ceived a commission to raise and equip one; but they did not exist in general longer than the power of the leaders for whom they were raised, and were always disbanded at the conclusion of peace. It was not until the reign of Louis XIII. that any great number of these corps were retained on the permanent strength of the national forces. The regiments that were created before the period of the civil and religious wars, remained intact, and were generally distinguished as the "old corps"-a designation which they retained until the end of the eighteenth century. The "middle corps" and the "little corps" were next in seniority to them. The introduction of the improved fire-arm, or mousket, into the French ranks, dates from the creation of the regimental system. Defensive armour, with the exception of the iron morion or head-piece, was entirely discarded, and in its stead was substituted a buff coat, without sleeves. The deep formation was also diminished by degrees, the abandonment of armour, and the pike, favouring this tactical modification. The disposition of a regiment in order of battle, being on a line of small squares, each company forming a square, the depth of the line could not be greater than 10 or 12 men, for that corresponded to the effective of the company, which was either of 100 or 144 men. As the intervals in the lines came to be more and more contracted, this depth was considered to be the normal one; and, towards the close of the reign of Henry IV. it was the ordained depth of the French infantry.

A FRENCH BATTALION ON 10 RANKS. (1610.)*

10 files.

100 musketeers.

30 files. 300 pikemen.

10 files. 100 musketeers.

Towards the close of the sixteenth century appeared Maurice of Nassau, who was one of the greatest soldiers of his age. As a disciplinarian and tactician he was perhaps unrivalled even by the great Gustavus himself; but he did so little to alter the general condition of infantry, that he can claim no more than a passing notice here. His principal improvements, with regard to that arm, consisted in a better and stricter discipline, in subjecting it to daily drills, and regulating more accurately, the size and number of the subdivisions and their position in line. But he still retained the formation in ten ranks, and did nothing towards increasing the flexibility of the battalion. He restored camps of exercise, which had fallen into disuse since the time of Louis XI., and his own became a school for all the soldiers of Protestant Europe, just as that of his opponent Spinola was one for the Catholics.

*The proportion of musketeers in this battalion, is two-fifths ; under Louis XIII. it was increased to two-thirds.

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CHAPTER XI.

SWEDISH INFANTRY.

Thirty years' War, 1618 to 1648.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS was one of those extraordinary men who, unfortunately for the world, appear too rarely in its history. Well versed in the language and literature of the ancients, he had formed an intimate acquaintance with their military institutions, which his genius soon turned to a profitable account. Adopting these institutions as a model, his principal aim was directed towards endeavouring to render himself independent of the mere caprice of fortune, an influence that so often decides the fate of battles and empires. Endowed with a rare and inventive faculty, he created a system of tactics immeasurably superior to the one then in use, and which has never been surpassed by any since. Called into Germany as the champion of the Protestant cause, at the head of a small but gallant army he endeavoured, by the inspirations of genius and the combinations of science, to counteract the disadvantages of numerical weakness. His quick eye detected at once the kind of enemies with whom he had to deal, and seeing the predilection which all

the Imperial generals had for the huge and unwieldy masses of mailed pikemen, hemmed in and girt so effectually by musketeers, as to render their weapons almost useless, he devised a more pliant and manageable formation for his infantry, which, by the rapidity and precision of its evolutions, entirely bewildered the slow and awkward Germans. The Swedish monarch was the first general who acknowledged and respected the fatal and increasing powerof artillery and small arms on crowded ranks, and in order to lessen their effects he reduced his ranks from ten to six. This was not the only gain accruing from the innovation. The mobility and flexibility of the battalion, as a matter of course, were advantages; the extended deployment, and in consequence, the increased effect of musketry fire, were others. In battle, the extension of the lines gave an exaggerated idea of numbers to the enemy, which Gustavus sometimes increased by a further elongation, thus reducing the line in fact to three ranks. In the matter of details, Gustavus did more than any of his predecessors, not excepting Maurice of Nassau; minute and practical, they all bear the impress of his thoughtful genius. He increased the proportion of fire-arms to three-fifths, each company containing 72 musketeers to 54 pikemen. A musket considerably improved and lightened, so as to dispense entirely with the fourchette, and to be carried on the shoulder without the alleviation of a pad, was given to the infantry.

The clumsy method of suspending the ammunition from a series of strings slung round the body, was discarded, and cartridges and the pouch substituted in place. He disembarrassed the men of all their defensive armour, except the salade or helmet. The pike, some eighteen or twenty feet in length, was shortened to a standard of eleven feet, more in unison with the reduced depth of the ranks. He was the first to clothe his regiments in a regular uniform, the merit of which has been erroneously ascribed to Louis XIV. by his admirers. Each brigade was commonly known by its distinctive colour, and the "Blue and Yellow Brigades "* are particularly mentioned by Hoyer as having distinguished themselves at Lützen. The foresight of Gustavus was eminently conspicuous, before embarking for Germany, in providing his men with sheep-skin suits, so that when the Imperial general, Torquato Conti, begged for a cessation of hostilities, on account of the inclement severity of the season, he was answered, that "the Austrians might do as they pleased, but the Swedes were soldiers in winter as well as in summer." Schiller and other writers represent the king as having been the first to restore the ancient practice of mixing up infantry with cavalry, and some go so far as to commend it as a highly excellent arrangement. The French writers and tacticians are, however, very jealous on this subject, and impute the same formation on many occasions to Coligny, * The Blue was composed of British.

Quaritch's Military Library, I.—Infantry.

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