, continuity in personnel, freedom from extraneous influences; all of which are threatened by an electoral and administrative system which may change the overhead control every two years.

On the other hand, upon broad grounds of public policy the integration of authority and the co-existence of long terms of office may necessitate the development of more adequate means of control, which in turn would open the way to the possibility of frequent changes. The solution of this paradox seems to come back to a constantly increasing care in the original selection of important public officials.

The new régime in state government raises a problem in an acute form for every department, but especially perhaps for the departments engaged in professional, technical or scientific work. This problem is to secure and retain as financial supervisor a man of high ability, firmness combined with tact, and a vision of the wide range of state functions which will enable him to approach each department with understanding and a desire to cooperate with their plans so far as the general financial policy of the state may permit. In the long run this may prove to be the turning point of the whole plan. If the appointees are primarily politicians, concerned with jobs and elections, or primarily business men, intent upon a narrowly conceived program of tax reduction, or primarily bureaucrats desiring to wield power, it is certain that the advantages which may arise from central financial supervision will be largely nullified. It is not easy to see from what source the financial supervisors of the next decade are to be drawn.

They might properly comprise a compact professional group like the city managers, and like them develop an esprit de corps which would safeguard the system. They are more likely in the near future to be what they have been in the recent past, men of long experience in the auditing, accounting, or other services of the state, who are drafted for the new work because of their wide familiarity with the state administration. They have not commonly been men of broad training, although among their number have been men of high capacity. Their task is one of enormous difficulty, almost certain to stir up disagreements and ill-feeling at best; but the opportunity to render service to the state is equally great. From the point of view of the scientific agencies, the danger is that even modest research programs may be squeezed out by an administrative official who is intent upon saving by elimination, rather than by ensuring value received for money spent. If the budget officials can be secured with an open mind on research programs and a fair understanding of the special conditions which research requires, this problem will disappear.

It has been said that if a central board undertakes to censor the printing of scientific manuscripts, it ought to assume responsibility for selecting the research projects out of which the manuscripts arise. This responsibility obviously will not be assumed by supervising officials interested in finance; but the remark suggests that those who are interested in safeguarding the status of science in government might properly undertake to devise a scientific supervision of the choice of projects for consideration. An advisory board drawn from the field covered by a government laboratory, composed of men technically qualified and appointed for long terms of years, might be able not only to suggest lines of inquiry but might prove to be a powerful buffer between the laboratory and administrative officials inclined to push their powers to the limit. The writer believes that too little use has been made of the power which resides in organized bodies of scientists, not only to protect but to encourage the conduct of research in government. State universities understand the value of the support of an organized alumni body; and there is equal expectation that the support of organized scientists would mean as much to state scientific agencies. There is a profound respect for scientific achievement in the mind of the intelligent men who for the most part make up our legislative bodies; and this respect should be capitalized to ensure a proper degree of freedom for the state institution engaged in scientific activity. The Illinois Board of Natural Resources and Conservation illustrates to a certain degree the type of organization the writer has in mind, although it does not serve as a means for building up the interest and activity of organized scientific groups.

For this wider purpose a comprehensive state scientific council composed of affiliated scientific and engineering societies may be suggested. The functions of the council might properly consist in supporting the scientific interests of the state government as other organizations stand back of the special activities in which they are interested. Such support would be useful at the time when budgets were under consideration, as the council could send representatives to explain and defend the requests made for scientific investigation. It would be useful in linking up government research with the great body of organized scientists from among whom research workers are obtained. Such a council could make a very effective opposition to forms of central financial control which it felt to be harmful. It could guarantee the continued preservation of scientific freedom from political interference. Fundamentally it could educate people and public officials to a more complete understanding of the conditions under which research is most effectively prosecuted.

The writer found no evidence of hostility toward research expenditures either on the part of administrative officials or legislative members. In some cases research has rather definite promise of economic results the fruits of which are gathered by powerful classes in the community. Thus the various phases of agricultural investigation mean greater returns to the farming interests, which dominate the legislatures of the mid-western states. In other cases there is no immediate economic promise, but the hope of ultimate financial returns, as in the search for mineral resources carried on by geological surveys.

No exact methods of measuring the relative success or failure of systems of financial control in relation to the conduct of scientific investigation present themselves. Some evidence can be secured by study of the financial history of institutions and agencies, and by comparison of one period with another; certain conclusions can be reached by conference with the men most directly concerned, but there is no method of inquiry which will segregate a method of financial supervision and measure its influence alone. Personalities, inherited traditions, physical circumstances, the views of legislators, social inertia, all combine to produce a result in which the system of financial control is only one of the variables. The present methods of control in turn have been in operation for a relatively short period, and it is perhaps early to attempt to state any conclusions. We can watch an evolution, and gather evidence which will help to formulate ultimately the conditions under which scientific enterprise and the necessities of adequate control of public expenditures can be harmonized.

CHAPTER IX

THE LIMITS OF CENTRAL FINANCIAL CONTROL IN RELATION TO THE PROSECUTION OF RESEARCH

IN STATE GOVERNMENT

The preceding pages give several illustrations of the type of central financial control which is now being developed in state administration. The general pattern of this plan is much alike in each of the systems examined, although many differences in degree and in detail exist. Before proceeding to a statement of the desirable limits to this scheme. of control so far as the conduct of scientific investigation is concerned it will be useful to present the outlines of this pattern in order that the problem may be the more clearly defined.

The key to the systems of administration described in these pages is to be found in the theory that honest, efficient, and responsible government will best be secured by concentrating substantial authority in the hands of the governor and by establishing administrative machinery subject to his supervision which can make this authority effective. In pursuance of this theory many state governments have formulated methods of preparing estimates of expenditure for the consideration of the legislature which vest in the hands of an administrative officer power to revise the original estimates of the departments concerned. The appropriation itself is considered not as an order to spend the sums appropriated, but as an approval of certain functions of state government and authorization to spend money in their execution up to the amount specified, so far as circumstances make necessary such expenditures. In some states, notably in Illinois and Ohio, the question of necessity is no longer determined solely by the department but ultimately by the governor, acting through a finance official. The mechanism by which this decision is made involves the approval by the finance department of proposed quarterly plans of expenditure, and of the individual vouchers, claims, and payrolls which are presented day by day in the course of the conduct of business.

In order further to ensure efficiency most states now authorize a central purchasing agency to make all purchases for the various departments, and likewise authorize a central printing board or agency to contract for, and sometimes determine, the amount and character of public printing. In order to make the financial history of the state more intelligible and to make central financial control more effective, more elaborate accounting systems have usually been installed.